MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976 on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the parties, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. The court also found, however, that the Government discovered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax return . . . and the related testimony." 434 F.Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the District Court set aside respondent's conviction.
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p.m., the two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that evening included papers evidencing a close working relationship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase. . . ." Id., at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence against third parties. . . ." Id., at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee agreement. Id., at 123.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its supervisory power. 590 F.2d 206 (1979) (per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due process question. We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 822 (1979), and we now reverse.
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the [Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). We reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S., at 143; id., at 149-152 (POWELL, J., concurring); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
We certainly can understand the District Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior of those who planned and executed this "briefcase caper."
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously served." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S., at 137-138; United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-451 (1974).
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights. The supervisory power is applied with some caution even
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 174-175.
The District Court erred, therefore, when it concluded that
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion because Payner—whose guilt is not in doubt—cannot take advantage of the Government's violation of the constitutional rights of Wolstencroft, for he is not a party to this case. The Court's opinion makes clear the reason for that sound rule.
Orderly government under our system of separate powers calls for internal self-restraint and discipline in each Branch; this Court has no general supervisory authority over operations of the Executive Branch, as it has with respect to the federal courts. I agree fully with the Court that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to a case of this kind, but the Court's holding should not be read as condoning the conduct
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that a federal court is unable to exercise its supervisory powers to prevent the use of evidence in a criminal prosecution in that court, even though that evidence was obtained through intentional illegal and unconstitutional conduct by agents of the United States, because the defendant does not satisfy the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment. That holding effectively turns the standing rules created by this Court for assertions of Fourth Amendment violations into a sword to be used by the Government to permit it deliberately to invade one person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evidence against another person. Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the federal courts are unable to protect the integrity of the judicial system from such gross Government misconduct.
The facts as found by the District Court need to be more fully stated in order to establish the level of purposeful misconduct to which agents of the United States have sunk in this case. Operation Trade Winds was initiated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1965 to gather information about the financial activities of American citizens in the Bahamas. The investigation was supervised by Special Agent Richard Jaffe in the Jacksonville, Fla., office. It was not until June 1972 that the investigation focused on the Castle Bank and Trust Company of the Bahamas. In late October 1972 Jaffe asked one of his informants, Norman Casper, to obtain the names and addresses of the individuals holding accounts with the Castle Bank. Casper set to work soon thereafter. He was already an acquaintance of Michael Wolstencroft,
As found by the District Court, Casper discussed the details of the plan with Jaffe on several occasions during the week before Wolstencroft's trip.
The illegalities of agents of the United States did not stop even at that point, however. During the following two weeks, Jaffe told Casper that the IRS needed additional information. Casper therefore sent Kennedy to visit Wolstencroft in the Bahamas. While there, acting pursuant to Casper's instructions, Kennedy stole a rolodex file from Wolstencroft's office. This file was turned over to Jaffe, who testified in the District Court that he had not cared how the rolodex file had been obtained.
The IRS paid Casper $8,000 in cash for the services he rendered in obtaining the information about Castle Bank. Casper in turn paid approximately $1,000 of this money to Kennedy for her role in the "briefcase caper" and the theft of the rolodex file.
The "briefcase caper" revealed papers which showed a close relationship between the Castle Bank and a Florida bank.
The District Court made several key findings concerning the level of misconduct of agents of the United States in these activities. The District Court found that "the United States, through its agents, Richard Jaffe, and others, knowingly and willfully participated in the unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase, and encouraged its informant, Norman Casper, to arrange the theft of a rolodex from the offices of Castle Bank." 434 F.Supp. 113, 120-121 (ND Ohio 1977) (footnotes omitted). The District Court concluded that "the United States was an active participant in the admittedly criminal conduct in which Casper engaged. . . ." Id., at 121. The District Court found that "the illegal conduct of the government officials involved in this case compels the conclusion that they knowingly and purposefully obtained the briefcase materials with bad faith hostility toward the strictures imposed on their activities by the Constitution." Id., at 130 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). The District Court considered the actions of Jaffe and Casper "out-rageous," ibid., because they "plotted, schemed and ultimately acted in contravention of the United States Constitution and laws of Florida, knowing that their conduct was illegal." Ibid.
