BLAIR MOODY, JR., J.
Plaintiff Kalamazoo City Education Association (hereafter KCEA) appeals from an order of the Court of Appeals summarily affirming the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (hereafter MERC). The MERC had dismissed its petition challenging Administrative Law Judge James Kurtz's determination that defendant Kalamazoo Public Schools had committed no unfair labor practices under the public employment relations act (hereafter PERA). 1965 PA 379, as amended, MCL 423.210; MSA 17.455(10).
Plaintiff Detroit Federation of Teachers (hereafter DFT) appeals from the order of the Court of Appeals summarily denying enforcement of a
The questions presented by these cases involve the interpretation of the enforcement and review provisions of PERA, MCL 423.216(d), 423.216(e); MSA 17.455(16)(d), 17.455(16)(e). We must decide in each instance whether the Court of Appeals erred, in light of recent amendments to these provisions, 1976 PA 99 and 1977 PA 266, when they gave only summary treatment to plaintiffs' petitions from their respective MERC orders. In the course of this determination, we must establish whether one of the amendments, 1977 PA 266, retroactively affects cases originally filed in the Court of Appeals prior to the amendment's effective date. We must also decide in the case of the DFT whether enforcement of an order of the MERC may be denied by the Court of Appeals on the basis of a purported change in circumstances.
We hold that the Court of Appeals did err by summarily denying the petition for review brought by KCEA. On the other hand, we do not find that the Court erred by extending only summary treatment to the petition for enforcement brought by the DFT. See MCL 423.216(d), 423.216(e); MSA 17.455(16)(d), 17.455(16)(e). Further, we hold 1977 PA 266 applicable to these parties, even though their petitions were first filed in the Court of Appeals before the effective date of the amendment. Finally, though we recognize that a change in circumstances may in some cases affect the continuing viability of a MERC order, we find the Court of Appeals erred here by denying the DFT enforcement on the basis of two judicial decisions issued subsequent to the MERC order, i.e., Bradley v Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (CA 6, 1976); Detroit
Due to a dispute involving the faculty and administration of Hillside Junior High School in Kalamazoo, the KCEA brought various charges of unfair labor practices against defendant. These charges were originally filed on July 25, 1975 and later amended. Three of the charges were ultimately addressed in an administrative hearing. The first alleged that defendant refused to properly comply with an arbitration award involving the involuntary transfer of a physical education instructor from one school within the system to another. A second charged defendant with a refusal to correctly process the grievance attendant upon the termination of two faculty employees. A third related to defendant's refusal to bargain in good faith regarding certain economic appendices open to contract negotiation during the school year 1975-76. Remaining charges were deferred to arbitration during the administrative hearing.
The matter was brought to hearing on January 27, 1976. During the course of the hearing, plaintiff claimed the administrative law judge wrongly precluded from the record evidence of defendant's bad faith in regard to some aspects of the case deferred to arbitration. Plaintiff also excepted to the judge's interlocutory order of November 10, 1975, quashing the use of a subpoena to obtain evidence concerning a speech by defendant's superintendent. A decision rejecting the KCEA claims and an order of dismissal were issued on November 12, 1976. A majority of the MERC upheld the ruling of the administrative law judge, though
KCEA filed both a claim of appeal as of right and an application for leave to appeal with the Court of Appeals. GCR 1963, 803.1, 806.6. The Court of Appeals issued an order summarily enforcing the MERC decision and denying the appeal as of right on December 21, 1977. Another order granting defendant's motion to dismiss the claim of appeal as of right was issued on December 27, 1977. The effect of these orders was to affirm the MERC decision and order by summary treatment. The Court specifically found that a petition to review under MCL 423.216(e); MSA 17.455(16)(e), as amended by 1976 PA 99, does not invoke the Court's jurisdiction as of right and only requires a summary disposition. KCEA appealed to us and we granted leave. 402 Mich. 918 (1978).
Detroit Federation of Teachers
The DFT filed 11 specific charges of unfair labor practices against defendant board of education on January 16, 1974. The allegations entailed interference with employee rights and refusal to bargain in good faith. All except six charges were withdrawn or dismissed prior to the administrative hearing.
