This case presents for decision an issue of first impression in this Commonwealth and one which is of great import to the administration of the system of juvenile justice. The issue is whether a judge of a Municipal Court, sitting in the capacity of a Juvenile Court judge, properly ordered the police department of Boston to expunge from its records fingerprints, photographs, and other records pertaining to the arrest of a juvenile when a delinquency proceeding against him had been dismissed with prejudice. The expungement order which issued also required that same police department to retrieve copies of such data sent to other law enforcement agencies and to turn over all such records to the court for destruction.
Prior to stating the procedural history of this case, the facts underlying it, and the arguments advanced by the parties, we think it appropriate to summarize our views at the outset of this opinion. We conclude that the police department of the city of Boston generally has the right to create and maintain records pertaining to the arrest of juveniles,
We turn now to consideration of the relevant facts and principles involved in this proceeding. This case was initiated by a complaint filed in the county court by the police commissioner of Boston under the provisions of G.L.c. 249, § 4, and G.L.c. 211, § 3. The complaint sought relief in the nature of certiorari against the judge who caused the particular expungement order to be entered. The complaint requested the county court to quash the order of the judge or, alternatively, to remand the entire case to "an appropriate forum" for a further hearing. After the defendant judge filed his answer, the juvenile who had been arrested was allowed to intervene in the case. A single justice reserved and reported the case without decision on the pleadings and a statement of agreed facts.
The statement of agreed facts shows that the juvenile was arrested on January 10, 1975, and charged with an act of delinquency, G.L.c. 119, § 54, by reason of assault with force and intent to rob, G.L.c. 265, § 20. That matter came on for hearing in a delinquency proceeding in the juvenile session of the Municipal Court of the Dorchester District on February 7, 1975. At that time the Commonwealth informed the judge that it could not proceed with the case due to the unavailability of the alleged victim. The judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The juvenile's
The statement of agreed facts further shows that routine police procedures were followed in developing the records in issue. After his arrest, the juvenile had been taken to police headquarters where he was booked, fingerprinted and photographed. The records created, maintained, and disseminated are as follows:
(1) Three copies of the juvenile's fingerprints were made. One copy remained at police headquarters, one copy was sent to the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety to be filed with the identification division, and one copy was sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2) Three copies of front and side photographs of the juvenile were made. One copy was sent to the police station in the district in which the arrest was made, one copy was sent
(3) An arrest booking sheet form was completed in four copies by the booking officer at the police station. One copy was kept at the district station, a second was given to the arresting officer, and the last two were sent to central police headquarters, with one copy forwarded to the record section and one to the identification section.
(4) A so called incident report was filled out in two copies, one of which remained at the district station and one of which was forwarded to the central headquarters record section.
(5) A three-by-five inch file card was filled out at police headquarters containing the name of the juvenile and a cross-reference to yet another form maintained at headquarters containing spaces for more information.
It thus appears from the statement of agreed facts that information of varying specificity regarding the arrested juvenile was created by or distributed to: the arresting officer, the district police station, the record section and identification section at police headquarters, the identification division of the Department of Public Safety, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
At the time of this litigation the policy of the Boston police department regarding disclosure of juvenile arrest records was to follow the procedures established by the Legislature for dissemination of adult criminal records.
The plaintiff argues that the order of the Juvenile Court judge is invalid on three grounds. He argues that the order is void (a) because the plaintiff was not a party to the action in which the order was entered and was afforded inadequate notice and opportunity to be heard, (b) because it was beyond the jurisdiction and authority of the defendant judge, and (c) because it was unsupported by any facts found by him. The defendent judge and intervener juvenile argue that a judge of a Juvenile Court has inherent power to order expungement of a juvenile's record after a dismissal of charges, that the order was a reasonable means of protecting the juvenile from the harmful effects of an arrest record, and that the order was properly made, on adequate notice, within the ancillary powers of the Juvenile Court.
