CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK v. BOROUGH OF MILLTOWN

OPINION OF THE COURT

GARTH, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal we are presented with two questions. The first is whether the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") acted within its authority in withholding federal grant funds from the Middlesex County Utilities Authority ("MCUA") on the ground that the Borough of Milltown, whose sewage is treated by the MCUA's plant at Sayreville, New Jersey, has not adopted a system of user charges as required by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. ("the Clean Water Act"), and its implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.900 et seq. The second issue is whether — assuming that the EPA's decision to withhold funds does fall within its authority — the Clean Water Act unconstitutionally impairs a contract which Milltown has with the neighboring City of New Brunswick, a participating member of the MCUA, under which New Brunswick is responsible for disposing of Milltown's sewage free of charge to Milltown. Because we agree with the district court's determination that the EPA is authorized to withhold funds from the MCUA in the circumstances of the present case, and that the provisions of the Clean Water Act authorizing such withholding are not inconsistent with the constitutional provisions regarding impairment of contracts, we will affirm the district court's judgment.

I.

The present dispute stems from a decision by the MCUA to apply to the EPA for federal funds to assist it in the expansion and improvement of a sewage treatment facility that the MCUA operates. This plant, located in Sayreville, New Jersey, receives sewage from approximately twenty-five municipalities in three New Jersey counties, as well as from a number of industrial concerns. Currently, the MCUA is engaged in a construction project to install new lines and make other improvements which will allow the Sayreville plant to operate with less of an adverse impact on water quality.

To help defray the cost of these improvements, the MCUA applied to the EPA for federal grant funds pursuant to the Clean Water Act.1 Title II of that Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1297, establishes a federal grant program under which the federal government will bear up to 75 percent of the construction cost of publicly-owned waste treatment plants, so long as certain conditions are met by the grantee. See generally Bosco v. Beck, 475 F.Supp. 1029, 1031 (D.N.J.1979), aff'd without opinion, 614 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822, 101 S.Ct. 81, 66 L.Ed.2d 24 (1980). On August 30, 1976, the EPA approved the MCUA's application, on the condition, among others, that the MCUA comply with the "user charge" provisions of the Clean Water Act.

Under the user charge provisions of the Act, the EPA administrator is not to approve a grant

33 U.S.C. § 1284(b)(1) (Supp.1982) (hereinafter referred to as "section 204(b)(1)"). The EPA regulations specify what requirements a user charge system must meet in order to satisfy section 204(b)(1). In general, the user charge system proposed by a grantee such as the MCUA must, in order to meet approval, ensure that "each user ... pays its proportionate share of operation and maintenance (including replacement) costs of treatment works within the grantee's service area, based on the user's proportionate contribution to the total waste water loading from all users...." 40 C.F.R. § 35.929-1(a).2 Moreover, in the case of a "regional treatment system accepting wastewaters from other municipalities," such as the MCUA, "the subscribers receiving waste treatment services from the grantee shall adopt user charge systems in accordance with section 204(b)(1)(A) of the Act [quoted above] and §§ 35.929 through 35.929-3" of the regulations. Id. § 35.929-2(e).

After making some payments to the MCUA pursuant to the grant agreement of August 30, 1976, the EPA determined that the MCUA was not complying fully with section 204(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act, or with the implementing regulations, as required by the terms of the grant agreement. The basis for this determination was the fact that the Borough of Milltown, whose sewage is treated by the MCUA at the Sayreville plant, has not adopted a user charge system.3 The explanation for Milltown's failure to adopt such a system is a contract that Milltown signed in 1914 with the City of New Brunswick, which, unlike Milltown, is a participating member of the MCUA and so pays the MCUA for sewage treatment. As the district court noted, it is undisputed that

City of New Brunswick v. Borough of Milltown, 519 F.Supp. 878, 881 (D.N.J.1981).

As a consequence of its determination that the MCUA was not in full compliance with the user charge requirement because Milltown, "a recipient of waste treatment services within the [MCUA's] jurisdiction," had not adopted a user charge system, the EPA began to withhold funds for the Sayreville project.4 It is that determination which is attacked by Milltown and the MCUA in the present case.

The legal challenge to the EPA's decision to withhold funds for the Sayreville project was brought into federal district court by a rather involved sequence of procedures and actions:

New Brunswick further alleged:

City of New Brunswick v. Borough of Milltown, 519 F.Supp. at 880-81 (footnote omitted).

