McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
Gary E. Simon, a former officer in the St. Louis County Police Department, appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court
This case is before us on appeal for the second time. In 1977 appellant, who is a paraplegic as the result of a gunshot wound sustained in 1971 in the line of duty, initiated this action against the St. Louis County Police Department for reinstatement as a commissioned officer. The district court found that appellant was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" protected by § 504 because he could not satisfy two police department requirements for commissioned officers — that they be able to effect a forceful arrest and that they be able to transfer among all positions within the department. Simon v. St. Louis County, 497 F.Supp. 141 (E.D.Mo.1980) (Simon I).
On appeal this court reversed the district court's § 504 holding and remanded the case for further consideration, with the following directions:
Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316, 321 (8th Cir.1981) (Simon II), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976, 102 S.Ct. 1485, 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982).
The police department produced evidence of the average number of transfers for officers according to their seniority, as well as expert testimony that the forceful arrest and transfer requirements were nationwide standards, reasonable and necessary to guarantee efficient police work.
The district court found that the forceful arrest requirement was uniformly applied to active commissioned officers and that the Rank and Assignment position qualifications and the two instances of retaining physically impaired officers did not negate this finding.
Finally, the district court found that the two challenged physical requirements were nationwide standards for active commissioned police officers and were reasonable, legitimate and necessary to guarantee effective police work and that the department's refusal to modify these requirements to accommodate appellant was not unreasonable. Thus, even though the district court found that it was unlikely that officers in certain positions would have to effect a forceful arrest and that appellant could physically perform the tasks specific to four such positions, it nevertheless concluded that given the forceful arrest and transfer requirements for all positions, appellant was not "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and dismissed the action. Id. at 80-81.
Appellant's first argument on appeal is that the district court erred in finding that appellant was not a handicapped person otherwise qualified to serve as a commissioned officer with the St. Louis County Police Department. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-07, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366-67, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), the Supreme Court interpreted § 504 as protecting persons who are qualified in spite of, rather than except for, their handicap. A handicapped person may be required to meet legitimate physical qualifications essential to the job. Id. In Simon II this court held that Southeastern Community College must be read to focus attention on whether job requirements set forth by an employer are in fact necessary and legitimate to the job. 656 F.2d at 320-21. We reaffirm our commitment to this principle. An employer subject to § 504 who denies an individual employment because of a handicap must show that the criteria used are job related and that the applicant could not efficiently perform the essentials of the job. See, e.g., Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 475 (11th Cir.1983) (employer bears the burden of persuasion to show legitimacy and necessity of requirements); Strathie v. Dept.
Nevertheless, after carefully reviewing the record here we cannot say that the district court's findings that the forceful arrest and transfer requirements were in fact necessary to the job and uniformly applied were clearly erroneous. The district court dutifully followed the dictates of this court's mandate and based its findings on adequate evidentiary support. It is not our function to reevaluate the evidence and to substitute our judgment for the district court's.
Appellant also argues that the district court erred in allowing three police department expert witnesses to testify on the reasonableness, necessity and legitimacy of the two challenged department policies. Appellant argues that these were legal conclusions which had to be addressed solely by the court. We find this contention to be without merit. See Fed.R.Evid. 704.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.