Necessary to the resolution of these conflicting claims is a consideration of the statutory framework pertaining to the creation, maintenance, preservation and dissemination of such records, and the statutes pertaining to the powers of the Juvenile Court. We need also identify the respective
1. The Statutory Basis for Arrest Records.
General Laws c. 263, § 1A, as amended by St. 1972, c. 217, provides that anyone who is arrested or taken into custody by a police officer "and charged with the commission of a felony shall be fingerprinted ... and may be photographed. Two copies of such fingerprints and photographs shall be forwarded within a reasonable time to the commissioner of public safety...." See G.L.c. 41, § 98; c. 94C, § 45. The Boston police department applied G.L.c. 263, § 1A, as applicable on its face to the juvenile in the case before us. The conduct for which the juvenile was arrested was an alleged violation of G.L.c. 265, § 20, conduct which would constitute a felony if he were an adult. The juvenile does not challenge the authority of the police to have taken fingerprints and photographs or to have compiled an arrest record, and thus we need not consider here whether a person "charged with the commission of a felony" includes juveniles who are arrested for the equivalent of a felony but charged with "delinquency" in accordance with the statutory directive. See G.L.c. 119, § 54. While there does not appear to be any explicit statutory requirement that police maintain or preserve juvenile records, the plaintiff police commissioner states that it is the policy of his department to retain them permanently. The creation and preservation of such records under such a policy would seem a proper exercise of the commissioner's statutory grant of power to provide all "needful rules and regulations for the efficiency" of the police department of Boston, St. 1962, c. 322, § 11, and within the general mandate for preservation of public records under G.L.c. 66, § 8, as amended. It appears at the outset, therefore, that these records were properly made and properly could be maintained absent some contrary statutory provision or valid judicial order.
2. Statutory Limitations on Dissemination.
The Legislature has provided a mechanism for the expungement of criminal records. As we have already noted, notes 3 to 5, supra, a Criminal History Systems Board was created by G.L.c. 6, § 168, to administer and regulate "criminal offender record information [CORI]." The board has the duty to assure the accuracy and completeness of CORI, as well as to prevent its unauthorized disclosure. § 171. Cf. G.L.c. 66A, as amended through St. 1977, c. 691, §§ 6-13. In addition, the board is directed to promulgate regulations "assuring the prompt and complete purging of criminal record information, insofar as such purging is required by any statute or administrative regulation, by the order of any court of competent jurisdiction, or to correct any errors shown to exist in such information...." G.L.c. 6, § 171. Purging is defined to mean the removal of information so that "there is no trace of information removed and no indication that said information was removed." § 167. The broad and comprehensive legislative
The Legislature has provided separately for the disposition of criminal records involving the possession of a controlled substance in violation of G.L.c. 94C, § 34. Section 44 of that chapter, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 533, § 1, provides that if a person is found not guilty of a violation of § 34, or if a complaint is dismissed or an indictment "nol prossed," then "the court shall order all official records relating to his arrest, indictment, conviction, continuance or discharge to be sealed; provided, however, that department records maintained by police and other law enforcement agencies which are not public records shall not be sealed." The section also provides that a person as to whose record such sealing has been ordered will not be guilty of perjury or of making a false statement in response to any inquiry by reason of failing to recite or acknowledge the matter sealed. This section originally referred to the "expungement" of records, but was amended by St. 1973, c. 533, § 1, to refer to "sealing." The same change was made by St. 1972, c. 806, § 23, to analogous provisions of G.L.c. 94C, § 34, applicable to certain first-time offenders.
General Laws c. 276, § 100C, inserted by St. 1973, c. 322, § 1, provides that probation records and court records must be sealed in criminal cases on the request of a defendant who has been found not guilty, as to whom no bill has been returned by the grand jury, or where there has been a finding of no probable cause by the court. Sealing may be ordered by a court in a criminal case in which a nolle prosequi or a dismissal has been entered. The section requires that inquiries involving sealed records be answered by saying that no records exist, except in the case of inquiries by "any law enforcement agency or any court." Section 100A of the same chapter allows persons with certain criminal records to obtain, after a specified period of time, the sealing of court and probation records on a showing of nonconviction of other offenses. Again, inquiries involving
Our review of statutes to this point has dealt entirely with provisions which by their terms involve records generated in the criminal, rather than the juvenile, justice system. A number of observations can be made based on that survey, however, which are relevant to the issues before us. It is clear that the Legislature has been made aware of the interests of those with arrest and court records. It is equally clear that the response of the Legislature has been measured so as to recognize the legitimate interests of courts, police and other authorities in access to such information. Sealing, in preference to expungement, of records usually has been specified where interests in confidentiality have been recognized. Police, as well as courts, have been given special consideration with regard to access to sealed information. Additionally, specific legislative authorization for the sealing of records has extended only to court and probation records; arrest or other police records have not been included in the specific sealing provisions and, in at least one instance, nonpublic police records have been explicitly excluded.