All parties then moved for partial summary judgment on the federal issues presented by the litigation. In an order of September 9, 1981, the district court essentially ruled in favor of the EPA on the federal questions. In its accompanying opinion of August 11, 1981, the district court first held that under section 204(b)(1) Milltown is a "recipient" of waste treatment services from the MCUA. According "great deference" to the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act, the district court held that "[t]he fact that Milltown itself does not directly place its own waste into the MCUA system or require that waste water be treated by the MCUA is not material"; Milltown's sewage is in fact treated by the MCUA, and so Milltown is a "recipient" of the MCUA's services. 519 F.Supp. at 882.

Such an interpretation of the statute, the district court reasoned, would fulfill what it found to be the twofold purpose of the user charge requirement of the Clean Water Act. By requiring that every recipient of waste treatment services pay its proportionate share of the treatment costs, section 204(b)(1) ensures that every facility built with federal financial assistance will be economically self-sufficient in its operations; moreover, the imposition of user charges provides an incentive to discourage excessive use of the sewage treatment system. In the present case, the district court held, the EPA's determination that adoption of a user charge system by Milltown should be a prerequisite to continued funding of the Sayreville improvements is consistent with those purposes:

519 F.Supp. at 883.

Having held that the EPA's withholding of funds falls within the scope of the statute and the regulations, the district court turned to the question whether "the [Clean Water] Act so interpreted unlawfully impairs Milltown's contract with New Brunswick or is otherwise invalid or contrary to public policy." 519 F.Supp. at 883.5 Reasoning that "the [federal] government does have the right to impair existing contractual obligations if the contemplated action is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate public purpose," the district court held that Congress has a legitimate interest in protecting the quality of the environment, and that the means chosen to further that end — the conditioning of federal grant money on compliance with terms designed to promote the improvement of the environment — were reasonably related to that end. This was so, the district court held, especially considering that the Clean Water Act is not an "automatic abrogation of all contracts involving charges for sewage treatment." Id. at 884. See also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1522, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977). As far as the "public policy" objections to the EPA's withholding of funds are concerned, the district court rejected the argument that MCUA is being "punished" for something beyond its control:6 "MCUA is under no obligation to apply for grant funds from EPA." Id.7

Finally, having granted judgment in favor of the EPA and New Brunswick on the federal claims, the district court held that the remaining issues should be resolved by the state courts. Thus, rather than order Milltown either to adopt a user charge system or to cease sending its sewage to the MCUA's plant (as the EPA and New Brunswick had requested the court to do), the district court remanded the case to the state courts for determination of whether, in light of the "dramatic change in circumstances" occasioned by the passage of the Clean Water Act, the Milltown-New Brunswick contract still has binding force. Id. at 886.8 Both the MCUA and Milltown then filed timely notices of appeal.

II.

In considering the arguments of Milltown and the MCUA that the EPA's decision to withhold funds is unauthorized by the Clean Water Act, we are guided by the Supreme Court's repeated admonitions that "when faced with a problem of statutory construction," the courts should show "great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed. 616 (1965); see EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83-84, 101 S.Ct. 295, 66 L.Ed.2d 268 (1981). Thus, so long as the interpretation of the Clean Water Act propounded by the EPA "is reasonable and is consistent with the language and purpose of the legislation," Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 631 F.2d 865, 884 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 589, 66 L.Ed.2d 483 (1980), we will defer to that interpretation. See American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1041 (3d Cir. 1975), modified on other grounds, 560 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914, 98 S.Ct. 1467, 55 L.Ed.2d 505 (1978). In the present case, we agree with the district court that Milltown and the MCUA have failed to produce the "weighty reasons," Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336, 50 S.Ct. 115, 117, 74 L.Ed. 457 (1930), that would be needed to persuade us to set aside the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act.

A.