Of the six remaining claims of unfair labor practices, the administrative law judge found that four of them did violate the bargaining provision of the PERA. MCL 423.210; MSA 17.455(10). The first finding concerned defendant's unilateral modification in the existing balance-of-staff formula governing racial balance in faculty assignments. Prior to the fall of 1973, undisputed evidence indicated that the ratio was 75-25%. The defendant then unilaterally altered the minimum critical ratio to 70-30%. The second finding entailed
On January 31, 1977, the DFT petitioned the Court of Appeals for a summary order of enforcement, citing MCL 423.216(e); MSA 17.455(16)(e), as amended by 1976 PA 99. The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's petition with an order dated June 7, 1977. Enforcement was denied "because changes in circumstances since the order was entered make present enforcement inappropriate. See Bradley v Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (CA 6, 1976), cert gtd, [429 U.S. 958]; 97 S.Ct. 380; 50 L Ed 2d 325 ; Detroit Federation of Teachers v Detroit Board of Education, 396 Mich. 220; 240 N.W.2d 225 (1976)." Judge MICHAEL CAVANAGH would have granted the petition for enforcement. Plaintiff appealed to this Court and we granted leave. 402 Mich. 856 (1978).
Prior to amendment by 1976 PA 99 and 1977 PA 266, the enforcement and review provisions of the PERA read as follows:
"(e) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals by filing in the court a complaint praying
These provisions were closely modeled upon corresponding enforcement and review provisions contained in the National Labor Relations Act.
This Court has in the past had occasion to construe the interdependent enforcement and review sections of the LMA. Labor Mediation Board v National Music Camp, 383 Mich. 518; 176 N.W.2d 588
The Court of Appeals responded with an order summarily enforcing the board's order in substantial part.
"We find: (1) Plaintiff is not entitled to summary enforcement. The Court of Appeals is required by statute to enforce, upon a petition for enforcement, only those orders in which it finds that the board has (a) acted within its statutory powers; (b) held a hearing comporting with procedural due process; (c) made findings based upon substantial evidence; and (d) ordered an appropriate remedy. 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, § 1078, pp 663, 664. (2) Interlochen filed a sufficient answer to bring before the Court of Appeals an issue that should have been decided on the merits." 383 Mich. 528.
The Court also recognized that defendant could have processed its appeal pursuant to a review of
The import of the decision was to allow aggrieved parties an original right of review whenever the prevailing party petitioned for enforcement. This position was emphasized in two succeeding decisions. MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, 387 Mich. 424; 196 N.W.2d 763 (1972);
In Detroit Symphony, this Court dealt with a petition to enforce a MERC order under the LMA. MCL 423.23(e); MSA 17.454(25)(e). The Court of Appeals ruled summarily against the petition. A dissent was entered by Judge, now Justice, LEVIN in which he found the summary disposition employed by the majority unsound.
This Court agreed with then Judge LEVIN'S conclusion. Consistent with National Music Camp, this Court again rejected summary treatment of enforcement petitions. Such proceedings were held
"When such a proceeding has been decided by the Court of Appeals, and is made subject to review by this Supreme Court as in section 423.23(e) provided, the decision of the Court of Appeals — either to enforce, modify, or refuse enforcement — has not been made on appeal to that Court. Nor is it treatable as an appeal. It starts in the Court having jurisdiction to entertain it in the first instance, which is the Court of Appeals. By virtue of its original importance, it deserves as suggested in the cases cited below a compendious if not formal opinion of the legislatively appointed court of original jurisdiction. The need for such an opinion is apparent, for as said in one of the earlier Supreme Court cases (Virginian R Co v United States, 272 U.S. 658, 675; 47 S.Ct. 222; 71 L Ed 463, 472 ):
"`The failure to accompany the decree by an opinion may thus deprive litigants of the means of exercising a sound judgment on the propriety of an appeal. And the appellate court, being without knowledge of the grounds of the decision below, is denied an important aid in the consideration of the case, and will ordinarily be subjected to much unnecessary labor.'" 387 Mich. 428-429.
Thus the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper consideration.
Two years later, in Reeths-Puffer, this Court again affirmed its prior decisions, finding that the original proceeding
"The act provides that, upon the filing of such petition, the Court of Appeals `shall' have jurisdiction of the proceeding and `shall' grant such relief as `it deems just and proper, enforcing, modifying, enforcing as so modified, or setting aside' the MERC order. It was not intended that this reviewing power would be exercised summarily without formal submission, oral argument and opinion." 391 Mich. 270.
Most recently, under the review provision of the PERA, we affirmed the principle of appeal as of right from MERC orders. See Crestwood Teachers Organization v Crestwood Board of Education, 401 Mich. 803 (1977).
