PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a judgment granting defendant's motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
BACKGROUND
Paul Smith contracted to star in a film to be produced by Producioni Atlas Cinematografica ("PAC"), an Italian film company. The contract allegedly provided that Smith would receive star billing in the screen credits and advertising for the film and that PAC would so provide in any subsequent contracts with distributors of the film. PAC then licensed defendants Edward Montoro and Film Venture International, Inc. ("FVI") to distribute the film in this country under the name "Convoy Buddies." Plaintiff complains, however, that Montoro and FVI removed Smith's named and substituted the name of another actor, "Bob Spencer," in place of Smith's name in both the film credits and advertising material. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of defendants' substitution, plaintiff has been damaged in his reputation as an actor, and has lost specific employment opportunities.
The complaint sought damages under several theories, including breach of contract, "false light publicity," violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and violation of Cal.Civ.Code § 3344 regarding commercial appropriation of a person's likeness. There being no diversity of citizenship, federal subject matter jurisdiction was based solely on plaintiff's Lanham Act claim. Plaintiff asserted that the district court had jurisdiction of the state law claims as a matter of pendent jurisdiction.
In proceedings held on May 1, 1978, the district judge explained his "tentative view" that defendants' motion should be granted and the complaint dismissed as "not stating a valid cause of action under the Lanham Act." While noting "there are many diverging interpretations of the Lanham Act" and that "some courts give a broad construction to it regarding it as a remedial kind of statute," the judge stated that "[i]t is my view ... that the Lanham Act is limited in its scope and intent to merchandising practices in the nature of, or economically equivalent to, palming off one's goods as those of a competitor, and/or misuse of trademarks and trade names." (Emphasis added.) According to the district court, the acts alleged in the complaint
As an "alternative ground" for dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, the district court indicated that "there is an issue additionally of the plaintiff's standing to bring this suit under the Lanham Act since the plaintiff is not in any sort of competition with the defendants." Shortly after the hearing, the court issued a minute order stating that defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. Judgment was entered on May 5, 1978. The remaining state law claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
I. Federal Claim
A. Elements of a Claim under Section 43(a)
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), forbids the use of false designations of origin and false descriptions or representations in the advertising and sale of goods and services. See New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979). The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
Appellant argues that defendants violated section 43(a) by affixing or using "a false designation or representation," i. e., another actor's name in place of appellant's, in connection with the movie's advertising and credits. Appellant claims standing under section 43(a) as a person "who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged" by the use of another actor's name in place of his. Thus, appellant's claim, although one of first impression, appears to fall within the express language of section 43(a).
The district court appears to have rejected appellant's argument on the ground that, to state a claim under section 43(a), a complaint must allege merchandising practices "in the nature of, or economically equivalent to, palming off ... and/or misuse of trademarks and trade names."
"Palming off" or "passing off" is the selling of a good or service of one's own creation under the name or mark of another. See 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 25.1 (1973); 1 R. Callman, Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, § 18.2(b)(1), at 294 (1980 Supp. to 3d ed.). Passing off may be either "express" or "implied." Express passing off occurs when an enterprise labels goods or services with a mark identical to that of another enterprise, or otherwise expressly misrepresents that the goods originated with another enterprise. Implied passing off occurs when an enterprise uses a competitor's advertising material, or a sample or photograph of the competitor's product, to impliedly represent that the product it is selling was produced by the competitor. 1 R. Callman, supra. Such practices have consistently been held to violate both the common law of unfair competition and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See id. 2 J. McCarthy, supra, § 25.1; and cases cited infra.
To the extent that the district court's standard for section 43(a) claims could be read as limiting such claims to cases of palming off, such a narrow rule would be contrary to established case law. As one commentator has explained, the law of unfair competition and trademarks "has progressed far beyond the old concept of fraudulent passing off, to encompass any form of competition or selling which contravenes society's current concepts of `fairness' ...." 2 J. McCarthy, supra, § 25:1. See also, e. g., L & L White Metal Casting Corp. v. Joseph, 387 F.Supp. 1349, 1356 (E.D.N.Y.1975) ("The purpose of [section 43(a)] was to create a new federal cause of action for false representation of goods in commerce in order to protect persons engaged in commerce from, among other things, unfair competition, fraud and deception which had theretofore only been protected by the common law. While this section is broad enough to cover situations involving the common law `palming off' of the defendants' products by the use of the plaintiff's photographs, it is also comprehensive enough to include other forms of misrepresentation and unfair competition not involving `palming off.'") (citations omitted).
