WEICK, Circuit Judge.
General Motors Corporation (GM) has perfected an interlocutory appeal to this Court from an order of the District Court denying GM's motion for a protective order seeking inter alia the disqualification of Meno W. Piliaris, an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attorney, from participating in the conduct of a grand jury proceeding investigating alleged income tax evasions by GM. GM contends that such participation by Piliaris is unlawful and creates a conflict of interest or an appearance of such a conflict.
During a 1975 audit by IRS of GM's 1972 income tax returns questions arose concerning the propriety of GM's deductions from income of the cost of expense materials when purchased.
GM conducted the survey. IRS, however, questioned its accuracy. GM contends that agents of IRS began a series of visits to the plants of GM, and they berated GM employees, using abusive tactics and improper behavior. GM filed affidavits with IRS relative to this misconduct, but GM asserts that IRS made no investigation. IRS, believing that GM employees had falsified the survey, stopped routine audit functions and the case was referred to the Intelligence Division of IRS for an investigation to determine whether false or fraudulent statements were made to it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Special agents of the Intelligence Division made several requests for the production of records and documents. When certain records were not produced, a recommendation was made to the Justice Department that a grand jury investigation be made to determine possible violations of the criminal laws by GM.
In February 1977 such an investigation was approved. Willard McBride and Robert Forrest, attorneys from the Tax Division, Department of Justice, were appointed as special attorneys to conduct the grand jury investigation. They in turn sought the assistance of Piliaris, who was an attorney and accountant employed the Office of Regional Counsel, Internal Revenue Service in Cincinnati, Ohio, and who was familiar with the GM income tax investigation. He had drafted the letter from the Regional Counsel to the Justice Department recommending a grand jury investigation. The letter stated that at the appropriate time IRS would request an order from the Court authorizing the disclosure of grand jury information to IRS. Piliaris also drafted a memorandum describing a meeting in which he participated and in which IRS planned its handling of the GM matter in coordination with the proposed grand jury proceedings. He was also familiar with the nature of the criminal investigation. On April 15, 1977 Piliaris was designated by Acting Associate Attorney General Modlin
Numerous grand jury subpoenas were served on GM and on GM employees. GM responded by filing motions to quash and for a protective order which asked the District Court to prohibit the disclosure of grand jury evidence to IRS employees. As a result of these motions the Government suspended the grand jury investigation to await the District Court's ruling on the motions. Subsequently GM learned of the contemplated use of IRS attorney Piliaris as a special attorney before the grand jury. GM then filed a motion seeking an order prohibiting Piliaris from participating in conducting the proceeding, or scrutinizing grand jury materials.
The District Court on June 30th entered orders denying GM's motions with respect to the subpoenas and the disqualification of Piliaris, and granted in part GM's motion for a protective order with regard to the disclosure of grand jury evidence to IRS agents assisting the investigation.
GM filed both a notice of appeal and a motion for a stay of the grand jury proceeding pending appeal. The District Court denied the motion for a stay; and GM immediately filed in this Court a motion to stay the grand jury proceeding. Circuit Judge Engel denied the motion for a stay on the ground that no final appealable order had been entered.
The grand jury investigation then resumed with Piliaris's active participation.
GM filed a motion requesting the District Court to amend the orders of June 30th to include a statement allowing an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This motion was denied with respect to all of the Court's orders except the one denying GM's motion to disqualify Piliaris from conducting the grand jury proceeding. The District Court accordingly amended its order of June 30th so as to provide:
This Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss GM's direct appeal of the District Court's orders on the ground that the orders were not appealable. In the same order we granted leave to GM to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the order denying GM's motion to disqualify Piliaris from acting as a Government attorney in the presentation of the case before the grand jury.
At the outset the Government contends that we have no jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b). It asserts that this section by its express terms applies only to civil actions, and that a grand jury investigation is a criminal proceeding and is not a civil action. The Government has not cited a single case to us which so holds. Interlocutory appeals under Section 1292(b) were allowed in the following cases: In Re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1976); In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 338 F.Supp. 1379 (W.D.Pa.1972).