Overlaying the specific sealing provisions is the broad regulatory scheme of G.L.c. 6, §§ 167-178, establishing a criminal record information system. These administrative mechanisms for ensuring confidentiality of records, and purging of records when appropriate, are provided to effectuate legislative policies regarding criminal history records. The Legislature thus has indicated that the purging, or expungement, of such records is potentially available; this action may be taken as provided by statute or by authorized administrative regulation. G.L.c. 6, § 171. Additionally, the further provision that purging may be required "by the order of any court of competent jurisdiction," id., is not to be read as a grant of power to issue such orders, but as
3. Juvenile Records.
Having canvassed those statutory provisions relative to the disposition of criminal records, we now focus on the activity of the Legislature specifically with regard to juvenile records.
The Legislature has taken action to protect juveniles against the consequences of the free and open dissemination of the records of juvenile delinquency proceedings. In G.L.c. 119, § 60, the Legislature mandated that an adjudication of delinquency shall not be admissible in any proceeding involving the juvenile, except subsequent delinquency proceedings or for purposes of disposition, and, in addition, provided that such prior histories should not disqualify the juvenile from efforts to obtain public employment in the Commonwealth. While the policy of the statute may, in limited instances, have to yield to countervailing constitutional considerations, see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), we have recognized that it was the intent of the Legislature "to provide broadly for the confidentiality of juvenile records." Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 368 Mass. 182, 185 (1975). See also Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 361 Mass. 214 (1972). General Laws c. 119, § 60A, limits access to court records in a juvenile case and precludes public inspection of them. Finally, § 65 of that chapter precludes public access to juvenile proceedings.
General Laws c. 276, § 100A, as amended through St. 1975, c. 278, also provides protection for juveniles from economic harm in regard to employment opportunities. The Commissioner of Probation, in response to all authorized inquiries except those from law enforcement agencies, is directed to state that no record exists where there exist records of court appearances and adjudications of delinquency in cases which have not been transferred to the Superior Court. Section 100A also allows a juvenile in the same class of cases to respond "no record" to an appropriate inquiry in an application for employment, by virtue of the following language: "[A]ny applicant for employment may answer `no record' with respect to any inquiry relative to prior arrests, court appearances and adjudications in all cases of delinquency or as a child in need of services which did not result in a complaint transferred to the superior court for criminal prosecution." This provision makes no reference to whether the juvenile record is sealed.
This survey of the applicable statutory law shows that the Legislature has recognized the need to take action to minimize the harm that can flow from the ready availability of Juvenile Court and probation records.
A remedy to this gap was attempted by the enactment of St. 1972, c. 805, § 1, inserting G.L.c. 6, §§ 167-178. The statutory scheme, previously described, seems only to authorize "purging" of data from the system if it is found to be "inaccurate, incomplete or misleading," but the Criminal History Systems Board may order that the records be modified or supplemented as opposed to purged. G.L.c. 6, § 175. The salient fact about this entire scheme however is that in restricting its applicability to "criminal offender record information," the statute excluded noncriminal proceedings such as those involving juveniles, see G.L.c. 6, § 167, as amended through St. 1977, c. 691, § 2, and the board so limited its jurisdiction. Criminal History Systems Board Regulation 1.5 (1974). This latter factor would negate the applicability of this statutory scheme to this case but for the fact that the Boston police department treats
A number of things appear from the above analysis. First, to the extent that the provisions of G.L.c. 6, §§ 167-178, may offer the juvenile protection from the adverse consequences of the dissemination of his record, such protection is only available in Boston; even then it is dependent on administrative fiat. Second, it appears that, in regard to adult records, G.L.c. 6, § 171, authorizes the promulgation of regulations for "purging" in accord with the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, thus recognizing a judicial power, left undisturbed by statutory enactment, to order the expungement or its equivalent of certain criminal justice data apart from the Criminal History Systems Board regulations and the statute. Third, there is at present no statutory right to expungement of juvenile records maintained by a police department. We do not conclude, however, that the Legislature has sought to preempt judicial power in this area. The failure of the Legislature to take action to limit access to juvenile records maintained by a police agency does not preclude the exercise of judicial power under the appropriate principles of law. We proceed to examine those principles.
