CALOGERO, Justice.
We granted a writ of certiorari in this personal injury damage suit to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal reducing substantially a significant jury award.
Plaintiff, a general laborer then twenty years old, was injured while operating an unguarded dado saw at Sherwood Homes, Inc. where he was employed in the business of constructing mobile homes. After a six-day trial, a civil jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $350,000.00, subject to a stipulated credit of $23,147.32 comprising workmen's compensation benefits earlier received by plaintiff.
Originally a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the quantum award. A rehearing was granted and thereafter a five-judge panel in the Court of Appeal reduced the award to $140,000, subject to the compensation credit. One
We granted review (La., 332 So.2d 864) upon plaintiff's complaint that the drastic reduction violated Civil Code Article 1934(3) and the principles announced in Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So.2d 149 (1963); Ballard v. National Indemnity Company of Omaha, Neb., 246 La. 963, 169 So.2d 64 (1964); Lomenick v. Schoeffler, 250 La. 959, 200 So.2d 127 (1967); and restated in a number of cases since, including these: Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So.2d 351 (La.1974); Bitoun v. Landry, 302 So.2d 278 (La.1974); Revon v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 296 So.2d 257 (La.1974); Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 294 So.2d 803 (La.1974); Boutte v. Hargrove, 290 So.2d 319 (La.1974); Fox v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 288 So.2d 42 (La.1973); Walker v. Champion, 288 So.2d 44 (La.1973); and Miller v. Thomas, 258 La. 285, 246 So.2d 16 (1971).
In the foregoing cases we have repeatedly referred to the Article 1934(3) assertion that in the assessment of damages in cases of offenses, quasi offenses and quasi contracts, "much discretion must be left to the judge or jury."
And we have asserted, initially in Miller v. Thomas, supra at p. 19 that
Recitation of the principles governing the legal issue presents no problem for our appellate courts. It is the application of those principles to particular cases which has proved difficult on occasion. Two questions are especially troublesome. What, in a given case, constitutes an acceptable quantum judgment in the sense of its being neither excessive nor inadequate within the framework of the legally-directed "much discretion" accorded judge or jury? When do awards in other possibly similar, reported cases properly aid (or erroneously mislead) an appellate court in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion by a given judge or jury?
The appellate court is aided in answering these questions by such later expressions of this Court as these:
Nonetheless, the ultimate determination by an appellate court as to whether a given judge or jury abused their "much discretion" as a matter of law is a judgment call, a fact which, of course, explains why on rehearing in this case, of the five judges only three (and even one of the three had been of the contrary view on original hearing) concluded that $140,000 rather than $350,000 was the legally acceptable quantum judgment and why three members of this Court have dissented to this very opinion.
Further complicating the already difficult problem is that this Court is constantly acting on writ applications alleging error by appeal courts in judgments applying the principle of Article 1934(3). In its opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal discussed many of the cases wherein this Court denied writs of certiorari following an adjustment in the quantum by a Court of Appeal, and it concluded from such study that this Court does not intend to take from the lower courts the right to review quantum awards made at the trial level. The Court of Appeal's conclusion that this Court intends for the appellate courts to continue to review quantum awards, is correct
Realistically, in quantum issues, as in other issues, there must necessarily be a degree of uncertainty in predicting the ultimate result in a given case. Results will differ principally because of the myriad differences in the cases presented for review. And, of course, there will continue to be honest disagreement among appellate judges when they attempt to determine whether the "much discretion" of Article 1934(3) has been abused in the trial court, and when they attempt to seek aid by looking to other possibly-comparable decided cases. Focusing an informed judgment tempered by a fair recognition of the discretion vested in the trial judge or jury (see the Chief Justice's comment in Miller v. Thomas, supra) is no simple task resulting in uniform result among judges engaged in appellate review.
We do reemphasize, however, that before a Court of Appeal can disturb an award made by a trial court that the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award. Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc., supra; Bitoun v. Landry, supra; Fox v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra; Walker v. Champion, supra. Only after making the finding that the record supports that the lower court abused its much discretion can the appellate court disturb the award, and then only to the extent of lowering it (or raising it) to the highest (or lowest) point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that court. Bitoun v. Landry, supra; Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Company, Inc., supra. It is never appropriate for a Court of Appeal, having found that the trial court has abused its discretion, simply to decide what it considers an appropriate award on the basis of the evidence.
Further we believe that, heretofore, courts of appeal have placed too much emphasis on their review of other reported decisions. Certainly no two cases are ever fully alike. And whether two cases are so similar as to produce like quantum judgments is hardly discernible by gleaning the facts of the comparable decision from simply a written opinion of an appellate tribunal. Of course, another factor bearing on this matter is that significant change has been, and is taking place in our society not
These preliminary observations behind us, we proceed to examine the case under consideration in order to determine whether the Court of Appeal was wrong in finding as they did that the jury in this case abused the much discretion accorded it by law.
The following portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeal on original hearing in our view fairly describes certain of the facts pertinent to the case at hand:
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In his testimony Mr. Thomza, plaintiff's boss, made several statements concerning the amount of diminished earning capacity plaintiff suffered at his job in comparison with the earnings of other mechanics. He said that because of his partial hand loss plaintiff was less productive in his work. A fair assessment of that testimony is that mechanics who compare favorably with plaintiff in competence and drive, but with two good hands, were earning on the commission piece work anywhere from three thousand to eight thousand dollars annually more than plaintiff.