Appellants' first contention is that the language of the Clean Water Act and the implementing regulations do not support the EPA's position that funds can be withheld from the MCUA based on Milltown's failure to adopt a user charge system. In support of this contention, appellants offer three arguments. First, Milltown argues that it cannot be deemed to be a "recipient" of the MCUA's waste treatment services within the meaning of section 204(b)(1). "Once the sewage crosses into New Brunswick," Milltown argues, "the sewage belongs to New Brunswick," not Milltown; thus it is New Brunswick, not Milltown, that "receives" services from the MCUA. See Brief of Milltown at 11-12. We think, however, that the district court was entirely correct in rejecting this argument: sewage generated in Milltown is in fact treated at the MCUA's Sayreville plant, and therefore the EPA's position is in no way inconsistent with the language of the statute in considering Milltown a "recipient," albeit an indirect one, of the MCUA's treatment services.

Second, both the MCUA and Milltown argue that even if Milltown can in this general sense be deemed a "recipient" of the MCUA's waste treatment services, section 204(b)(1) contains a plain and explicit limitation on the scope of the term "recipient": only those recipients who are "within the applicant's [MCUA's] jurisdiction" can be required to adopt a user charge system.9 Milltown, the appellants argue, is not within the MCUA's "jurisdiction," for under state law the MCUA has no legal power to direct Milltown to do anything.10 The EPA replies that the phrase "within the applicant's jurisdiction" does not refer to legal power, but rather simply means "within the territory served by the sewage treatment plant." See 40 C.F.R. § 35.929-1(a) (referring to users "within the grantee's service area"). The territory served by the Sayreville plant, of course, includes Milltown.

Like the term "recipient," the word "jurisdiction" is not defined in the statute. Nor, in our view, is there any clear legislative history indicating precisely what the phrase "within the applicant's jurisdiction" was intended to mean.11 The EPA's interpretation, however, is certainly a plausible one; and considering that section 204(b)(1) speaks of the "applicant's jurisdiction, as determined by the Administrator," we will not set aside the agency's interpretation simply because appellants offer another plausible interpretation. Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 631 F.2d at 885 (refusing to set aside plausible and reasonable interpretation of Clean Air Act by EPA simply because party offers an alternative plausible interpretation).

Finally, Milltown argues that the language of the EPA's own regulations clearly indicates that the "EPA itself ... did not intend to override an agreement such as that between Milltown and New Brunswick." Brief of Milltown at 24. Milltown points to 40 C.F.R. § 35.929-2(g), which provides in part that "[t]he user charge system shall take precedence over any terms or conditions of agreements or contracts between the grantee and users ... which are inconsistent with the requirements of section 204(b)(1)(A) of the [Clean Water] Act and these regulations." This regulation, Milltown argues, "was only intended to supersede inconsistent contracts to which the grantee (here MCUA) is a party, not contracts (such as that between Milltown and New Brunswick) to which the grantee is not a party." Brief of Milltown at 24. We are not presented here, though, with a case in which the basis for a determination of a failure to comply with section 204's requirements is a "contract between a grantee and a user." Thus for the very reason that Milltown's interpretation of section 35.929-2(g) appears correct, that particular regulation is simply irrelevant to the present case: the EPA is not basing its withholding of funds on any contract between the MCUA and Milltown.

In attempting to counter Milltown's argument concerning the regulations, the EPA relies on 40 C.F.R. § 35.929-2(e), which provides:

(Emphasis added.) It is possible that the underscored passage in this regulation was intended to require municipalities such as Milltown, whose sewage is treated by the grantee but who have no direct relationship with the grantee as a subscriber, to adopt user charge systems. On the other hand, it is also possible that the underscored passage simply refers to the implementation of a user charge system by the municipal subscribers to a regional waste treatment facility. Were the regulations more lucid, this section might well provide an alternative ground for our decision. Given its lack of clarity, however, our decision that Milltown is a recipient rests not on 40 C.F.R. § 35.929-2(e), but on the plain meaning of the statute, its intended goals, and the agency's interpretation of its mandate.12

B.

Appellants' second contention concerning the proper interpretation of the Clean Water Act is that even if the statutory language itself does not compel adoption of their reading of the Act, an analysis of the purposes of the Act clearly indicates that Congress' intent was such that the MCUA's eligibility for grant funds should in no way be jeopardized by the fact that Milltown has not adopted a user charge system. More specifically, the MCUA argues that the Clean Water Act, interpreted in light of its purposes, does not give the EPA the authority to withhold funds from a grantee because a relatively insignificant user with no direct relationship to the grantee fails to adopt a user charge system, Brief of MCUA at 19-39, and, alternatively, that even if the statute does give the EPA such authority, the agency's exercise of that authority constitutes an abuse of discretion on the particular facts of this case, id. at 39-43. The MCUA advances the same arguments in support of its abuse of discretion claim as it does for its claims concerning the proper interpretation of the statute, however, and we will consider the two claims together.

