PIVARNIK, Justice.
This cause comes to us on a petition to transfer by Petitioner-Appellee-Defendant Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company following Petitioner's adverse ruling in the First District Court of Appeals. This cause originated in the Industrial Board as a claim filed by Appellant-Plaintiff Shirley Donahue based on injuries she received from an accident on October 17, 1978. The accident took place at a location on Dickey Road, a four-lane public thoroughfare in East Chicago, Indiana, after she had finished her work, had "punched out" on a time clock at Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company and was walking to her automobile parked on said road. The Industrial Board concluded that Donahue's injuries did not result from an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Youngstown. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision and remanded the cause to the Board for further action. Donahue v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., (1983) Ind. App., 456 N.E.2d 751, reh. denied (1984) (Ratliff, J., dissenting).
The sole issue now presented is whether Donahue's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment. Judge Ratliff pointed out in his dissenting opinion that worker's compensation benefits are awarded to employees only for injuries which arise out of and in the course of employment and a claimant must show a causal connection between his or her employment and injury for the injury to have been received in the course of the employment. We agree. See Ind. Code § 22-3-2-2 (Burns Supp. 1984); Bowling v. Fountain County Highway Department, (1981) Ind. App., 428 N.E.2d 80, reh. denied (1982); Slinkard v. Extruded Alloys, (1971) 150 Ind.App. 479, 277 N.E.2d 176. Whether or not an injury arises in the course of employment ordinarily is a question of fact to be determined by the Industrial Board. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., v. Wilson, (1970) 147 Ind.App. 556, 262 N.E.2d 660, see Calhoun v. Hillenbrand Industries, Inc., (1978) 269 Ind. 507, 381 N.E.2d 1242. In reviewing a negative award by the Industrial Board, we do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our decision for that of the Board, rather, we will overturn the Board's decision only when there is substantial undisputed evidence compelling a result contrary to that reached by the Board. Bowling, supra; Birge v. Bryant Air Conditioning, (1979) 182 Ind.App. 1, 393 N.E.2d 790, reh. denied; Martinez v. Taylor Forge & Pipe Works, (1977) 174 Ind.App. 514, 368 N.E.2d 1176, trans. denied; Wolf v. Plibrico Sales & Service Co., (1973) 158 Ind.App. 111, 301 N.E.2d 756, reh. denied, 158 Ind.App. 127, 304 N.E.2d 355, trans. denied. Since the record in the instant case supports the Board's conclusion that Donahue's injury was not received in the course of her employment, we must defer to that finding and affirm its decision. We accordingly vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the Industrial Board.
In reaching its decision, the Board found that Donahue had completed her duties and clocked out, had left Youngstown's premises, was crossing a public street, was not directed by Youngstown to park her vehicle on Dickey Road and was struck by a non-employee on the public highway. The record supports these findings of fact. Specifically, the record shows that Donahue was employed with Youngstown as a "counterman" at the Youngstown pipe mill canteen with duties limited to general cafeteria work at that location. There are two general areas at the Youngstown Complex — the pipe mill and the tin mill — and each area has a separate location for hourly employees to clock out. Although the
Plaintiff's reliance upon several Indiana cases does not support her position. In O'Dell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., (1977) 173 Ind.App. 106, 362 N.E.2d 862, trans. denied, an employee was killed when struck by a fellow employee on a company owned and controlled road. The company altered the direction of traffic on the road during peak traffic periods and, apparently, confusion about which employee had the right-of-way caused a head-on collision resulting in one employee's death. The appellate court in O'Dell simply held that since claiming dependant properly secured benefits from the employer under Indiana's Workmen's Compensation Act, no common law action for personal injury would be allowed. In Ward v. Tillman, (1979) 179 Ind.App. 626, 386 N.E.2d 1003, an employee was injured in a collision with a fellow employee in their employer's parking lot. The Appellate Court affirmed the benefits award by holding that employer controlled parking lots and private drives used by employees were extensions of the employer's operating premises. In L.W. Edison, Inc., v. Teagarden, (1981) Ind. App., 423 N.E.2d 709, Teagarden was an employee of a general contractor on a state highway project in which a number of sub-contractors were under the supervision of the employer including Hipskind Asphalt Corporation. On the day of the accident, Teagarden's van collided with a Hipskind asphalt paver as Teagarden
Reed, 129 Ind. App. at 90, 152 N.E.2d at 263. See also United States Steel Corporation v. Brown, (1967) 142 Ind.App. 18, 231 N.E.2d 839, trans. denied (1968) [award to employee injured on street owned and controlled by employer shortly after finishing work day] and Goldstone v. Kozma, (1971) 149 Ind.App. 626, 274 N.E.2d 304, trans. denied [award to employee injured during lunch period while in parking lot provided by employer]. All of these cases are distinguished from the instant case in that Donahue was injured while on a public thoroughfare and the hazards and dangers of her accident were common to all persons using that public way since Youngstown had no control over the use of the public right-of-way by either Donahue or the public at large.
There are other cases which are consistent with the Board's finding here. In Markley v. Richmond Glove Corporation, (1959) 129 Ind.App. 325, 156 N.E.2d 407, an employee had fallen on an icy public sidewalk which abutted the employer's premises while en route to work. The Appellate Court held:
Markley, 129 Ind. App. at 336, 156 N.E.2d at 413. In Stanley v. Riggs Equipment Co., (1961) 133 Ind.App. 86, 178 N.E.2d 766, reh. denied (1962), the Appellate Court affirmed the Industrial Board's decision to deny compensation where a heavy equipment operator sustained fatal injuries in an automobile accident on a public highway in front of the employer's premises while operating his own vehicle. In Keller v. H.P. Wasson & Co., (1958) 129 Ind.App. 59, 153 N.E.2d 386, the Appellate Court sustained
The record supports the Industrial Board's conclusion that Donahue's injury was not received in the course of her employment and, as a reviewing court, we therefore defer to the findings of the Board. The Court of Appeals opinion is ordered vacated and the decision of the Industrial Board is affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with separate opinion.
DeBRULER, Justice, dissenting.
Several separate forays into this case have left me with the view that the majority of the First District was correct when it concluded that this employee's injuries must be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of her employment. In O'Dell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (1977), 173 Ind.App. 106, 362 N.E.2d 862, an employee was killed in a collision in a company parking lot after punching out. That death was deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. In United States Steel Corporation v. Brown 91968), 142 Ind.App. 18, 231 N.E.2d 839, an employee had clocked out and had reached the intersection of a company road with a public road when she stepped into the company road to accept a ride from a fellow employee and was struck by an entering car. That injury also qualified the injured employee for workmen's compensation.
In the case on appeal, the time element is qualifying. The injury occurred moments after the employee clocked out and was in the process of leaving work. Unlike the majority in its opinion, I also find that the place element is also qualifying. Here the employer had parts of its plant on both sides of the street. The street itself was public enough, but there were entrances and exists to the plant on both sides of the street. There was a traffic control device there which restrained traffic on both the public street and the company entrances and exits. The intersection and the devices channeled employee traffic to that location and provided a safe zone for it. Partial control of the devices was exercised by employer. The employee here was injured while walking in this zone to reach her car which she had parked at the curb on the public street, adjacent to the zone. The fact that the injury was at the hands of a non-employee is not disqualifying. Prater v. Indiana Briquetting Corporation (1969), 253 Ind. 83, 251 N.E.2d 810. And I furthermore can detect no disqualifying force to the facts that she parked on the public street rather than a company parking lot and that she punched out at one point in the plant rather than another. I would reverse the Board.
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