A grand jury proceeding constitutes "a judicial inquiry." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). It is a grand inquest with powers of investigation and inquisition. The function of the grand jury is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and to protect citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), aff'g 455 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1972); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962). The proceeding becomes criminal as to a defendant when the grand jury returns
Merely because a witness has been subpoenaed to testify and to bring his records before a grand jury, does not involve the witness in a criminal action. If the witness refuses to answer a question on the ground that it tends to incriminate him, and the Court finds him guilty of contempt, he has the right to a direct appeal under Section 1291. In Re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, supra.
Where the witness files a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum on Fifth Amendment grounds, the Court, instead of finding him guilty and punishing him for contempt, from which a direct appeal could be taken, may certify an interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b). In Re Grand Jury Investigation, supra.
Even in a criminal case where a witness had been served with a subpoena duces tecum to bring his tapes and other records, and the Court denied a motion to quash, the Supreme Court held that the witness was entitled to a direct appeal from the order rather than to be subjected to a contempt charge. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974).
The proceedings before the grand jury thus far have been protracted. They should not be converted into a minitrial. If we hold that GM has no right of appellate review GM and the Government could be subjected to a protracted trial and considerable unnecessary expense if an indictment results and the trial court or this Court, on review, holds that the procedure followed was unlawful. Judicial supervision should prevent a wrong before it occurs.
But we need not determine this issue anew because another panel of this Court has considered the Government's motion to dismiss GM's direct appeal under Section 1291 and GM's petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b). The issues were fully briefed and the same contentions made by the parties before that panel are repeated here. The panel granted the Government's motion to dismiss GM's appeal and also granted GM's petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. GM filed its interlocutory appeal pursuant to the order of this Court. We decline to vacate the order allowing the interlocutory appeal.
Even if the order sought to be reviewed is nonappealable under Section 1291 or under Section 1292(b), we hold that the issues presented are subject to review by mandamus, and accordingly we treat this interlocutory appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Young Properties Corp. v. United Equity Corp., 534 F.2d 847, 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 90, 50 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976); United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 808 (5th Cir. 1975); Application of Johnson, 484 F.2d 791, 794 n.2 (7th Cir. 1973); In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916, 918 (1st Cir. 1970); International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1963); International Nickel Co. v. Martin J. Barry, Inc., 204 F.2d 583, 585 (4th Cir. 1953); Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1950).
Courts of Appeals, pursuant to their supervisory powers, may review in a mandamus proceeding questions of unusual importance necessary to the economical and efficient administration of justice. Schlangenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964); LaBuy v. Howes
Such supervisory jurisdiction may arise to correct errors or abuses of discretion on the part of the District Courts in connection with grand jury proceedings. Application of Johnson, supra at 795; United States v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of W. Va., 238 F.2d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 1956); cf. United States v. Briggs, supra; Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1964).
Clearly this is an exceptional case. If GM's assertion concerning the impropriety of Piliaris's presence before the grand jury is correct, not only will a great waste of both time and money ensue in permitting the grand jury to continue its investigation, but such waste will be substantially enlarged if an indictment is returned and GM is forced to go to trial.
If this is not enough, this appeal presents important issues of first impression. As was stated in United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 444 F.2d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972), quoting from Schlangenhauf v. Holder, supra, 379 U.S. at 110, 85 S.Ct. 234:
Cf. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976).
In United States v. King, 157 U.S.App. D.C. 179, 482 F.2d 768 (1973), it was held:
AUTHORITY TO APPOINT SPECIAL ATTORNEYS
GM has questioned the authority of the Attorney General to appoint an administrative agency attorney such as Piliaris as a special attorney. In our opinion this authority is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 515(a), 543. See H.R.Rep. No. 2901, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1906); cf. Schebergen v. United States, 536 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas of Persico, 522 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1975).
Nothing precluding such an appointment is found in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 6(d) of Fed.R.Crim.P. provides that "attorneys for the government" may be present during grand jury sessions. Rule 54(c) defines attorneys for the government as including "the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United States Attorney, an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney. . . ." The original Advisory Committee Notes to Rules 6(d) and 54(c) indicate that they are to be read in conjunction with existing statutes, including 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (previously codified at 5 U.S.C. § 310). 18 U.S.C.A. annots. to Rules 6(d) and 54(c); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas of Persico, supra at 66; United States v. DiGirlomo, 393 F.Supp. 997, 1000-01 & n.2 (W.D.Mo.), aff'd 520 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033, 96 S.Ct. 565, 46 L.Ed.2d 407 (1975). Accordingly, special attorneys appointed pursuant to Sections 515(a) and 543 are authorized assistants of the Attorney General under Rule 54(c), and are therefore attorneys for the Government within the meaning of Rule 6(d). Little v. United States, 524 F.2d 335, 336 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920, 96 S.Ct. 1125, 47 L.Ed.2d 326 (1976).