The most disturbing finding by the District Court, however, related to the intentional manipulation of the standing requirements of the Fourth Amendment by agents of the United States, who are, of course, supposed to uphold and
The Court of Appeals did not disturb any of these findings. 590 F.2d 206 (CA6 1979) (per curiam). Nor does the Court today purport to set them aside. See ante, at 730-731, n. 3. But cf. ante, at 733-734, n. 5. It is in the context of these findings—intentional illegal actions by Government agents taken in bad-faith hostility toward the constitutional rights of Wolstencroft for the purpose of obtaining evidence against persons such as the respondent through manipulation of the standing requirements of the Fourth Amendment—that the suppression issue must be considered.
This Court has on several occasions exercised its supervisory powers over the federal judicial system in order to suppress evidence that the Government obtained through misconduct. See, e. g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (supervisory powers used to enjoin federal agent from testifying in state criminal prosecution concerning illegal search and from turning over to the State evidence illegally seized). The rationale for such suppression of evidence is twofold: to deter illegal conduct by Government officials, and to protect the integrity of the federal courts. McNabb v. United States, supra, at 342, 345, 347; Mesarosh v. United States, supra, at 14; Elkins v. United States, supra, at 217, 222-223. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-660 (1961) (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975) (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979) (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments). The Court has particularly stressed the need to use supervisory powers to prevent the federal courts from becoming accomplices to such misconduct. See, e. g., McNabb v. United States, supra, at 345 ("Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law"); Mesarosh v. United States, supra, at 14 (the Court should use its supervisory powers in federal criminal cases "to see that the waters of justice are not polluted"); Elkins v. United States, supra, at 223 (federal courts should not be "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold").
Mr. Justice Brandeis noted that "a court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands," id., at 483, and that in keeping with that principle the court should not lend its aid in the enforcement of the criminal law when the government itself was guilty of misconduct. "Then aid is denied despite the defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination." Id., at 484. See also id., at 469-471 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id., at 488 (Stone, J., dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 453, n. 3 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
The present case falls within that category. The District Court found, and the record establishes, a deliberate decision by Government agents to violate the constitutional rights of Wolstencroft for the explicit purpose of obtaining evidence against persons such as Payner. The actions of the Government agents—stealing the briefcase, opening it, and photographing all the documents inside—were both patently in violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of Wolstencroft
Since the supervisory powers are exercised to protect the integrity of the court, rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the defendant, it is hard to see why the Court today bases its analysis entirely on Fourth Amendment standing rules. The point is that the federal judiciary should not be made accomplices to the crimes of Casper, Jaffe, and others. The only way the IRS can benefit from the evidence it chose to obtain illegally is if the evidence is admitted at trial against persons such as Payner; that was the very point of the criminal exercise in the first place. If the IRS is permitted to obtain a conviction in federal court based almost entirely on that illegally obtained evidence and its fruits,
It is particularly disturbing that the Court today chooses to allow the IRS deliberately to manipulate the standing rules of the Fourth Amendment to achieve its ends. As previously noted, the District Court found that "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence against third parties, who are the real targets of the governmental intrusion, and that the IRS agents in this case acted, and will act in the future, according to that counsel." 434 F. Supp., at 132-133 (emphasis supplied). Whatever role those standing limitations may play, it is clear that they were never intended to be a sword to be used by the Government in its deliberate choice to sacrifice the constitutional rights of one person in order to prosecute another.
The Court's decision to engraft the standing limitations of the Fourth Amendment onto the exercise of supervisory powers is puzzling not only because it runs contrary to the major purpose behind the exercise of the supervisory powers— to protect the integrity of the court—but also because it appears to render the supervisory powers superfluous. In order to establish that suppression of evidence under the supervisory powers would be proper, the Court would also require
I also do not understand the basis for the Court's assertion that this is not a case in which the District Court was supervising the administration of justice "among the parties before the bar," ante, at 735, n. 7, and therefore supervisory powers are inapplicable. Clearly the Government is before the bar. Equally clearly, the Government embarked on this deliberate pattern of lawless behavior for the express purpose of gaining evidence against persons such as Payner, so there can be
Contrary to the Court's characterization, this is also not a case in which there has been "indiscriminate" or "unbending" application of the exclusionary rule. The District Court noted that "exclusion on the basis of supervisory power is only done as a last resort," 434 F. Supp., at 134, n. 74. That court concluded that suppression was proper only where there had been "purposefully illegal" conduct by the Government to obtain the evidence or where the Government's conduct was "motivated by an intentional bad faith hostility to a constitutional right." Id., at 134-135 (footnotes omitted). In this case, both those threshold requirements were met, and the District Court in addition concluded that absent suppression there was no deterrent to continued lawless conduct undertaken by the IRS to facilitate these types of prosecutions.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and suppress the fruits of the Government's illegal action under the Court's supervisory powers.
