CRAIN, Judge.
This case involves a jury conviction of defendant of manslaughter, subsequently overturned by the trial judge when he granted a new trial based on insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The effect of granting the new trial on this basis amounts to an acquittal because of the double jeopardy holding of Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981).
The case points out the difficulties in which we have become mired because of Louisiana's interpretations and application of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1977). Jackson held that for purposes of federal habeas corpus review, sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law reviewable by the appellate courts. Louisiana's Constitution, Article V, Sec. 10(B) prohibits appellate court review of facts. Formerly only no evidence was reviewable as a question of law. State v. Youngblood, 321 So.2d 333 (La.1975). In State v. Mathews, 375 So.2d 1165 (La.1979) the Louisiana Supreme Court used Jackson as a springboard to create appellate fact review of sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases in spite of the Louisiana constitutional provision to the contrary. See, concurring opinion of Judges Covington, Lanier and Alford in State v. Ruple, 426 So.2d 249 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).
When rules of law established by the people through the constitution and legislative process are judicially changed, the cleaning up process is sometimes quite lengthy. Thus, the effect of our present judicially created review of fact on C.Cr.P. Art. 858 has not been resolved. That article provides that,
The transfer of criminal jurisdiction from the supreme court to the courts of appeal makes C.Cr.P. Art. 858 applicable to the courts of appeal. La. Const. Art. 5, Sec. 10(A).
The trial court has granted a new trial based on insufficient evidence. The jurisprudence holds that C.Cr.P. Art. 851(1), which gives the trial court the right to grant a new trial when the "... the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence..." also gives the trial court the right to review the legal sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Plummer, 281 So.2d 716 (La.1973). Formerly, the result of this holding would be a new trial. Since Hudson, supra, the result is a verdict of acquittal if the trial court does not think the state has produced sufficient evidence to prove guilt. Because of this result the legislature in 1982 enacted C.Cr.P. Art. 821. That article provides that where the trial court finds the evidence legally insufficient to support the guilty verdict applying the Jackson standard, the appropriate remedy is a judgment of acquittal. This judgment is reviewable by the appellate courts on application of the state, and the appellate courts are likewise to use the Jackson standard.
There is a distinction between legally insufficient evidence and the weight of the evidence, both in substance and in the manner of review. This distinction was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211,
It is our view, and we so hold, that only the weight of the evidence can be reviewed by the trial judge in a motion for new trial under C.Cr.P. Art. 851. The trial judge can grant a new trial only if dissatisfied with the weight of the evidence, and in so determining the trial judge makes a factual review as a thirteenth juror rather than under the Jackson standard. If he grants a new trial because of the weight of the evidence, that new trial can proceed without being barred by double jeopardy. Tibbs v. Florida, supra. Such a determination by the trial judge is not subject to review by the appellate courts because of Louisiana Constitution Article 5, Sec. 10(B) and C.Cr.P. Art. 858.
On the other hand, if the trial judge finds the evidence legally insufficient, he must do so under C.Cr.P. Art. 821 which decision is subject to appellate review on application of the state. The trial judge cannot act as a thirteenth juror in reviewing a jury verdict under C.Cr.P. Art. 821, but must review under the much more restrictive Jackson standard.
Post Jackson, supra, insufficient evidence to support the verdict was determined by the trial court under C.Cr.P. Art. 851(1). This now being prohibited the proper article to review weight of the evidence should be C.Cr.P. Art. 851(5).
In this case the trial judge has held the evidence legally insufficient, but has granted a new trial. This he cannot do. He must either grant a verdict of acquittal under C.Cr.P. Art. 821 so we can review his decision, or he must find that he is dissatisfied with the weight of the evidence and grant a new trial under C.Cr.P. Art. 851(5). Otherwise, he must let the jury verdict stand.
FootNotes
Thus, Jackson does not permit trial or appellate courts to act as thirteenth jurors in reviewing jury findings for sufficiency of the evidence.
The legislature has spoken. In cases where the appellate court can review facts at all, which are cases under C.Cr.P. Art. 821, the Jackson standard must be applied. Accordingly, the appellate court must defer to the findings of the jury and cannot sit as a "thirteenth juror."
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