OVERSEAS MOTORS, INC. v. IMPORT MOTORS LIMITED, INC.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND A NEW TRIAL

FEIKENS, District Judge.

This action is brought by Overseas Motors, Inc. (Overseas) against Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft (ANAU), Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (VWAG), Volkswagen of America (VWOA), and Import Motors Limited, Inc. (Import). Plaintiff alleges violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Count I); Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Count II); and Section 2 of the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (Count III).

Background

Overseas is a Michigan corporation. Prior to July of 1968 it operated a Detroit area dealership specializing in NSU trademarked automobiles. After that date its business expanded to include the importation and distribution of NSU cars in a ten (later eleven) state area.

ANAU, a German corporation, is the successor to NSU Motorenwerke Aktiengesellschaft (NSU), manufacturer of NSU automobiles, and Auto Union Gmbh (Auto Union), manufacturer of Audi automobiles. The two companies merged in 1969. Since that time ANAU has continued to produce both lines of cars.

VWAG is a German corporation engaged in the manufacture of Volkswagen automobiles. VWOA, a New Jersey corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of VWAG; its sole function is the importation and distribution of Volkswagen, Porsche and Audi cars in the United States.

Import, a Michigan corporation, distributes Volkswagen, Porsche and Audi cars in the midwestern United States. Although a part of the Volkswagen distribution network, it is independently owned and operated.

Between June 17 and July 1 of 1968 Overseas entered into an importer contract with NSU. It provided, inter alia, that plaintiff was to have the exclusive right to import and distribute NSU automobiles in a ten state area; that any extension of the contract was reserved; that plaintiff was to deal only in NSU products; that the contract might be terminated at the end of any calendar year after 1969 upon three months notice by any party; that the contract was to be governed by and interpreted in accordance with German law; and that disputes were to be submitted to a court of arbitration sitting in Zurich, Switzerland.

To obtain its automobiles Overseas was required to submit a "firm order" to NSU which was binding on Overseas but not on NSU. "Within the frame of the production available" NSU would respond with a "confirmed order" which was binding on both parties, subject apparently to Overseas providing an adequate letter of credit.

After entering into this agreement, Overseas began building and supplying a dealer network of modest proportions. Then in March of 1969 NSU and Auto Union agreed to merge, the merger being completed in August of that year. Sometime between then and the summer of 1970 there began what plaintiff has referred to as a "pinching off" of its supply of automobiles. By the end of 1970 plaintiff was unable to obtain any cars from ANAU. Meanwhile, in December of 1969 Overseas had applied to Import for a retail Porsche-Audi franchise, but the application was never acted upon. In September of 1971, after the relationship between Overseas and ANAU had almost broken down, Overseas once again sought to obtain a Porsche-Audi franchise. This time Import approved the application and forwarded it to VWOA for final action which was never taken. Overseas eventually abandoned its efforts, secured a Fiat dealership, which it presently operates, and instituted this lawsuit.

The Arbitration

Shortly after the commencement of this action ANAU gave notice to Overseas of its intent to submit Overseas' grievances to arbitration, as provided for in the contract. Overseas objected to any such proceedings and moved this court for a stay of arbitration on the ground that only antitrust issues, which the arbitrators would not be competent to pass on, were involved. This motion was denied, and on November 24, 1972, ANAU filed a complaint with the court of arbitration in Zurich asking it to declare that ANAU had not breached its contract with Overseas and to determine the date upon which the contract had been or would be terminated. Overseas refused to participate. The court of arbitration proceeded, and in its decision of May 24, 1973, made findings of fact and law and handed down a judgment in favor of ANAU. An English translation of the arbitrators' opinion was completed on June 14 and made available to all parties. Trial in this case commenced on July 5.

Upon completion of opening statements, and prior to the offer of any testimony, defendants interposed an objection in limine to the admission of any evidence inconsistent with the findings and decision of the court of arbitration, based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Defendants subsequently extracted the following list of findings and conclusions from the arbitration opinion, and requested the court to limit the proofs and permissible inferences therefrom in this case in accordance with those findings and to so instruct the jury.