In 1976, the Michigan Legislature amended the enforcement and review provisions of both the LMA and the PERA. The changes accomplished the same purpose for both acts. Regarding the LMA, see 1976 PA 98. As amended, the PERA enforcement provision read in relevant part:
"(d) The commission or any prevailing party may
Similarly, there were significant changes incorporated into the review provisions of both acts. The amended provision of the PERA read in relevant part:
"(e) Any party aggrieved by a final order of the commission granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals by filing in the court within 20 days of such order a petition praying that the order of the commission be modified or set aside, with copy of the petition filed on the commission, and thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, certified by the commission. Upon the timely filing of the petition, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the commission under subsection (d), and shall summarily grant to the commission or to any prevailing party such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, enforcing, modifying, enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the commission. The findings of the commission with respect to questions of fact if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If a timely petition for review is not filed under this subdivision by an aggrieved party, the commission or any prevailing party shall be entitled, upon application therefor, to a summary order enforcing the commission's order." (Emphasis added.) 1976 PA 99.
"(e) Any party aggrieved by a final order of the commission granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may within 20 days of such order as a matter of right obtain a review of the order in the court of appeals by filing in the court a petition praying that the order of the commission be modified or set aside, with copy of the petition filed on the commission, and thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, certified by the commission. Upon the timely filing of the petition, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the commission under subsection (d), and shall summarily grant to the commission or to any prevailing party such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, enforcing, modifying, enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the commission. The findings of the commission with respect to questions of fact if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If a timely petition for review is not filed under this subdivision by an aggrieved party, it shall be conclusively presumed that the commission's order is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, and the commission or any prevailing party shall be entitled, upon application therefor, to a summary order enforcing the commission's order." (Emphasis added.) 1977 PA 266.
In large part, what we must decide in the present cases involves the meaning and significance of these legislative amendments to the PERA.
Before discussing the impact of the recent amendments to the act, we must determine whether they are applicable to the parties in these cases.
Plaintiff DFT filed its petition with the Court of Appeals for a summary order of enforcement on January 31, 1977. The MERC order affirming the administrative law judge had issued on July 30, 1975. The Court of Appeals order denying enforcement issued on June 7, 1977.
The amending language of 1976 PA 99 became effective immediately on April 27, 1976. The amending terms of 1977 PA 266 became effective immediately on December 8, 1977.
The 1976 amendment was clearly applicable to the plaintiff KCEA, as it preceded the MERC order in that case. Furthermore, both plaintiffs filed their respective petitions as original proceedings
Moreover, upon evaluating the language of the 1976 and 1977 amendments, we find it deals with matters of procedure, not substance. Allowing the prevailing party to appeal for enforcement of a MERC order is procedural in nature. As a rule, when amendments relate only to remedy or procedure they may be given a retrospective construction. 21 Michigan Law & Practice, Statutes, § 105, pp 133-134. We have often expressed this principle:
"Statutes related to remedies or modes of procedure which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of a remedy or confirmation of rights already existing will, in the absence of language clearly showing a contrary intention, be held to operate retrospectively and apply to all actions accrued, pending or future, there being no vested right to keep a statutory procedural law unchanged and free from amendment." Hansen-Snyder Co v General Motors Corporation, 371 Mich. 480; 124 N.W.2d 286 (1963) (syllabus 1), quoted in Ballog v Knight Newspapers, Inc, 381 Mich. 527, 533-534; 164 N.W.2d 19 (1969).
In essence, the amending language repeals the former provision, serving in its place as if passed in the original legislative enactment:
"An amendatory act has a repealing force, by the mechanics of legislation, different from that of an independent statute. Repugnancy is not the essential element of implied repeal of specifically amended sections. The rule is:
"`Where a section of a statute is amended, the original ceases to exist, and the section as amended supersedes it and becomes a part of the statute for all intents and purposes as if the amendments had always been there.' 25 RCL, Statutes, § 159, p 907. * * *
"Nevertheless, the old section is deemed stricken
"It is plain from the authorities in this State and elsewhere that the effect of an act amending a specific section of a former act, in the absence of a saving clause, is to strike the former section from the law, obliterate it entirely and substitute the new section in its place. This effect is not an arbitrary rule adopted by the courts. It is the natural and logical effect of an amendment `to read as follows.' It accomplishes precisely what the words import. Any other construction would do violence to the plain language of the legislature." Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich. 578, 587-588; 99 N.W.2d 490 (1959), quoting People v Lowell, 250 Mich. 349, 354-356; 230 NW 202 (1930).