According to appellants, a literal or strict reading of the Clean Water Act, by which every municipality whose sewage is treated by the MCUA is considered to be a "recipient" of its services and so obligated to institute a system of user charges as a condition of the Sayreville project grant, contravenes, or at the very least does nothing to further, three important policies embodied in the Clean Water Act. The first policy is the congressional determination that because the massive job of cleaning up the nation's waters cannot be completed without generous federal financial assistance, Clean Water Act grants should not be denied on the basis of trivial matters over which the grantee has no control. The second policy is that of flexibility in adapting the grant requirements to "allow for such special and local variations in the legal and financial circumstances of a particular public grantee as those presented in the instant case." Brief of MCUA at 33. The third policy is that of ensuring that each federally-assisted waste disposal plant is efficient and economically self-sufficient in its operations. We consider the impact of each of these three policies in turn.

(1)

With respect to the first policy, the MCUA argues that in passing the Clean Water Act Congress made it clear that it believed that state and local governments could not reach the desired water quality standards without significant amounts of federal financial assistance. Section 101 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, for example, states in part that "[i]t is the national policy that Federal financial assistance be provided to construct publicly owned waste treatment works." Similarly, the Senate Committee on Public Works emphasized that in tackling the "massive" job of "cleaning up polluted waterways ... States and local governments can go forward only when there is strong assurance that federal funds be available when needed." S.Rep.No. 414 at 35, 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 3701.13 In the present case, the MCUA argues that because of mandatory federal water pollution standards, it has no choice but to improve its Sayreville facility, a project for which federal grant money is extremely important. Moreover, the MCUA asserts, Milltown's contribution to the sewage flow at Sayreville is practically insignificant. In withholding funds, then, the EPA — for a trivial reason beyond the MCUA's control — has frustrated the clear congressional policy to ensure through federal funding that local governments improve the quality of their waste disposal facilities; such a "narrow and niggardly approach," the MCUA concludes, Brief of MCUA at 25, cannot have been intended by Congress in enacting section 204(b)(1).

It is indisputable, of course, that the Clean Water Act evinces a clear congressional determination that the clean-up of the nation's waters is an important aim, one which requires large amounts of federal financial assistance to state and local governments. It is equally indisputable, though, that Congress placed a number of mandatory conditions on the receipt of such assistance. Indeed Title II is replete with conditions on the grant of aid to sewage construction works, conditions which, in the words of the Senate Report, are intended "to assure that such works are constructed and finally operated and maintained in a manner which will produce the best practicable application of treatment technology." S.Rep.No. 414 at 27, 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 3693.14 Unless these conditions are meaningless, the EPA must have the power to cut off funds to nonconforming projects, even when the local public body demonstrates a strong need for the grant money. To hold otherwise would be to conclude that Congress vested authority in the EPA to deny funds only to those projects for which the grant money is not particularly important. Such an interpretation, however, would render the conditions on the grant of federal assistance practically meaningless. Thus, even assuming without deciding that the withholding of funds would indeed seriously burden the MCUA, it certainly could not be contended that that fact alone would justify overturning the EPA's decision to withhold funds for the Sayreville project.

The MCUA, however, does not rely solely on the fact of its need for the funds; it also repeatedly asserts that Milltown's noncompliance is a trivial matter. In its brief before this court, the MCUA asserts that Milltown's sewage constitutes only one percent of the average daily gallonage flow at the Sayreville plant, and that the estimated cost of treating Milltown's sewage is only 4.7 percent of the total cost of treating the combined Milltown-New Brunswick sewage flow. Brief of MCUA at 12-13. Thus, the MCUA claims, even assuming that Congress did contemplate that an applicant for Clean Water Act funds would be turned down if it failed to comply with the Act's conditions in some important respect — no matter how great its need for federal assistance — Congress never intended to give the EPA the authority to withhold funds when such an applicant has demonstrated "substantial effectuation of a user charge requirement." Brief of MCUA at 34.

