DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
Mrs. Yelvington slipped on an algae-coated boat launching ramp at Pelican Harbor, a recreational facility operated and maintained by Metropolitan Dade County.
The County asserts first, that Section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1975), relieves it of any duty of care toward any person who goes onto Pelican Harbor or any park area which it provides. This contention was rejected in McPhee v. Dade County, 362 So.2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), and is rejected here.
The County's second argument is that Mrs. Yelvington's negligence in failing to look out for her own safety in the face of the open and obvious algae condition precludes the plaintiffs from recovering any damages. This argument is similarly rejected. The slippery algae condition on the boat launching ramp was not, as a matter of law, so open and obvious as to completely relieve the defendant of liability. See, e.g., Rice v. Florida Power & Light Co., 363 So.2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 373 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1979). Nor can it be said that, as a matter of law, the defendant was not chargeable with any knowledge of the danger. See, e.g., Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Conway, 358 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). To the extent that Mrs. Yelvington was negligent in not perceiving the danger created by the County, her negligence was not a bar to recovery, but rather was reflected in the jury's special verdict on comparative negligence. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Pittman v. Volusia County, 380 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Cf. Auburn Machine Works
On their cross-appeal, the Yelvingtons contend that there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that Mrs. Yelvington was negligent to any degree. We hold that there was ample evidence to support the jury's special verdict that Mrs. Yelvington was sixty per cent negligent.