Photographs in the record reveal that plaintiff's injury is grossly disfiguring. Testimony indicates he is ashamed and humiliated by the grotesque appearance of his lobster claw right hand. It is a source of mental trauma to him. Plaintiff who is right handed is handicapped to accomplish such simple things as buttoning up the front of his shirt. He cannot button his left shirt sleeve nor left jacket sleeve; he cannot remove anything from either of his right hand pockets, side or rear, with his right hand; he cannot tie a tie; he cannot tie his shoe laces except with great difficulty; he cannot use a knife and fork nor other eating utensils except with difficulty; he cannot wash his face or brush his teeth except in an awkward manner; he cannot pick up a pencil or a coin off of a table with his right extremity; and use of hand tools is something he accomplishes only with extreme effort and difficulty.
Three of the five members of the Court of Appeal concluded on rehearing that the highest award which could be allowed in this case for general damages is the sum of $75,000, and that $65,000 is sufficient to compensate him for loss of earnings. These sums made up the $140,000 to which the Court of Appeal reduced this plaintiff's award.
We have thoroughly reviewed this record and desist from speculating what part each of the major items (general damages and loss of wages) played in the total award of $350,000.
As indicated in the Court of Appeal's recitation of facts (which we have adopted hereinabove) and our assessment of other pertinent evidence, to which we have alluded at various parts of this opinion, plaintiff's virtually complete loss of his right hand was disabling to an extreme degree with debilitating physical and mental consequences; and his loss of past and future earnings was for not less than forty-five years, and except earnings for two or three years immediately succeeding his injury, was not less than $5,000 annually. Whatever the composition of the jury award, we conclude from a review of this record that the jury did not abuse its much discretion in concluding that plaintiff was due for his injury the total sum of $350,000.
Able counsel for defendant has vigorously though unsuccessfully argued the merit of the Court of Appeal reduction and the propriety of that court's application of the legal principles governing appellate review of trial court quantum awards. We will attempt to answer certain of his specific complaints.
Defendant contends that no more than $61,017.28 was proven by plaintiff to be his loss of future earnings. He argues that the jury probably allowed $225,000 for
Although defendant's argument is a persuasive one if we accept his initial premises, he oversimplifies the import of the economist's testimony, disregards the witness' consideration of plaintiff's restricted opportunity in a competitive labor market, and assumes factual bases which might have been, but apparently were not found by the jury. It is clear to us that the evidence was sufficient to warrant significantly different conclusions on the part of the trial jury. For these reasons we are unimpressed with defendant's otherwise plausible computations.
Defendant had argued in the Court of Appeal, and inferentially does so again in this Court, that a plaintiff earning $2400 annually at the time of an injury who asserts a minimum $5,000 annual earnings loss at the time of trial, from a newly-found occupation, may not use this basis because prohibited by the rules requiring minimization of damages (plaintiff cannot by choosing his particular trade increase his loss of earnings). In support of this argument defendant cites this language from Viator v. Gilbert, 253 La. 81, 216 So.2d 821, 822 (1968):
But the full indemnification to which an injured party is entitled under Article 2315 (Jordan v. Travelers Insurance Co., 257 La. 995, 245 So.2d 151 (1971)) includes damages for decreased earning capacity which is determined by deducting plaintiff's earning ability after the injury from his earning ability immediately prior to the injury rather than by deducting his income after the injury from his income prior to the injury. The Court of Appeal on original hearing emphatically rejected defendant's argument and said:
We believe that the foregoing passage from the Court of Appeal opinion on original
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeal is set aside and the quantum judgment of the district court reinstated. Accordingly there is herewith decreed judgment in favor of plaintiff Gary James Coco, against Universal Underwriters Insurance Company in the sum of $350,000 together with legal interest thereon from date of judicial demand until paid, and all costs of these proceedings including expert witness fees fixed by the district court, subject to a credit against the above judgment in the sum of $23,147.32, being the total sum of workmen's compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff.
SANDERS, C.J., dissents in part and assigns written reasons.
SUMMERS, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by the Court of Appeal.
MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
MARCUS, Justice (dissenting).
I am of the opinion that the court of appeal correctly reduced the award from the sum of $350,000.00 to the sum of $140,000.00. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
SANDERS, Chief Justice (dissenting).
In Miller v. Thomas, 258 La. 285, 246 So.2d 16 (1971), this Court summarized the jurisprudence relating to the appellate review of general damages as follows:
Plaintiff's injury consisted of the loss of four fingers and part of the palm of his right hand. The medical procedure and residual effect are described in the majority opinion.
The Court of Appeal, applying the above principles of appellate review, concluded that the jury had abused its discretion in awarding $350,000. It reduced the award to $140,000. The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge had failed to review the award, because of his erroneous opinion that he was prohibited from doing so.
As the record reflects, I did not join in the granting of the writ, being of the opinion that the Court of Appeal had committed no error of law in its judgment. Unquestionably, the Court of Appeal applied the principles of review announced in the decisions of this Court. Moreover, I noted that the trial judge had not reviewed the award in accordance with our normal procedures.
After further consideration, I agree with the Court of Appeal that the jury abused its discretion in awarding $350,000. The award is equivalent to an income of over $26,000 per year for the remainder of plaintiff's life. An award of this magnitude is clearly unwarranted. Louisiana law allows no punitive damages. Our consideration, therefore, is restricted to compensatory damages only. Plaintiff is not totally disabled and is regularly employed. He has received no medical attention since shortly after the accident. He suffers no pain and leads a relatively normal life. Giving the plaintiff a liberal appraisal of his injury, I would fix the award at $200,000.
For the reasons assigned, I respectfully dissent.
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