Although some authority exists to support appellant's proposition that a municipal police officer lacks authority outside of the municipality which he serves to make a warrantless arrest for the commission
The question will remain open however because appellant has not presented it in a posture susceptible to adjudication.
Appellant's motion for dismissal was overruled by the court upon a holding
Appellant has not directly appealed or challenged those findings, but argues, in effect, that once officer Barnickel was outside of the city of Hamilton he ceased to be a policeman with respect to Anderson. Such argument fails to recognize that the offenses for which Anderson was charged and convicted arose out of Anderson's interference with a concededly valid policeman-arrestee relationship.
The record adequately establishes a violation of R. C.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
O'NEILL, C. J., HERBERT, STERN and W. BROWN, JJ., concur.
CELEBREZZE, J., concurs in the judgment.
CORRIGAN and P. BROWN, JJ., dissent.
CORRIGAN, J., dissenting. Absent statutory authorization, an arrest without a warrant for the commission of a misdemeanor, committed in his presence but not within the municipal limits which he serves, cannot be made by a police officer outside the corporate boundaries of the municipality which he serves.
"The officer was in pursuit; the officer had a right to make the arrest after he was pursuing him [Hubbard] for offenses which occurred within the city of Hamilton. And it's my opinion that anyone obstructing that arrest under the state law, the officer would, also, be entitled to arrest him. * * *
"* * *
"Well, I'm going to hold * * * [where] a police officer is lawfully chasing a person for an offense which occurred in his community that if at the end of the chase someone tries to interfere with him arresting that man, he is violating the law. And I hold that."