OPINION OF THE COURT
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
This class action challenges the constitutionality of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §§ 1431-1438 (Purdon 1964) (Agreement), and is brought by plaintiff Adams, an inmate of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania. After careful review, we find it unnecessary to decide the constitutional issues, but conclude on statutory grounds that procedural safeguards provided in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §§ 191.1-.31 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1978) (Extradition Act), also apply to prisoners subject to Article IV of the Detainer Agreement. We therefore will vacate the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Adams received a copy of the request for temporary custody delineating the nature of the indictment lodged against him, but this notice did not contain a copy of the Agreement. Plaintiff contends that the failure to advise him of his right under Article IV of the Agreement to petition the governor for review of the custody request, as well as the absence of any pretransfer hearing provisions, constitute due process violations. He asserts, also, that the refusal of state authorities to apply the hearing requirement of the Extradition Act denies the affected prisoners equal protection under the law.
I.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is a compact among 47 states and the United States.
Before embarking on an examination of the plaintiff's contention, we must determine if statutory construction will negate the need to confront the constitutional challenges. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). We turn, therefore, to a review of the pertinent parts of the Detainer Agreement.
Article III of the Agreement provides that a person serving a term of imprisonment is to be given notice of a detainer lodged against him by the authorities of another state and has the right to demand disposition of the underlying indictment or criminal complaint. If the prisoner requests that the pending case be processed, he is then transferred to the accusing state where trial must be had within 180 days. Article III(a). This article enables the prisoner to compel the prosecuting authorities in the accusing state to dispose of all pending charges. See Article III(d).
Article IV is addressed to the prosecution and allows the authorities of the charging state to secure temporary custody of the prisoner so that he may be tried on outstanding indictments or complaints. Section (a) of that Article provides a simplified procedure for arranging transfer of the
Before adoption of the Agreement, the only method available to prosecutors to obtain custody of a person in another state was the extradition process. The procedure under the Extradition Act is more elaborate than that spelled out in the Interstate Detainer Agreement. In an extradition proceeding, the governor of the demanding state asks the governor of the asylum state to deliver the accused. The accused is then entitled to a hearing with the aid of counsel
The petitioner here asserts that there has been a denial of equal protection because these procedural measures were not available to him before his transfer under the Detainer Agreement. He contends that since prisoners requested by a state not a party to the Agreement receive these statutory benefits, the Equal Protection Guarantee of the United States Constitution is offended. This argument has been accepted by some state appellate courts, see Moen v. Wilson, 536 P.2d 1129 (Colo.1975); State ex rel. Garner v. Gray, 55 Wis.2d 574, 201 N.W.2d 163 (1972), and rejected by others, Wertheimer v. State, 294 Minn. 293, 201 N.W.2d 383 (1972); State v. Thompson, 133 N.J.Super. 180, 336 A.2d 11 (1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Coleman v. Cuyler, ___ Pa.Super. ___, 396 A.2d 394 (1978). Our reading of the Agreement obviates the need to answer Adams' contention.
In granting the prisoner the right to demand disposition of outstanding charges, Article III imposes a significant limitation in section (e):
The Extradition Act remained in effect after adoption of the Agreement, but when a prisoner chooses to claim the benefits of Article III, he must give up the procedural safeguards of the Extradition Act.
Article IV of the Agreement, which confers power on the out-of-state prosecutor to secure custody of an accused prisoner, contains no explicit provision with respect to extradition. There is, however, an oblique but pregnant reference in section (d) which reads:
We construe section (d) as reserving to the prisoner the rights granted to him under the existing Extradition Acts, absent, of course, the specified exception. Our interpretation is consistent with that of the Council of State Governments, which approved the text of the Detainer Agreement at its 1956 conference. In its comments on the draft, the Council stated:
Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, at 78-79 (1956). See also Meyer, Effective Utilization of Criminal Detainer Procedures, 61 Iowa L.Rev. 659 (1975).