Collateral Estoppel

Inherent in the concept of law as a mechanism for settling disputes is the requirement that properly rendered judgments must effectively bind the parties thereto.

This essential principle is formally recognized in the broad, judicially created doctrine of res judicata.2

One of the doctrine's two basic applications, to which use of the term res judicata is often restricted, prevents relitigation of any facet of a once tried cause of action. The other — the doctrine of collateral estoppel — prevents relitigation of particular issues which have been previously resolved as part of a different cause of action.3

There are five basic requirements for collateral estoppel:5 (1) There must be a final6 and valid7 judgment affecting the same (or similarly situated) parties as appear in a second action;8 (2) the issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action;9 (3) the issue must have been raised, considered, and actually adjudicated in the prior action;10 (4) the issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action;11 and (5) the resolution of that issue must have been essential to the judgment rendered (i. e., not dictum).12

The presence of several of these preconditions in this case is undisputed. The arbitration was properly commenced under the terms of the importer contract, and its outcome is determinative as to all contractual rights and liabilities.13 That it was an arbitration rather than a judicial proceeding does not affect its authority as res judicata,14 nor does the fact it was before a foreign rather than a domestic tribunal.15 The findings of the arbitrators were relevant and material to the central issues of the arbitration and essential to their resolution. Although not all defendants were parties to the arbitration, the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel,16 which would have precluded strangers to that judgment from taking advantage of it here, has been thoroughly discredited and largely discarded in the federal courts.17 Consequently, all defendants may properly benefit from any estoppel arising out of the arbitration.

There are other conditions, however, which plaintiff argues have not been met. It asserts that: (1) defendants waived the affirmative defense of an arbitration award or estoppel by failing to raise it in the pleadings; (2) the decision of the court of arbitration was in the nature of a default judgment, and the issues resolved by that panel were therefore not "fully litigated" as is required for estoppel; (3) in view of plaintiff's appeal from the decision of this court refusing to stay the arbitration, the award is not final; and (4) the matters considered by the arbitrators involved exclusively antitrust issues which the arbitration court was incompetent to adjudicate.

Waiver — Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires affirmative defenses, including arbitration and award, estoppel, and res judicata, to be pleaded as such.18 Failure to plead an affirmative defense is generally held to constitute a waiver of that defense, at least to the extent that its proponent may not introduce evidence in support thereof.19 The apparent harshness of this rule is considerably mitigated, however, by several judicially recognized exceptions.20 An affirmative defense is not waived, even though not specifically pleaded, where it is based upon the opposing party's own proofs or pleadings,21 where there was no opportunity to raise it in the pleadings,22 or where it is tried by express or implied consent of the opposing party.23 The majority of cases also hold that affirmative defenses may properly be raised by motion to dismiss24 or for summary judgment,25 and that absent prejudice, leave to amend the pleadings to include an affirmative defense should be freely granted.26

Although defendants argue that Rule 8(c) is inapplicable here because the estoppel is raised as a rule of evidence rather than an affirmative defense, that argument is not persuasive. This case is unusual in that the issues sought to be foreclosed are evidentiary or mediate rather than ultimate; plaintiff would be restricted in its proofs, but the restrictions would not be dispositive as a matter of law of any of the ultimate questions (antitrust issues) in this case.27 In this sense the estoppel principles involved do resemble rules of evidence. There is, however, a crucial difference. A rule of evidence is essentially procedural; it limits the mode of proof, not its objective. An affirmative defense is substantive, and restricts what may be proved (by any means) rather than prescribing how points properly in issue may be proved. Collateral estoppel, because it operates as a limitation on the issues in a case, not on the types of evidence which may be introduced in support of those issues, is a substantive defense. Being extrinsic to the plaintiff's prima facie case it is affirmative in nature, and therefore falls within the ambit of Rule 8(c).28 Nevertheless, there are good reasons for rejecting plaintiff's argument.