DISQUALIFICATION OF PILIARIS
The final question is whether Piliaris, on ethical grounds, was disqualified to conduct proceedings before the grand jury as a special attorney for the Government while remaining on the payroll of IRS.
The ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function provide in material part:
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
The evidence does not disclose anything actually unlawful on the part of Piliaris in accepting his appointment. The District Court made no findings of any actual conflict of interest. We consider only the appearance of a conflict of interest which, in our opinion, was established by the evidence in this case, and the District Court should have so found. As was stated by Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman in General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974), in which no actual impropriety was claimed:
This appearance of impropriety arises by reason of the prior connection of Mr. Piliaris with the investigation by IRS of the income tax returns of GM and the recommendations in which he participated when he was serving as attorney for IRS in Cincinnati. It was Piliaris who, while acting for IRS, wrote the letter to the Department of Justice recommending the grand jury investigation of GM. Piliaris, in that letter, stated that at the appropriate time IRS would request an order from the court authorizing the disclosure of grand jury information to IRS under the provisions of Rule 6(e) of the Fed.R.Crim.P. Shortly prior to his appointment as special attorney Piliaris wrote a memorandum describing an IRS meeting which he attended, at which was planned the conduct of its own handling of the GM matter in coordination with the proposed grand jury investigation. Some IRS employees were assigned to various aspects of the investigation and IRS would defer GM's request for civil tax ruling pending the grand jury investigation.
It is clear that the Department of Justice attorneys were interested only in the criminal aspects of the case, whereas IRS was interested in the civil aspects and contemplated asking the Court to permit the use of the grand jury material in its civil matters which included GM's 1972 returns and also later returns which have not been audited.
In United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion for the Court, spoke out against "using criminal procedures to elicit evidence in a civil case. If the prosecution were using that device, it would be flouting the policy of the law."
Congress has granted to IRS adequate powers of investigation with respect to civil matters, and it should not be necessary for IRS to conduct a grand jury investigation in order to obtain evidence for its use in civil cases. 26 U.S.C. § 7601, et seq.
GM asserts that Piliaris, in conducting the grand jury proceeding, could be interested in obtaining an indictment in order to justify the IRS recommendation to the Department of Justice for a grand jury investigation.
GM further complains about the presence of Piliaris in the secret hearings before the grand jury where it would be possible for him to have access to evidence which IRS could use in civil matters against GM, not only with respect to its tax return for 1972, but also with respect to its returns for subsequent years. Piliaris has been placed in a conflicting and intolerable position.
It should also be remembered that the function of the prosecutor, as was held in United States v. Calandra, supra, in addition to obtaining an indictment where probable cause has been shown that a crime has been committed, is also to protect citizens against unfounded criminal prosecution.
In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962), Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing the opinion for the Court, described the function of a grand jury with respect to its protection of the rights of citizens, in stronger terms, stating:
In the present case the worry of GM is that Piliaris has an axe to grind and is more interested in justifying his previous investigations, his recommendations, and the conduct of IRS agents than in protecting GM against unfounded criminal prosecution. It is our duty to determine these important questions now, and not to await review of a possible protracted criminal trial, and not to permit the conduct of grand jury procedures for civil purposes.
In a hearing in the District Court the following exchange took place between the Court and the Government attorney:
As we have held, the power of appointment resides in the Attorney General or in his designated assistant. This power of appointment does not authorize the Attorney General, or his associate, to appoint an attorney who has a conflict of interest or an appearance of a conflict, nor does it immunize such an appointment so as to prevent judicial review. The courts have jurisdiction in a proper case to decide whether such conflict or appearance of conflict exists.
