TATE, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiff Melancon appeals from a denial of his motion to remand to the state court an action that, on grounds of diversity, had been removed from state court to the federal court for the Western District of Louisiana. Melancon argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to remand the suit to the state court and in recalling and vacating an order that on Melancon's ex parte motion had permitted the joinder of a non-diverse party defendant. Because the interlocutory orders complained of are not appealable, we dismiss the appeal.
This tort suit was filed in the form of a class action on behalf of those employees of Diamond Crystal Salt Company of Jefferson Island, Louisiana, who were left unemployed when due to the defendant Texaco's fault a mine owned and operated by Diamond Crystal was flooded by the waters of Lake Peigneur. Actions were commenced both in state and federal court. Texaco removed the state case to federal court; twenty days later, the federal district court granted Melancon's ex parte motion to amend its complaint to add another defendant, Wilson Brothers Corporation (a Louisiana corporation), which Melancon alleges was in charge of Texaco's drilling operations in the Lake Peigneur area.
Two weeks later, Melancon then filed a motion to remand the case to state court, arguing that diversity had been destroyed because Wilson, a Louisiana corporation had been joined as party defendant by Melancon's ex parte motion. (Melancon also argued that, the jurisdictional amount did not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction because, although one hundred million dollars in damages was claimed for the class, in fact not all the members of the class had suffered a loss sufficient in amount to confer diversity jurisdiction.) The trial court recalled and vacated the order allowing Wilson to be joined as codefendant and it denied the motion to remand.
The Issues Raised by the Appeal
On appeal, Melancon contends (1) that the trial judge erred in not remanding the case to state court for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional amount necessary, and (2) that the judge erred in recalling and vacating his order to allow joinder of Wilson Brothers Corporation, in that Wilson is allegedly an indispensable party under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19.
The Orders Appealed from are Interlocutory and Non-Appealable
We do not reach the merits of either ruling, because the orders appealed from are interlocutory and non-appealable.
As to the first issue raised by the appeal, an order denying remand of a case removed to federal court is not a final order
For similar reasons we are without jurisdiction to review by this appeal the second issue raised. Orders granting or denying motions to add new parties to a pending suit are interlocutory and non-appealable. Wells v. South Main Bank, 532 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1976); 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914, at 558 (1976).
Further, no authority supports Melancon's argument that a procedural impropriety resulted from the district court's recall and vacating of the order previously obtained by Melancon's ex parte motion to join Wilson as a codefendant. As long as a district (or an appellate) court has jurisdiction over the case, then (in absence of prohibition by statute or rule), it possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.
Because the orders complained of by this appeal are non-appealable interlocutory orders, the appeal is DISMISSED.