Further, we note in regard to language specifying an appeal as of right that this Court had previously adopted the principle by judicial interpretation in Reeths-Puffer, well before the petition for review was filed by plaintiff KCEA or the petition for enforcement by the DFT. MERC v Reeths-Puffer School Dist, supra, 270. No vested rights were altered or new obligations imposed.
As to the conclusive presumption raised on the evidentiary record where the aggrieved party fails to timely appeal, we note that the Court of Appeals did not question the evidentiary record with regard to the MERC order in favor of the DFT. The Court merely found a change in legal circumstances requiring denial. The substantive rights of the board were not affected by the amending language. In any case, under the amended language of 1976, the Court already possessed the authority to issue a summary order of enforcement upon untimely application by an aggrieved party.
Consequently, we find the language of 1977 PA 266 retroactively applicable to the parties in the
C. Statutory Interpretation
In the cases of National Music Camp, Detroit Symphony and Reeths-Puffer, this Court established a judicial interpretation and policy statement in regard to the enforcement and review provisions of PERA. We construed the statute to require plenary consideration of both enforcement and review petitions, including oral argument and the issuance of "a compendious if not formal opinion". In 1976 and again in 1977, the Legislature amended these provisions. We must now review our prior pronouncements in light of these changes.
In reviewing questions which involve a statutory scheme, this Court first considers the specific language of the statute itself. The Lamphere Schools v Lamphere Federation of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 110; 252 N.W.2d 818 (1977). See also Dussia v Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich. 244; 191 N.W.2d 307 (1971). We review the language in order to ascertain and declare the intention of the Legislature. Aikens v Department of Conservation, 387 Mich. 495; 198 N.W.2d 304 (1972).
It is apparent from a reading of the statute that the enforcement and review provisions are closely interrelated. In tandem, they form a cohesive procedure for seeking enforcement or review of MERC orders. As in Federal practice, where the parties' claims are timely raised for enforcement or review, they should be processed together in a single proceeding. See Ford Motor Co v NLRB, supra, 305 U.S. 369-370.
Since the passage of 1976 PA 99, either the
Once initiated, the Court of Appeals "shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and shall summarily grant such temporary or permanent relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, enforcing, modifying, enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the commission". MCL 423.216(d); MSA 17.455(16)(d). The addition in 1976 PA 99 of the word "summarily" leads us to the present conclusion that the Legislature did not intend enforcement proceedings to be plenary proceedings in the Court of Appeals.
To this degree, our holding in prior cases must be limited. The Legislature has made it clear that where enforcement is sought the Court of Appeals may summarily grant temporary or permanent
"The failure to accompany the decree by an opinion may thus deprive litigants of the means of exercising a sound judgment on the propriety of an appeal. And the appellate court, being without knowledge of the grounds of the decision below, is denied an important aid in the consideration of the case, and will ordinarily be subjected to much unnecessary labor." MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, supra, 387 Mich. 429, quoting Virginian R Co v United States, 272 U.S. 658, 675; 47 S.Ct. 222; 71 L Ed 463 (1926).
Further, because the petition invokes the original jurisdiction of the Court, we find no discretion in the Court's responsibility to entertain the petition. The Court may not dismiss the petition without at least a summary consideration of the matter. See Labor Mediation Board v National Music Camp, supra, 528; MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, supra, 387 Mich. 428-429; MERC v Reeths-Puffer School Dist, supra, 270.
The review provision presents a different picture. This Court's prior interpretations of the statute
In response to potential delays occasioned by an apparently indefinite period within which an aggrieved party might seek review, the Legislature enacted that portion of 1976 PA 99 which limited the time to seek review to 20 days. By enacting 1977 PA 266 a year later, the Legislature further specified that the review accorded would be as of right. We had so construed the statute previously in Reeths-Puffer. 391 Mich. 270.
However, the amending language of these acts did not create the basis for summary review as was the case in enforcement proceedings. The language of the two provisions clearly eliminates this interpretation.
In other words, the commission or prevailing party may seek enforcement of a MERC order
We note that the proper standard by which the Court of Appeals shall consider review petitions includes at a minimum whether the record considered as a whole contains competent, material and substantial evidence to support the MERC decision and order. MERC v Detroit Smyphony Orchestra, Inc, 393 Mich. 116, 121-124; 223 N.W.2d 283 (1974).
