During the course of litigation, appellant David Kyle (appellant) became dissatisfied with the representation he received from the law firm of Bond, Schoeneck & King (Bond) and discharged the firm by letter dated August 23, 1981. A dispute then arose over the counsel fees, if any, due Bond from appellant. Pursuant to an order to show cause dated December 10, 1981, and supporting papers, appellant, inter alia, moved to substitute the Clements Firm, P. C., as his attorneys of record. This matter came on for a hearing while David Kyle was in Florida. However, after Mr. Clements of the Clements Firm, P. C., contacted appellant by phone, it was agreed in open court between attorney FitzPatrick of Bond and Mr. Clements that the hearing would be waived on the issue of whether any counsel fees were due the Bond firm, and, if so, the amount of the fees, how they would be paid and security arrangements. It was agreed that these issues would be decided by the court based on the affidavits already submitted, on an itemized fee statement to be furnished by Bond, and on some additional comments made on appellant's behalf. The itemized fee statement was furnished soon thereafter. On January 10, 1982, Special Term rendered a decision which served as a basis for an order dated January 20, 1982 which, inter alia, substituted the Clements Firm, P. C., as counsel for appellant; awarded $25,000 (in addition to $5,000 already paid) to Bond as its fee; and imposed a lien on the proceeds of the underlying litigation and on any stock appellant may now or hereafter own in St. Lawrence Radio, Inc. Thereafter, on February 2, 1982, appellant made a motion for reargument, or in the alternative, to resettle the January 20, 1982 order. On February 23, 1982, Special Term, in an oral decision, denied appellant's motion because of the stipulation in which it was agreed that the decision of the court as to attorney's fees was to be based on evidence then before the court plus the itemized fee statement duly furnished by Bond. These appeals ensued. There should be an affirmance. Special Term, in making the award of attorney's fees to Bond, must have, at least by implication, first determined that Bond was not discharged for cause or misconduct. If the discharge is for cause or misconduct, the attorney has no right to a fee nor to a retaining lien (Marschke v Cross, 82 A.D.2d 944). The record submitted in the instant case supports the conclusion, implicit in Special Term's decision, that Bond was discharged without cause and is thus entitled to an award of counsel fees fixed on a quantum meruit basis (Marschke v Cross, supra; Paulsen v Halpin, 74 A.D.2d 990, 991). Appellant's contention that the award of $25,000 as counsel fees to Bond is excessive is not persuasive. Since Special Term's decision does not reveal on what basis the
Orders affirmed, with costs.