First, the substance of the defense was in fact pleaded in paragraph 19 of ANAU's answer, raising the arbitration as a jurisdictional bar.29 Of course the defense of res judicata had not matured at the time the answer was filed,30 and it was not possible for all of its essential elements to be pleaded with specificity, nor was there even an explicit reference to its future application. But at the very least plaintiff was apprised of ANAU's intent to proceed with the arbitration and to assert it in some manner as a limitation on this lawsuit. Under the liberal system of notice pleading established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure31 such an averment adequately informs the opposing party of the existence of the defense, thereby fulfilling the requirement of Rule 8(c).

Alternatively, even if this original pleading were insufficient to raise collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense, that issue has entered the case in other ways which fall within the exceptions to Rule 8(c). Although plaintiff did not mention the arbitration in its pleadings, it did interject it as an issue in this case in a very substantial way by its motion to stay the arbitration proceedings. The effect was no different than if it had appeared on the face of the complaint, and plaintiff cannot now exclude from the case a matter it has itself put in issue.32 Plaintiff also failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of evidence at trial in support of defendants' claim of estoppel.34 Having once permitted evidence of an affirmative defense into the case without objection, plaintiff has expressly or impliedly consented to trial of that issue and cannot reverse that decision and object at a later date to its non-pleading.35 Finally, because the arbitration court's decision was handed down well after the answers in this case were filed, there was no prior judgment which could have been pleaded as res judicata in those answers. This lack of opportunity excuses any failure to plead the affirmative defense prior to the time it arose.36 Once the defense became available, defendants were required to raise it within a reasonable time. This they did by an appropriate motion at the opening of trial.37

In support of these conclusions it must be noted that the plaintiff's position on this issue is one of sheer technicality. "The purpose of [requiring res judicata and collateral estoppel to be pleaded as affirmative defenses] is to give the opposing party notice of the plea of estoppel and a chance to argue, if he can, why the imposition of an estoppel would be inappropriate."38 That purpose has unquestionably been fulfilled in this case. Plaintiff all along the way has been well aware of the arbitration and its potential significance. It has had ample time and full opportunity to prepare, brief, and argue its position on the merits, and has done so not only fully but interminably. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate one scintilla of prejudice it has suffered as a result of defendants' failure to frame a pleading under the rubric of res judicata/collateral estoppel. In these circumstances amendment of defendants' pleadings to expressly set forth such a defense would readily be permitted at any point during the trial or even thereafter;39 to refuse such a request might constitute an abuse of discretion.40 To hold that the defense has been waived merely because no request to amend was ever made would represent an equally intolerable miscarriage of justice.41

Default Judgment — Collateral estoppel applies only to those issues which were "actually" or "fully litigated" in the prior action.44 However, this rule does not refer to the quality or quantity of argument or evidence addressed to an issue. It requires only two things: first, that the issue has been effectively raised in the prior action,45 either in the pleadings46 or through development of the evidence and argument at trial or on motion;47 and second, that the losing party has had "a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially"48 to contest the issue.49 The general rule therefore is that subject to these restrictions default judgments do constitute res judicata for purposes of both claim preclusion50 and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).51

The restatement position is contrary — that a default judgment may not be used as a basis for collateral estoppel52 — and has some limited support in the cases53 and commentary.54 To the extent this reluctance is founded (as it seems to be) upon the possible injustice of compelling a defendant to engage in expensive and time-consuming litigation over relatively trivial matters, at the risk of being forever bound by the plaintiff's allegations if he does not, a blanket refusal to recognize collateral estoppel in default cases is far too heavy-handed and indiscriminate a remedy. The two-part test referred to above is far more functional. It not only protects against the abuses of unforeseeability, by including such factors as incentive to litigate and choice of forum in the calculus of full and fair opportunity,55 it is also more sensitive to those instances in which the legitimate functions of an estoppel and the absence of abuse compel a different result.