On the other hand, if a petition for review is not filed timely, then the nature of any review under these provisions changes drastically. First, 1976 PA 99 requires that the status of the proceeding would be returned to that of an enforcement procedure. The MERC or prevailing party would then be in a position to obtain a summary order of enforcement. Also, 1977 PA 266 limits the issues that may be presented in such a case, as it is to be conclusively presumed that the MERC order is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence of record.
The Court of Appeals erred by denying the timely petition for review brought by KCEA. Under the statute, plaintiff was entitled to plenary consideration as of right. The case should have been properly docketed and brought on for oral argument. The statutory proceeding is of a status equal to any review as of right from a MERC administrative decision. See MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, supra, 393 Mich. 120-124. A resolution will require an appropriate opinion addressing the issues raised. We thus reverse the Court of Appeals disposition and remand the case to them for full consideration.
Detroit Federation of Teachers
This case presents more difficult problems.
Second, while delay will not normally affect enforcement, defendant's claim of change in circumstances may well do so. It is noted that under federal law an order of the NLRB, lawful when made, does not become unenforceable simply because changed circumstances indicate that the need for the order may be less than when made. NLRB v Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc, 303 U.S. 261, 271; 58 S.Ct. 571; 82 L Ed 831 (1938). See also C-B Buick, Inc v NLRB, 506 F.2d 1086, 1093 (CA 3, 1974); NLRB v Raytheon Co, 398 U.S. 25; 90 S.Ct. 1547; 26 L Ed 2d 21 (1970).
On the other hand, when circumstances clearly changed after an order of the NLRB had issued, a reviewing court was given discretion to decide the matter itself or to remand the question to the board for further consideration. NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 331 U.S. 416, 428; 67 S.Ct. 1274; 91 L Ed 1575 (1947). Further, where an order has become obviously inappropriate or moot because of a change in circumstances, the reviewing court may deny enforcement. Id. See also
Though we recognize that this Federal principle may apply in cases like the present, still we find the MERC order in this dispute of definite continuing validity. In relation to the balance of teaching staff, the MERC order read as follows:
"Rescind change in the balance of staff formula and apply formula as of January, 1974; rescind any personnel changes resulting from the implementation of its illegally adopted new formula; make whole any employees for loss of pay resulting from the implementation of the changed formula; restore any employee affected by the new formula to his previous position of employment without any loss in seniority, benefits or other privileges."
Defendant contends that this order is no longer enforceable because supervening federal authority conflicts irreconcilably with its directive. Bradley v Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (CA 6, 1976). The apparent conflict arose when Federal District Judge De Mascio, during the formulation of a new federal desegregation plan for the City of Detroit, included in its provisions a formula for reassignment of teachers involving not more than 70 percent of teachers of one race in each school "subject to collective bargaining agreement provisions".
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded "this aspect of the case to the District Court for the hearing of the evidence on the issue of faculty assignment". Bradley v Milliken, supra, 247. Nonetheless, the Court did recognize the authority to order the reassignment of faculty as an equitable remedy in achieving racial balance. Id.
Realizing that the future progress of federal desegregation in the area of teacher reassignment may affect the original MERC directive, plaintiff DFT suggested in its petition to the Court of Appeals that enforcement be ordered, but subject to the dictates of Bradley v Milliken:
"We concede that the decision in Bradley v Milliken * * * may affect references in the MERC order, in paragraphs 1a and 2a, to `balance of staff' issues, only. We accordingly respectfully suggest that the enforcement order of this Court be qualified, `subject, with respect to "balance of staff" issues, to the decision in Bradley v Milliken * * *'." (Citations omitted.)
We find this suggestion appropriate. As the DFT points out, the cease-and-desist order requires defendant to avoid unilateral changes on subjects deemed bargainable; yet any such bargaining would depend upon "specific directives of a federal or other court".
We thus find no legal reason why enforcement would not be proper, subject to Bradley v Milliken. The essence of the MERC order is that defendant bargain on mandatory matters of negotiation and refrain from unilateral changes. Within this context, no fixed balance of staff ratio need be established which would contravene federal directives. In short, we find no basis in law to deny enforcement because of conflict with Bradley v Milliken.
The other change in circumstances purportedly affecting enforcement relates to plaintiff's access to certain information regarding emergency substitutes
"Supply to the bargaining representative, within a reasonable time after being so requested, information relevant to the conduct and administration of collective bargaining including, if not already furnished at the time of this order, data relating to the implementation of the agency shop provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, including communications with employees not in compliance with that provision, names and addresses or school location addresses, of teachers entitled to individual contracts after completing substitute status requirements."
