McCALEB v. JACKSON

KELLY, Justice.

Plaintiff, Willie McCaleb, appeals from a judgment dismissing with prejudice her complaint against defendant St. Paul Housing and Redevelopment Authority (hereinafter the authority) for failure to serve notice of claim on the authority as required by Minn.St.1971, § 466.05. Plaintiff was injured on December 15, 1972, when she slipped on a snow-covered cellar door and fell through that door on premises owned by the authority and rented by defendant Dora Jackson. Plaintiff served her complaint on the authority on December 3, 1973. The district court dismissed as to the authority on November 18, 1974. Plaintiff has conceded that she did not serve notice of claim on the authority within 30 days of the date of her injury as required by Minn. St.1971, § 466.05.1

The sole issue she raises on appeal is whether the notice-of-claim requirement of that statute applies to an action against a municipal housing and redevelopment authority. We hold that it does and affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Minn.St.1971, § 466.05, subd. 1, provided in part:

Minn.St. 466.01 defines "municipality" as: "any city * * *, any county, town, public authority, public corporation, special district, school district * * * or other political subdivision." (Italics supplied.) The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether defendant authority is a public authority or public corporation within the meaning of this section.

The Housing and Redevelopment Act describes a municipal housing and redevelopment authority as "a public body corporate and politic." Minn.St. 462.425, subd. 1, and § 462.445, subd. 1. We view it as too plain to be contested that a housing and redevelopment authority is both a public authority and a public corporation.2

Plaintiff relies on our decision in Schultz v. Ruiz, 281 Minn. 281, 161 N.W.2d 537 (1968), in which we held that the notice-of-claim requirement found in Minn.St.1961, § 465.09, a predecessor of the statute at bar which was repealed by L.1963, c. 798, § 16, was not applicable to an action against a municipal housing and redevelopment authority. In that case we found a clear conflict between the notice-of-claim statute which applied generally to "any city" and Minn.St. 462.455 of the Housing and Redevelopment Act which provides: "An authority shall be liable in contract or in tort in the same manner as a private corporation." We resolved that conflict in the following manner:

In deciding Schultz, we noted that the notice-of-claim statute in that case had been replaced with Minn.St. 466.05 of the Tort Liability Act, but we declined comment on the effect of the latter statute since that issue was not before us. 281 Minn. 286, 161 N.W.2d 541.

Plaintiff's reliance on Schultz is misplaced for several reasons: First, the notice-of-claim statute involved in that case did not define the term "city," thus making it unclear whether that statute was intended to apply to municipal housing and redevelopment authorities. In contrast, § 466.01 defines the term "municipality" to include public authorities and public corporations. We cannot overlook such a clear expression of legislative intent to extend the benefits of the notice-of-claim requirement to municipal housing and redevelopment authorities. See, Sorenson v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission, 289 Minn. 207, 183 N.W.2d 292 (1971) (applying § 466.05 to the Metropolitan Airports Commission as a public corporation).

Second, the instant case is precisely within the exception alluded to in our language in Schultz quoted above. Minn.St. 466.01 and 466.05 are parts of the Tort Liability Act of 1963,3 a general law enacted after Minn.St. 462.455 of the Housing and Redevelopment Act.4 A reading of the Tort Liability Act renders irresistible the conclusion that the legislature intended it to apply generally to municipal tort liability. Therefore, the Tort Liability Act must prevail over the earlier § 462.455 on the question of notice of claim.5

Third, if further evidence of legislative intent is needed, it can be found in Minn.St. 466.11, which provides:

Minn.St. 462.455 of the Housing and Redevelopment Act, as it applies to the requirement of notice of claim, is a special law and is superseded by §§ 466.01 to 466.15.6

Unlike other injured parties recently before this court, plaintiff does not attempt to show actual notice on the part of the authority within 30 days of her injury.7 Nor does she assail the constitutionality of the notice-of-claim requirement.8 In short, she gives no reason why she should be excused from the requirements of § 466.05. We would note, however, that this statute may prove to be manifestly unfair to persons with valid claims for serious injuries. The injured party might not know who owned the premises or instrumentalities of injury or reasonably expect that a lapse of 30 or 60 days without serving a notice would irrevocably bar recovery. Moreover, when the government carries on a business in the same manner as a private entity and thereby subjects other parties to the same risks of injury, it is only fair that it have no additional advantage in defending claims. See, Nieting v. Blondell, Minn., 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975).

We hold that the notice-of-claim requirement in Minn.St. 466.05 applies to a negligence action against a municipal housing and redevelopment authority, and, since plaintiff admits she did not comply with that requirement, her action was properly dismissed.

Affirmed.