In United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F.Supp. 579 (W.D.Tex.1977), the District Court was faced with a somewhat similar situation. There, Burton Kolko, the former Chief of the Agreements Division of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and who had become a permanent attorney of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice, was commissioned as a special attorney to assist in and to conduct a grand jury investigation of an alleged conspiracy by certain airlines to exclude other airlines from doing business in the Southwest, in violation of the antitrust laws. Certain agreements between the airlines that the Government believed were a part of the alleged conspiracy, had been reviewed by Kolko while he was employed by the CAB. The District Court held that his presence in the grand jury room vitiated the indictment of Braniff. The Court stated, at 583 and 589:
In American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 1966), this Court disqualified the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission from hearing a case because of his prior connection with it, and held that his participation in the case deprived the petitioners of due process of law, and invalidated the order under review. Circuit Judge Phillips (now Chief Judge), who wrote the opinion for the Court, stated:
Other issues are raised by GM which include the conduct by the District Judge of an in camera hearing permitting only counsel for the Government to appear and excluding counsel for GM, cf. United States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1975); and also the entry of an order, copies of which were not furnished to counsel for GM. In view of our disposition of this appeal it is not necessary that we pass upon these issues.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to terminate the grand jury investigation as invalid, and to enter necessary protective orders relative to the use of the grand jury information.
MERRITT, Judge, dissenting.
The majority has concluded that this case is now ripe for review and, reaching the merits, that the Attorney General's appointment of an IRS lawyer to conduct a Grand Jury investigation of General Motors in Detroit is unethical under the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. I disagree with both conclusions.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In February, 1977, the Department of Justice approved the convening of a special federal grand jury in Detroit to investigate possible criminal tax violations by General Motors. On April 15, 1977, the Attorney General appointed an IRS lawyer to assist Justice Department lawyers in conducting the grand jury inquiry. General Motors moved to disqualify the IRS lawyer from participation in the grand jury proceedings on the grounds that public policy considerations and conflict-of-interest principles of the legal profession prohibit such participation by IRS lawyers who have previously participated in a civil tax investigation of the taxpayer.
Finding that the Attorney General's action is specifically authorized by statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 515, 543 (1970), the District Judge overruled General Motors' motion to disqualify but certified the issue to us under the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) as a "controlling question" — apparently on the ground that, if the District Court's ruling were later found to be erroneous, the presence of an IRS lawyer in the grand jury room might void any indictment returned by the grand jury against General Motors or its officials. General Motors pursued its appeal to this Court under the Interlocutory Appeals Act, and it also appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, treating the order as a "final decision" for purposes of review. General Motors did not file an application for mandamus against the District Judge.
The government then moved to dismiss both appeals, the § 1291 appeal on the grounds that the lower court order overruling General Motors' motion to disqualify was interlocutory and not final, and the § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal on the grounds that such piecemeal appeals are not allowed in criminal cases. A panel of this Court consisting of Judges Weick, Edwards and Celebrezze entered an order on October 3, 1977, dismissing General Motors' § 1291 appeal but granting General Motors leave to proceed under § 1292(b).
II. THE QUESTION OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The District Court's order is not reviewable under the Interlocutory Appeals Act, or as a final decision under § 1291 or on mandamus.
The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958 authorizes an appeal of an interim or non-final decision "in a civil action" upon a certification by the District Judge that his
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940) strongly supports the view that this case is a criminal rather than civil appeal and therefore is not reviewable under the Interlocutory Appeals Act or § 1291. There, the Supreme Court decided that a District Court order overruling a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena was not a final appealable order under § 1291. Holding that a grand jury proceeding is part of the criminal process, the Supreme Court based its ruling on the historic principle of judicial administration "forbidding piecemeal disposition" and "separate review of the component elements" of criminal cases. The principle is designed to conserve judicial time and prevent delaying tactics in criminal proceedings. Noting that the Fifth Amendment makes the grand jury a necessary part of the criminal process, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, explained that "it is no less important to safeguard against undue interruption the inquiry instituted by a grand jury than to protect from delay the progress of the trial after an indictment has been found."
In U. S. v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971) the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the holding of Cobbledick and the principles on which it is based, observing that non-compliance resulting in a contempt citation is the only way to obtain review of such a grand jury question in advance of indictment and trial:
General Motors as the target of the Grand Jury investigation has the same appellate remedies that were available in Ryan. It can raise the disqualification of counsel issue after indictment and conviction, the normal course of review in criminal cases, or it can refuse to obey grand jury subpoenas on this ground and appeal a contempt citation. These are the usual remedies, and they are adequate.