1. The State Interest in the Compilation and Maintenance of Arrest Records and Identification Data.
The previous survey of legislative enactments and administrative policies concerning the compilation, maintenance,
The maintenance of fingerprint, photograph and arrest records serves an important law enforcement function. It has been said that juvenile arrest records are necessary to know an offender's previous antisocial behavior to determine appropriate dispositions and that their maintenance provides a source of information about persons and conditions which may threaten the public welfare. Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices and the Juvenile Offender, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 567, 602-603 (1969). Moreover, it has been noted that arrest records serve "as a means for identification and apprehension of criminals.... Statistical experience tells [police] that persons with arrest records commit a higher percentage of crimes than persons who do not have arrest records." Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 748 (D.C. Cir.1969) (Tamm, J., dissenting in part). United States v. Kalish, 271 F.Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967). In addition to the records of arrest, additional justifications have been advanced for the retention of fingerprints. Most particularly, it is said that the maintenance of such files allows identification of "a person printed on a given occasion as the same person who was printed on a previous occasion. The purpose of this procedure is to establish the presence or absence of a record of previous offenses." Ferster & Courtless, supra at 598.
More specific justifications have been advanced for the retention of juvenile arrest records. One court, noting numerous incidents of juvenile crime, has stated that such records may be of assistance in informally disposing of the
Two points should be readily apparent. The first is that arrest records play an integral role in the over-all function of the criminal justice system in terms of the investigative, prosecutorial,
2. The Nature of Harm to the Individual.
In recent years much attention has been focused on cases dealing with the effect on individuals of the maintenance and dissemination of arrest records. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 900 (1972); Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 753 (1976) (juveniles); Volenik, Juvenile Court and Arrest Records, 9 Clearinghouse Rev. 169 (1975); Comment, Amplification of Arrest Records by Criminal Courts: A Judicial Compromise, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 139 (1975); Comment, Police Records of Arrest: A Brief for the Right to Remove Them from Police Files, 17 St. Louis L.J. 263 (1972); Comment, Arrest Record Expungement — A Function of the Criminal Court, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 381 (1971). See also Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 837 (1971).
The very reasons which are asserted in part to justify retention of such records may serve as the source of the injury.
Although in our society the mere fact of arrest is not considered probative of anything, Schware v. Bar Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957), the fact remains that "[a]ny citizen, even one with an absolutely clean lifetime record of not violating the law, through a series of circumstances could find himself charged with a violation of the law even though he may be entirely innocent of the charges. Our system of criminal justice will in due course bring out the truth and he will be cleared. But his record will not be cleared. And although he has been cleared under our laws, at any future time the cloud of prosecution against him will remain to all who one way or another gain access to it: be it inquiries concerning employment ... or investigations concerning other criminal offenses." United States v. Dooley, 364 F.Supp. 75, 78-79 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also Hess &
It is particularly clear that the existence of such records is likely to be devastating in the case of the juvenile. The potential for further contact and possible harrassment by law enforcement authorities predicated on the existence of a worthless or almost worthless arrest record is likely to breed a cynicism and disrespect for the law which could not help but be counterproductive in so far as rehabilitation of the juvenile is sought.
