FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr., Circuit Judge:
The plaintiffs, Deborah and Robert Timm, filed this diversity action in the district court for personal injuries to Deborah Timm, and consequential damages from those injuries, allegedly caused by her use of defendant The Upjohn Company's drug Cleocin.
On appeal, Upjohn raises several objections to the proceedings below: (1) that the district court should have granted its motions since all the evidence was to the effect
In March 1974, Deborah Timm sought relief from a condition called sinusitis
It has been established that, in the case of prescription drugs such as Cleocin, the manufacturer has no obligation to warn a consumer of that drug so long as the prescribing physician has been adequately warned of any potentially adverse side effects. Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968); cf. Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Services, 365 F.Supp. 1344, 1350 (W.D.La. 1973), modified on other grounds, 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975). The prescribing physician acts as a "learned intermediary" between the manufacturer and the consumer, since he is in the best position to weigh the benefits against the risks of a particular drug therapy. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, supra, 498 F.2d at 1276; see Merrill, Compensating for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 Va.L.R. 1, 91 (1973). Upjohn asserts that its warning
Upjohn's major claim on appeal is that the evidence concerning Dr. Tabb's awareness of the hazards of Cleocin was uncontroverted and thus the evidence as to Upjohn's liability was insufficient as a matter of law to generate a question for the jury. Defendant argues that Dr. Tabb unequivocally stated in his testimony that he knew that a colectomy and the more severe
The standard of review for questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence is well settled in this Circuit. Givens v. Lederle, supra, 556 F.2d at 1345; Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, supra, 498 F.2d at 1288; Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969).
In light of the Boeing standard, we hold that a rational basis for the jury's verdict exists since the evidence regarding the adequacy of Upjohn's warning to Dr. Tabb was sufficient to create a question for the jury. The jury was entitled to weigh the conflicting statements made by Dr. Tabb and the other physicians along with all the other evidence presented in the case. Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1117 (5th Cir. 1980); Accord: Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979). Upjohn's contentions that the trial court made certain erroneous evidentiary rulings and that the trial judge's charge to the jury was misleading are without merit. In the evidentiary rulings complained of, the lower court acted well within its discretion. See Givens v. Lederle, supra, 556 F.2d at 1346; Kershaw v. Sterling Drug., Inc., 415 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1969); cf. Bryan v. John Bean Division of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978). In reviewing the trial judge's instructions to the jury, we consider the charge as a whole to determine whether the jury was misled and whether it understood the issues presented. Couglin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1978); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1100 (5th Cir. 1973). Under this standard we find no error. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, supra, 498 F.2d at 1292.