We decline the MCUA's invitation to second-guess the EPA's determination that Milltown's complete failure to adopt any user charge system at all is more than an inconsequential matter. To begin with, the district court made no finding of fact that Milltown's contribution to the sewage flow at the Sayreville plant is de minimis.15 More important, we believe that the determination whether a deviation from the conditions of the Act is important enough to warrant a denial of federal funds is a matter primarily for the EPA and not the courts. We can overturn the EPA's decision to withhold funds from the MCUA's plant at Sayreville only if that decision is arbitrary and capricious. See Hotel Employers Association v. Gorsuch, 669 F.2d 1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982). In the present case, the EPA has taken the position that while there is flexibility in designing the user charge system, an outright refusal by one of the users to adopt any user charge system at all is, in itself, a sufficient basis for concluding that the applicant has failed to meet section 204's mandatory requirement that "each recipient of waste treatment services ... will pay its proportionate share ... of the costs ... of any waste treatment services provided by the applicant." 33 U.S.C. § 1284(b)(1) (emphasis supplied). Such a determination, in our view, hardly qualifies as a "clear error of judgment," Hotel Employers Ass'n, 669 F.2d at 1307, and so we will not disturb the EPA's determination that Milltown's failure to adopt a user charge system is more than the trivial matter that the MCUA pictures it to be.

(2)

For similar reasons, we find unpersuasive the appellants' arguments concerning the flexibility that Congress intended the EPA to show in administering the Clean Water Act grant program. Both the MCUA and Milltown place heavy reliance on the Senate Report accompanying the Clean Water Act, which states:

S.Rep.No. 414, at 28, 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 3695 (emphasis supplied).16 According to appellants, the 1914 New Brunswick-Milltown contract is one of those unique "legal and financial circumstances" to which the Senate Report refers. In essence, appellants argue that taking into account the special circumstances created by the Milltown-New Brunswick contract, the MCUA has adopted a "system of user charges" in requiring that every user with whom it has a direct relationship and over whom it can thus exercise some control institute a system of user charges.

The EPA, however, takes the position that the flexibility which Congress envisioned relates not to whether a particular user must adopt a user charge system at all, see 40 C.F.R. § 35.929-1(a) ("each user ... [must] pay[] its proportionate share"), but rather to the precise form that the user charge system takes. Significantly, the Senate Report speaks not of "flexibility" in general, but of "flexibility in the design of a system of user charges." S.Rep.No. 414 at 28, 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3695 (emphasis supplied). We see no reason to conclude that the congressional policy of flexibility necessarily extends to the very question of whether a particular recipient of treatment services will adopt a user charge system in the first place.17

(3)

Finally, appellants object to the district court's holding that requiring Milltown to adopt a system of user charges as a condition of the grant would serve the dual purposes of section 204(b)(1), which are to ensure that federally-assisted facilities become economically self-sufficient in their operations, and to promote water conservation by discouraging excessive use of the sewage system. 519 F.Supp. at 883, 885. According to appellants, the aim of financial self-sufficiency is fully assured even without adoption of a user charge system by Milltown; because New Brunswick pays for treatment of Milltown's sewage out of user charges imposed on businesses and residences within New Brunswick, there is no danger that the MCUA will suffer a shortfall in revenues. As the district court pointed out, however, should New Brunswick ever abrogate its contract and cease paying for the treatment of Milltown's sewage, the MCUA would indeed be faced with a revenue shortfall. 519 F.Supp. at 883.18

Moreover, it is clear that one of the purposes of section 204's user charge requirement is to promote water conservation. See S.Rep.No. 370, 95th Cong.2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4326, 4352 ("A charge to the `consumer' based on cost of treatment would be a positive force in encouraging more efficient management of wastes discharged through a municipal system as well as an economic inducement to reduce excessive use.").19 Although Congress in 1977 amended the Clean Water Act to allow charges to be based on ad valorem taxes or flat fees in certain cases rather than on direct measures of sewage flows such as metering, see 33 U.S.C. § 1284(b)(4) (Supp.1982),20 we cannot agree with appellants that in so doing Congress "eviscerated" any conservation purpose to the user charge requirement. On the contrary, conservation of water is heavily stressed in the legislative history to the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4351. In our view, the 1977 amendments were intended simply to provide "greater flexibility ... for the assessment of user charges," id. at 4352, and not to undermine the user charge concept itself or its underlying purposes.

Accordingly, we reject the appellants' arguments that the EPA's decision to withhold funds in this case contravenes the underlying policies of the Clean Water Act or constitutes an abuse of discretion.