The apprehension of injury from a juvenile arrest record is not without basis in Massachusetts. We have seen that there are no statutes in the Commonwealth regulating the maintenance and dissemination of juvenile arrest records. The possibility of their availability to sundry governmental agencies has been demonstrated. Even in Boston, where the police department follows an administrative policy of adhering to the Criminal History Systems Board guidelines, the protections afforded are less effective than may appear.
To be considered together with this substantial danger of harm to the juvenile is recognition that the maintenance of the source of the injury may not serve any valid State purpose. More to the point, as the apparent utility of the records decreases, there is a concomitant increase in the juvenile's interest in being insulated from the possible adverse consequences of the existence and dissemination of the records.
3. The Power of the Courts to Order Expungement.
It appearing that there is a grave potential for injury to a juvenile due to the maintenance and dissemination of his records, and that the statutes of the Commonwealth, the
We note that requests to expunge have arisen in a variety of procedural settings, including civil rights proceedings, post-conviction proceedings, and actions brought directly against the custodian of the records sought to be expunged. See United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975), for a summary of cases involving these various procedures. The Linn case involved, as does this case, a request to expunge in the proceedings in which the arrestee received a favorable disposition. The Linn court held that the trial court had such power. The power of a court in such circumstances is not dependent on its possession of general equity powers, Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir 1969), see St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268 (1976), but is an incident of and ancillary to the court's original jurisdiction.
The terms "jurisdiction" and judicial "power" often are used interchangeably, for jurisdiction "is a term of comprehensive import." Paige v. Sinclair, 237 Mass. 482, 483 (1921). Jurisdiction concerns and defines the power of courts, encompassing the power to inquire into facts, apply the law, make decisions, and declare judgment. Id. at 483-484. It is a first principle that the jurisdictions of the several lower courts of this Commonwealth, and therefore their powers, are limited to those granted by the Constitution
The primary purpose of recognizing ancillary jurisdiction is to ensure that a particular court judgment is given complete and final effect. Subsumed within this broad rationale are practical considerations in favor of judicial economy and against piecemeal litigation which are effectuated by allowing a litigant to resolve all matters arising from a particular transaction in a single forum and in a single proceeding. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728
4. The Power of a Juvenile Court to Order Expungement.
The plaintiff commissioner has argued that even if the power of expungement may be exercised by the courts in the Commonwealth, the Juvenile Court is not among those so empowered. He grounds this argument first on the lack of specific statutory authorization. His second argument concerns the fact that the Juvenile Court does not possess the necessary powers of equity to order the particular remedy. In this context, the plaintiff's complaint prays that, should
The District Courts, including the juvenile session of the Municipal Court of the Dorchester District, are "courts of superior and general jurisdiction with reference to all cases and matters in which they have jurisdiction...." G.L.c. 218, § 4. See G.L.c. 218, §§ 19-20 (civil), §§ 26-37 (criminal). That the District Courts are not courts of general equity jurisdiction, see G.L.c. 218, § 19C, is of no particular relevance to the question of the proper exercise of their powers under the statutes granting jurisdiction to these courts as to matters involving juveniles. Delinquency proceedings against juveniles are governed by G.L.c. 119, §§ 52-63, and jurisdiction in the first instance lies exclusively in the juvenile session. Joyner v. Commonwealth, 358 Mass. 60, 62 (1970).
The philosophical underpinnings of the juvenile justice system in this Commonwealth are revealed in the directive that statutes concerning delinquency proceedings "shall be liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance." G.L.c. 119, § 53. This court has often recognized the unique character of the Juvenile Courts as forums in which, to the extent possible, the best interests of the child serve to guide disposition. This rehabilitative goal applies equally to juveniles charged with the most serious offenses as to those charged with minor offenses. A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272,
The statutory and case law of this Commonwealth thus firmly support the assertion that the Juvenile Courts have a broad mandate to act in furtherance of a child's welfare. Moreover, this special characteristic of Juvenile Courts has been recognized and respected by the Supreme Court in the course of delineating those Federal constitutional safeguards applicable to juvenile proceedings. It may appear that an expungement order directed to the police is an exercise of power different in kind from an exercise of discretion regarding disposition after a finding of delinquency. Such an expungement order is motivated, however, by the same concerns regarding adverse present and future consequences
The position asserted by the defendant judge and the intervener is consistent with the philosophy underlying the juvenile justice system. General Laws c. 119, § 53, states a rehabilitative philosophy which mandates the avoidance of the attachment of the stigma of criminality to the juvenile. Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 651 (1959). A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272, 282-283 (1976). There would be a considerable irony if a court charged with exercising its function in a manner consistent with § 53 was viewed not to have the power to take the necessary steps to ensure that in proper circumstances the juvenile shall suffer no injury as a result of involvement with the judicial process by the dissemination of records which have in some ways an impact equivalent to criminal records. Accordingly, the scope of a Juvenile Court's powers necessarily implies that a Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to order expungement of police records as a matter ancillary to its power to hear and dispose of a complaint in a manner consistent with the best interests of the child and the philosophy of the Juvenile Court system. See In re Smith, 63 Misc.2d 198, 204 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970).