In a different proceeding, the DFT complained of the board's practice of classifying certified teachers as ESRPs rather than probationary contract teachers. Judge Horace Gilmore ordered the board to provide probationary contracts to ESRPs. The Court of Appeals affirmed; and we reversed, directing the following:
"The case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of a declaration of rights that each `duly qualified' teacher in the board's employ is entitled to a written, individual contract evidencing the employment relationship. The circuit court may hold this case in abeyance pending determination, either by agreement of the parties or through the grievance procedure, of the kind of contract to which each teacher is entitled. If any teacher is aggrieved by the job classification and contract offered by the board, he may file a grievance. After resolution of any dispute regarding the kind of contract to which a teacher is entitled, the circuit court
In the present case, plaintiff took issue with defendant's failure to promptly furnish information requested by the union in order to determine which of its teachers was entitled to a probationary contract under Judge Gilmore's ruling. Defendant contends that our decision in that case reversing Judge Gilmore moots the present MERC order.
We disagree. As plaintiff observed in its reply brief before the Court of Appeals, the information may be very necessary to its grievance at present and in the future:
"Rather, the obligation found by the commission arose out of the collective bargaining relationship and the relevancy of the data as it related to the collective bargaining relationship between the parties, all under PERA. Indeed, the action of the Michigan Supreme Court of April 1, 1976 in Detroit Federation of Teachers v Detroit Board of Education * * * emphasizing the grievance process, reinforces the validity of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission order and the necessity for its enforcement." (Citation omitted.)
Certainly, in ongoing negotiations, plaintiff will still have to determine the names and other pertinent data regarding contracts for teachers who had been classified as ESRPs. We find that the affirmative order requiring this data is not mooted by our decision in Detroit Federation of Teachers v Detroit Board of Education.
We thus find that the Court of Appeals erred by denying the petition for enforcement on the basis
Having found the Court of Appeals in error by denying the parties in Kalamazoo City Education Ass'n v Kalamazoo Public Schools a proper plenary proceeding under MCL 423.216(e); MSA 17.455(16)(e), we reverse and remand that case for full consideration. We also find that the Court of Appeals erred in Detroit Federation of Teachers v Detroit Board of Education by denying enforcement of the MERC order under MCL 423.216(d); MSA 17.455(16)(d) on the basis of changed circumstances. We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for further consideration and for entry of an order of enforcement pursuant to and as modified by this opinion.
COLEMAN, C.J., and KAVANAGH, WILLIAMS, LEVIN, FITZGERALD, and RYAN, JJ., concurred with BLAIR MOODY, JR., J.
"In contrast with a complaint for mandamus or superintending control, which original proceedings are considered by the Court of Appeals at least initially as motions, a petition for enforcement is not addressed to the discretion of the Court of Appeals." MERC v Reeths-Puffer School Dist, supra, 270.
"Original jurisdiction is the jurisdiction conferred on or inherent in a court in the first instance. It is to be distinguished from appellate jurisdiction, which is the jurisdiction of a superior court to review the final judgment, order, or decree of an inferior court on the record made in the inferior tribunal, and to affirm, reverse, or modify such decision, judgment or decree. A particular court may, of course, have both original and appellate jurisdiction." 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts, § 98, p 459.
The nature of these original enforcement and review proceedings is specified in the language of the statute itself. See MCL 423.216(d), 423.216(e); MSA 17.455(16)(d), 17.455(16)(e).
"The purpose of the bill[s] is * * * to insure the finality of decisions made by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, which are not appealed, and to remove the ability of losing parties to avoid and delay the enforcement of MERC decisions."
"Under the present statute, parties have ignored orders by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, forcing it to seek court enforcement of decisions and orders. This bill will reverse the Court decision in MERC v Cafana Cleaners, * * * where the Court of Appeals held that, in cases where respondents do not take any action, the Attorney General, on behalf of MERC, must prove every aspect of the case, even though all aspects are not covered in the MERC case. This ruling places an unfair burden on those who comply with MERC decisions by giving benefits to those who refuse to comply. While the right to appeal will not be diminished in any way, the premium on procrastination and avoidance of MERC orders will be removed. Enforcement of decisions is the key in carrying out the mandate of the Act, and these amendments are designed to speed up the process." (Citation omitted.)