III.

Milltown's final contention is that if section 204(b)(1) does authorize the EPA's decision to withhold funds, that section unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of a contract.21 The district court rejected this constitutional challenge, holding that section 204's user charge requirement is reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate congressional purpose. 519 F.Supp. at 883-85. In so holding, the district court apparently assumed that section 204(b)(1) does impair the obligation of the New Brunswick-Milltown contract, but determined that such impairment did not run afoul of the constitutional strictures on the contract impairment.22 While we agree that section 204(b)(1) is constitutional, we do so on a different basis from that relied upon by the district court: in our view, section 204(b)(1) cannot be said to impair the New Brunswick-Milltown contract.23

The Clean Water Act provides for a grant of funds to the MCUA on the condition that the MCUA comply with certain requirements. Neither the statute itself nor the regulations contain any provision explicitly abrogating contracts such as that between Milltown and New Brunswick. Nor can it be said that section 204(b)(1) implicitly abrogates such contracts. In the present case, it is by no means clear that the EPA's withholding of funds from the MCUA on the basis of Milltown's failure to adopt a user charge system makes abrogation or impairment of the 1914 contract necessary or inevitable. First, the MCUA could forego funding under the Clean Water Act; nowhere in its pleadings or in its brief before this court has the MCUA alleged that completion of the Sayreville project or, for that matter, construction of the dewatering plant, would be impossible without federal funds. Rather, the MCUA has argued that a loss of federal funds will seriously burden it, will cause large and unanticipated increases in expenses to the municipalities participating in the MCUA, and so on. Second, while the MCUA has no control over Milltown, it could simply refuse to accept New Brunswick's sewage, and so qualify for federal funds (at least insofar as the EPA's objections to Milltown's failure to adopt a user charge system are concerned). Neither contingency is necessarily incompatible with New Brunswick's retaining responsibility for Milltown's sewage, as called for in the 1914 contract.

To be sure, neither course of action — foregoing federal funds or refusing to accept the New Brunswick-Milltown sewage — would likely be very palatable to the MCUA, Milltown, or New Brunswick as a financial matter, and both alternatives might make it significantly more difficult for the parties to comply with mandatory federal water quality standards. In that sense, it cannot be denied that the EPA's decision to withhold funds makes abrogation of the Milltown-New Brunswick contract a more attractive alternative than it might otherwise be. That fact alone, however, cannot constitute a sufficient basis for deeming section 204(b)(1) to impair the obligation of a contract, for "to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion [would be] to plunge the law in endless difficulties." Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90, 57 S.Ct. 883, 891-92, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937).

The reason why "temptation" cannot be deemed equivalent to "coercion" — that is, to contract impairment — is not hard to discern. As a general rule, it is clear that "Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States." Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2141, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). Moreover, while that power is not without limits, see 451 U.S. at 17 n.13, 101 S.Ct. at 1540, it is indisputable that the power to fix terms lies essentially with the Congress, and not with the federal courts. Yet because a great many if not all conditions on federal grants might very well have an impact on pre-existing contractual arrangements, to hold that every condition of a federal grant program that possibly enhances the likelihood that a contract will be breached is an "impairment of contract" in the constitutional sense, would be tantamount to ruling that virtually every federal funding statute is subject to the heightened judicial scrutiny that is invoked whenever the contract clause is implicated. As a result, no condition in a federal grant program could be upheld unless it was demonstrated to the satisfaction of the courts that the condition represented the only way to achieve an important state purpose. See generally Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 57 L.Ed.2d 727 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977). To adopt such an approach would be drastically to undercut Congress' broad discretion to set such terms on federal funding programs as it deems appropriate, and, in consequence to give to the courts extensive power over the conditions that may be attached to the disbursement of federal money. We know of nothing in the Constitution that compels such a result.

Accordingly, we decline to give the contract clause the expansive scope that Milltown urges upon us. As a matter of state law, the obligations of the 1914 contract remain untouched by the district court's decision; the user charge requirement of section 204(b)(1) and the applicable regulations do not by their terms purport to abrogate the Milltown-New Brunswick contract, nor do they inevitably require such impairment. In our view, that fact alone is a sufficient basis for rejecting Milltown's constitutional challenge to section 204(b)(1).

IV.

For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.