In the instant case, appellant argues that the defendants' alleged conduct constitutes reverse passing off and that appellant's complaint therefore stated a section 43(a) claim even under the district court's own standard. Appellees argue, however, that the protection afforded by the Lanham Act is limited to "sales of goods" and does not extend to claims that a motion picture shown to the public might contain false information as to origin.
The short answer to appellees' argument is that the Lanham Act explicitly condemns false designations or representations in connection with "any goods or services." The prohibitions of this section have been applied to motion picture representations. See, e. g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 467 F.Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). Moreover, the names of movie actors and other performers may, under certain circumstances, be registered under the Lanham Act as service marks
In John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F.Supp. 292 (E.D.Penn.1976), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978), the court stated that section 43(a) "prohibits `reverse palming off,' i. e., conduct whereby the defendant purchases or otherwise obtains the plaintiff's goods, removes plaintiff's name and replaces it with his own." 419 F.Supp. at 325.
According to appellant's complaint, defendants not only removed appellant's
In the film industry, a particular actor's performance, which may have received an award or other critical acclaim, may be the primary attraction for movie-goers. Some actors are said to have such drawing power at the box office that the appearance of their names on the theater marquee can almost guarantee financial success. Such big box office names are built, in part, through being prominently featured in popular films and by receiving appropriate recognition in film credits and advertising. Since actors' fees for pictures, and indeed, their ability to get any work at all, is often based on the drawing power their name may be expected to have at the box office, being accurately credited for films in which they have played would seem to be of critical importance in enabling actors to sell their "services," i. e., their performances. We therefore find that appellant has stated a valid claim for relief under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
B. Standing under the Lanham Act
As an alternative ground for dismissal, the district court raised the issue of the plaintiff's standing to sue, on the ground that appellant was "not in any sort of competition" with the defendants. On this appeal, appellees contend that appellant has no standing to sue under the Lanham Act since appellant is not a member of a "purely commercial class." We reject this argument and hold that appellant is entitled to press his claim for "false representation" in federal court under section 43(a)
On its face, section 43(a) gives standing to sue to "any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged." See L'Aiglon Apparel Co. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954) ("It seems to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false representation of goods in commerce and has given a broad class of suitors injured or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in the federal courts."). The word "person" in section 43(a) includes "juristic persons" (e. g., firms, corporations, unions, and associations) as well as "natural persons." 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Moreover, the plaintiff under section 43(a) need not be in actual competition with the alleged wrongdoer. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 151 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830, 83 S.Ct. 1870, 10 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1963); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 466 F.Supp. 1034, 1044 (N.D.Ill.1978); Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F.Supp. 1288, 1294 (S.D.N.Y.1972).
II. State Law Claims
In addition to the claim under section 43(a), appellant's complaint alleged claims under state law for breach of contract, "false light publicity," and commercial appropriation of a person's likeness under Cal.Civ.Code § 3344. Since we are reversing the dismissal of appellant's Lanham Act claim, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of appellant's state law claims is also reversed. "One important benefit of section 43(a) is that it grants federal question jurisdiction totally apart from federal diversity jurisdiction." 2 J. McCarthy, supra, § 27:6-A. Thus, once in federal court under section 43(a), a plaintiff can allege related claims of unfair competition under common law and any available state statutory provisions.
CONCLUSION
As the district court stated, a section 43(a) claim may be based on practices or conduct "economically equivalent" to palming off. We find that appellant did state such a claim by alleging that defendants engaged in conduct amounting to "express reverse palming off." Since appellant also has standing to sue under section 43(a), the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a federal claim is reversed. The dismissal of the pendent state law claims is also reversed. Reversed and remanded.
FootNotes
As to registration of a person's name as a service mark, see also sections 2(e)(3) and (f) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(3) and (f).
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