The Council's comments are consistent with the extradition waiver requirements of Article III and explain the savings proviso of Article IV(d). Nowhere in the Agreement is there any indication that the procedural protections of the Extradition Act are abrogated by Article IV and there is no inconsistency between the two enactments, other than the requirement of affirmative action by the asylum governor. Moreover, the fact that Article IV(d) does specifically refer to one minor procedural feature of the extradition process which is to be affected suggests forcefully that the other aspects, particularly those furnishing safeguards to the prisoner, are to continue in effect.
We need not and do not decide whether the Detainer Act could constitutionally eliminate prisoners' rights under the Extradition Act. It is enough that the Agreement does not purport to do so. In a situation of this nature where a statute confers certain procedural rights, the enactment of legislation at a later date does not act as a repeal by implication in the absence of substantial inconsistency between the statutes or evidence of an intention to limit or abolish the rights. To hold otherwise would render Article IV(d) meaningless, in derogation of our duty "to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152, 2 S.Ct. 391, 395, 27 L.Ed. 431 (1882).
Incorporating the prisoner's procedural rights under the Extradition Act is not inconsistent with Esola either philosophically or by its terms. The Agreement still forms the basis for the demand of the accusing state. The only substantial variation is that in carrying out the delivery of the prisoner, the hearing and notification rights of the extradition process will be implemented. To this extent, the two enactments are complementary rather than conflicting.
II.
After argument in this case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court filed its opinion in Commonwealth ex rel. Coleman v. Cuyler, supra, in which it rejected constitutional challenges to the Detainer Act, holding that the prisoner petitioner was not entitled to a hearing or notification of charges.
Although a state's interpretation of its own statute is binding on the federal courts, a different result obtains when the legislation adopts an interstate compact. A compact is an agreement between two or more states and is the subject of a brief and negatively phrased authorization in the Constitution: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power." Art. I, § 10. In a typical situation, an agreement is reached between two or more states, enacted by their respective legislatures, and sanctioned by Congress, often in broad, general terms. At times compacts receive congressional approval before state adoption. Thus, it may be said that a compact is neither exclusively a state nor federal statute but an amalgam of both — in reality, a third category.
Over the years, compacts have engendered diverse problems, such as the question of jurisdiction in the district courts, compare League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 1398, 43 L.Ed.2d 654 (1975) (finding federal question jurisdiction) with Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. Miller, 147 F.Supp. 270 (E.D.Pa. 1956) (rejecting jurisdiction); certiorari jurisdiction in the Supreme Court,
The underlying theory of federal predominance in the interpretation of interstate compacts is that they become a "law of the Union" because of congressional sanction. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 566, 14 L.Ed. 249 (1851). Yet this rationale has been strongly criticized. For example, a compact may treat matters not assigned to Congress by the Constitution and a new and questionable area may be opened to federal oversight. In some instances, moreover, because approval is given before the precise terms of the compact have been determined, Congress never actually passes upon the language of the enactment that is said to be a "law of the Union." See Engdahl, Construction of Federal Compacts: A Questionable Federal Question, 51 Va.L.Rev. 987, 1040-47 (1965).
However valid these objections might be, they are not present in this case. Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution places extradition in the federal domain, and Congress has legislated in this area since 1793, when it passed the first Federal Extradition Act, Act of February 12, 1793, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3182). And although it is true that the compact was sanctioned in advance in only general terms, the Detainer Agreement was later adopted by Congress, ipsissimis verbis, when it made the United States a party.
Accordingly, we express no opinion on the constitutional reasoning advanced in Coleman, since it is not binding upon us. Our analysis of the statute persuades us that prisoners may be transferred under Article IV of the Agreement only after being given the opportunity for a hearing provided in the Extradition Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, 191.10 (Purdon 1964). Therefore, the judgment of the district court will be vacated and the case will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including consideration of the propriety of declaratory relief applicable to members of the class.
FootNotes
In 1970, the United States Government, on behalf of itself and the District of Columbia, joined the compact. Pub.L.No. 91-538, §§ 1-8, 84 Stat. 1397 (1970).
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