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
"(1) Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of any law, no person shall disclose any information relating to the affairs of . . . the customer of a bank which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of his functions under this Act." See also the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 1965 Bah. Acts, No. 64, § 10, as amended, 1968 Bah. Acts, No. 34, 1969 Bah. Acts, No. 20, 1971 Bah. Acts, No. 15. The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been directed to no authority construing its terms. Moreover, American depositors know that their own country requires them to report relationships with foreign financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24 (1979). See generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974). We conclude that respondent lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented his account.
The dissent, post, at 746, urges that the balance of interests under the supervisory power differs from that considered in Alderman and like cases, because the supervisory power focuses upon the "need to protect the integrity of the federal courts." Although the District Court in this case relied upon a deterrent rationale, we agree that the supervisory power serves the "twofold" purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity. See post, at 744. As the dissent recognizes, however, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule serves precisely the same purposes. Ibid., citing, inter alia, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-660 (1961). Thus, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, like the supervisory power, is applied in part "to protect the integrity of the court, rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the defendant. . . ." Post, at 747; see generally Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486; United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.
In this case, where the illegal conduct did not violate the respondent's rights, the interest in preserving judicial integrity and in deterring such conduct is outweighed by the societal interest in presenting probative evidence to the trier to fact. See the first paragraph, supra; see also, e. g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-486. None of the cases cited by the dissent, post, at 744-745, supports a contrary view, since none of those cases involved criminal defendants who were not themselves the victims of the challenged practices. Thus, our decision today does not limit the traditional scope of the supervisory power in any way; nor does it render that power "superfluous." Post, at 748. We merely reject its use as a substitute for established Fourth Amendment doctrine.
"Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Casper, you knew you were committing an illegal act, and you wanted somebody who could be trusted to keep his mouth shut about it?
"A. There is that possibility, yes.
"Q. Isn't that the fact?
"A. Yes." 434 F. Supp., at 119, n. 20; Tr. 452-453.
It is interesting to note that even the locksmith who could be "trusted" refused to enter Kennedy's apartment with Casper. Id., at 451.
The Government contends that when Agent Jaffe made the referral he did not know what use Casper intended to make of such a locksmith. Brief for United States 6, n. 4. The District Court found, however, that Jaffe already knew at the time of the referral that Casper intended to enter Kennedy's apartment and to take and open Wolstencroft's briefcase. There were, then, only two logical alternatives why Casper would want such a locksmith: to make a key to enter the briefcase, or to make a key to enter the apartment. Either way, Jaffe must have known that Casper's conduct was improper, and yet Jaffe made the referral anyway.
Wolstencroft in fact was indicted for aiding and abetting Payner. Brief for United States 3, n. 2. However, Wolstencroft is a Bahamian resident, and did not return to the United States to answer the indictment. Ibid. The mere fact that the Government went through the steps of indicting Wolstencroft does not in any way undermine the District Court's finding, based on substantial evidence in the record, that Wolstencroft was never the target of the IRS investigation. In light of the Government's concession that Wolstencroft's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, it is hard to see how the banker could be successfully prosecuted on the aiding and abetting charge.
In addition, the only authority cited by the Court for its suggestion is Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion). Hampton was only a plurality opinion, and the issue for which the Court purports to cite it was not raised by the facts of that case. Similarly, in the Court of Appeals below the United States was able to cite only Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407 (1967), a case plainly not on point, and the sentence from the Hampton plurality opinion quoted by the Court, ante, at 737, n. 9, for the proposition that Payner lacked standing to raise a due process argument. See Brief for United States in No. 78-5278 (CA6), pp. 21-22; Reply Brief for United States in No. 78-5278, p. 6. The issue whether the standing limitations this Court has imposed for challenging Fourth Amendment violations also apply for violations of the Due Process Clause based on outrageous Government conduct has not yet been settled by this Court. Cf. 434 F. Supp., at 129, n. 65, and authorities discussed therein. The due process issue should be left for consideration in the first instance by the Court of Appeals on remand.