Given our recognition of the potential injuries which may flow from the maintenance and dissemination of the records in this case, it is clear that in the proper circumstances a final, complete and effective disposition of the juvenile complaint will require expungement.
The record in this case fails to reveal, however, that there was any consideration by the defendant judge of the interests of law enforcement in the maintenance of the records in issue. Nor is it shown whether the order of expungement was issued in light of a reasoned view that such an order furthered the interests of the intervener juvenile. Since the principles we have set forth in this opinion require a consideration and balancing of the competing interests involved, we cannot say that the defendant judge's order was properly issued on the basis of the record before us. Further, we agree with the plaintiff that adequate notice and opportunity to be heard ought to be given to all parties, including one in the position of the plaintiff, before such an order be entered. In ruling on the request for the issuance of an order of expungement (or sealing) a written statement by the judge setting forth the facts, the interests considered, and the reasons for the particular order — or denial thereof — would be an appropriate and preferable practice to be followed.
We remand this case to the single justice for the entry of an order transferring it to the Municipal Court of the Dorchester District for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
"It is further ORDERED that Commissioner Robert DiGrazia, his deputies, agents, and employees recall and retrieve all fingerprints, photographs and other identifying data concerning the juvenile ... which may have been forwarded to any law enforcement agencies, in or out of the Commonwealth, so that no trace of the information so retrieved, remains;
"It is further ORDERED that Commissioner Robert DiGrazia, his deputies, agents, and employees, deliver to the Court all of the juvenile's fingerprints, photographs and identifying data, and all copies thereof which exist, so that the Court may properly destroy them."
Statute 1977, c. 841, also added the following sentence to G.L.c. 6, § 172: "Notwithstanding the provisions of this section or chapter sixty-six A, the following shall be public records: (1) police daily logs, arrest registers, or other similar records compiled chronologically, provided that no alphabetical arrestee, suspect, or similar index is available to the public, directly or indirectly; (2) chronologically maintained court records of public judicial proceedings, provided that no alphabetical or similar index of criminal defendants is available to the public, directly or indirectly; and (3) published records of public court or administrative proceedings, and of public judicial administrative or legislative proceedings."
The expungement order in the case before us has been characterized as an exercise of remedial power pursuant to the ancillary jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. It is possible that the characterization of the order as an exercise of remedial power was intended to invoke a secondary meaning of the term "ancillary jurisdiction" — that of the "power of a court to issue different types of remedies to effectuate its conceded jurisdiction over some subject matter." Morrow v. District of Columbia, supra at 732 n. 10. We agree with the Morrow court that the use of the term would be more appropriately reserved for situations of the type first discussed, and not where the court's jurisdiction over the matter is conceded and only the extent of relief is at issue. See id. at 732-733 n. 10. However, we need not conclude in this case that the order of expungement directed to the police was merely a particular form or type of relief effectuating the court's conceded jurisdiction to determine the delinquency case before it. The order was intended to remedy the perceived injustice of stigmatizing this juvenile with an arrest record that would survive the dismissal of the charge against him. See Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir.1974) ("The judicial remedy of expungement is inherent and is not dependent on express statutory provision, and it exists to vindicate substantial rights provided by statute as well as by organic law" [citation omitted]).