Justice Frankfurter in Cobbledick and Justice Brennan in Ryan apply these principles of appellate review in order to prevent piecemeal appeals from grand jury activity under § 1291, but the Interlocutory Appeals Act, passed eighteen years after the Cobbledick decision, is based on the same set of principles forbidding piecemeal consideration of criminal cases. The Act limits interim review of "a controlling question of law" to civil cases only and, therefore, should not be read to allow piecemeal review of grand jury activity.
It is true, as the majority opinion suggests, that the Supreme Court made an exception to the Cobbledick-Ryan principle in the Nixon Tapes case, characterizing as a "final, appealable order" Judge Sirica's denial of the President's motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum, an order that in other circumstances would not be considered "final" under § 1291. After reaffirming Cobbledick and Ryan, the Court states the reason for making an exception in that case:
The Nixon case is, therefore, distinguishable, unless we think that General Motors is in the same position as the President and cannot be investigated by a grand jury without causing a "constitutional confrontation."
Nor should we review this case on mandamus. General Motors has not applied for a writ of mandamus against the District Judge, and the principles discussed in Cobbledick and Ryan apply in double measure to the use of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus as a means of piecemeal review in criminal cases. Reasoning that mandamus may only be used in "exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial `usurpation of power,'" the Court in United States v. Will, 389 U.S. 90, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967) rejected the government's mandamus action to compel a district judge to limit pretrial discovery in a criminal case, adding that "this general policy against piecemeal appeals [by mandamus] takes on added weight in criminal cases." Id. at 95, 88 S.Ct. at 274.
The district judge below has handled General Motors' claim with deliberation, patience and forbearance, in my opinion, and is not guilty of "judicial usurpation."
III. THE CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST QUESTION
The Court holds that the IRS lawyer is disqualified under Canon 9 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility after conceding that the Attorney General appointed the lawyer in accordance with specific statutory authority granting him the power to appoint a lawyer to represent the government for a particular case or grand jury investigation. Canon 9 provides that "a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."
In this case the lawyer has not accepted new employment that either creates a conflict of interest or creates the appearance of a conflict of interest. There is no conflict of interest between the Department of Justice and the Internal Revenue Service. If the lawyer had left General Motors to participate in the grand jury proceedings, General Motors would be entitled to have the lawyer disqualified on grounds of conflict of interest. In tax cases, however, the investigative arm of the government, the IRS, and the litigative arm, the Department of Justice, must exchange information; and they may also exchange the people in the departments who have the information.
In a civil tax investigation of General Motors, the IRS uncovered information which led it to suspect criminal tax fraud. It gave the information to the Justice Department which initiated a grand jury investigation and deputized an IRS lawyer familiar with the facts so that he could participate in the grand jury investigation — a natural, not a sinister, sequence of events.
Here the majority seems to have confused the demands of the canons of ethics of lawyers with the code of conduct of judges. In its opinion, the majority relies upon two cases, American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), and United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F.Supp. 579 (W.D.Tex.1977). In American Cyanamid this Court on due process grounds overturned a decision of the FTC because one of the judges participating in the decision had conducted a legislative investigation of the same facts while serving as chief counsel of a Senate Subcommittee. We must recognize, however, that while litigants are entitled to an impartial tribunal,
In light of the above discussion, I would conclude that neither appellate jurisdiction nor a conflict of interest exists in this case. In addition, both conclusions are strongly supported by the most recent amendment to Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
1. Exchange of Grand Jury Information. Under the new Rule 6(e), most grand jury proceedings may be disclosed to "an attorney for the government" or "to such governmental personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law." Under the old rule, disclosure could be made only to "attorneys for the government," but not to other "government personnel."
The Senate Report on the proposed amendment states that the purpose of the change is to facilitate the kind of intra-government cooperation which occurred in this case and to enable federal prosecutors in grand jury proceedings to benefit from the expertise of agents from other departments and agencies of government:
The Senate Report goes on to say that there is "no intent to preclude the use of grand-jury developed evidence for civil law enforcement purposes. On the contrary, there is no reason why such use is improper, assuming that the grand jury was utilized for the legitimate purpose of criminal investigation." Id. at 532. There is no showing in this case, and no finding by the Court below, that the government is using the grand jury for impermissible purposes or that the exchange of information or employees between the IRS and the Justice Department is improper.
2. Interlocutory Review of Grand Jury Proceedings. The old Rule 6(e), according to the Senate Report, had created a "state