The decision of the Zurich court of arbitration meets both preconditions for the use of a default judgment as collateral estoppel. It appears from an examination of the complaint and the arbitrators' opinion that the findings made therein do relate to matters raised in the complaint. They were formally put in issue and properly before the tribunal; decision on them was within the scope of that proceeding as defined by the complaint. Plaintiff also had a "full and fair opportunity to argue [its] version of the facts"56 before the court of arbitration. The possible inconvenience of litigating in that forum is outweighed by its voluntarily assumed contractual obligation to do so in the event of a dispute. Although plaintiff has consistently denied any intention to pursue its contractual remedies for ANAU's alleged breach, and thus might ordinarily have had little incentive to contest ANAU's claim of no liability under the contract, it is undenied that the arbitration was a proper proceeding for the determination of contractual rights and liabilities. To the extent that plaintiff has itself raised these same issues in this case it cannot argue that the possibility of estoppel by prior decision was unforeseen. This is simply not a case where a party defaults because it has little interest in the outcome of the first suit, and is then surprised by the later application of its result to a matter of much greater moment.

Finality — "[I]t is familiar law that only a final judgment is res judicata",57 but finality for these purposes, much like finality for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,58 is not the equivalent of immutability. The judgment need only make a currently effective disposition of the issues raised; the possibility of future impairment in separate proceedings generally does not diminish its effectiveness as res judicata.59 This is true in most states60 and in the federal courts61 during the pendency of an appeal, unless the appeal will involve a trial de novo.62

The arbitration award was not directly appealed nor has its operation been in any way impaired. The appeal from this court's refusal to stay the arbitration can at best have no greater effect than would a direct appeal of the award itself. The fact that it will not be determined until after a decision is entered in this case63 merely emphasizes the necessity of proceeding on the record as it presently exists.

Antitrust and Contract Issues — Claims arising under the antitrust laws are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.64 They are not subject to arbitration and no res judicata qua claim preclusion could be based on any such proceeding.65 As this court has previously determined, the questions submitted to the Zurich court of arbitration were not in the nature of antitrust claims. That cause of action was bottomed on contract, and in the absence of allegations that the contract itself was intrinsically violative of the antitrust laws, such actions are not preempted by this court's exclusive authority over them.66 Conversely, an adverse judgment in that case is no bar to maintenance of antitrust claims arising out of the same transactions.

The far more difficult question now before the court is the extent to which issue preclusion through collateral estoppel must also be limited in antitrust suits in order to preserve a viable policy of pre-emption. It is one thing to conclude that because the arbitration was based on a different cause of action and performed a distinct and legitimate function it was a proper proceeding, which could not be stayed and which resulted in a valid, binding judgment. It is quite another to conclude that the arbitrators' decision must be given collateral as well as direct effect so as to predetermine in some measure the result of this separate antitrust suit.

This suit and the arbitration are based almost entirely upon the same series of events. In lesser measure they also involve identical questions as to the jural significance of those facts. Thus, as between these two actions, many of the preliminary determinations of fact and law upon which a judgment must ultimately be based concern identical issues.66a

Identity of issues is absolutely essential for the invocation of collateral estoppel. If particular issues in the two suits differ in any significant way, a prior determination of one is simply irrelevant to a later determination of the other. Yet the greater the range and significance of identical issues in the two cases, the more conclusive will be the estoppel effects of the arbitration, the greater will be their infringement on this court's exclusive jurisdiction, and the stronger will be the reasons for refusing to give effect to them.

It is this foreclosure factor which demands some restriction upon the application of collateral estoppel in antitrust cases. Determining exactly how much requires some means of comparing the degree of foreclosure involved in preclusion of various kinds of issues, an inquiry in which the judicially developed distinction between evidentiary, mediate and ultimate issues or data67 is helpful. The classic version is Judge Learned Hand's definition in The Evergreens v. Nunan:68

Those facts which Judge Hand termed "mediate" may be further divided into those consisting of raw sensory data existing wholly independent of any legal standards (evidentiary facts), and those which represent applications of law to fact, but unlike ultimate facts, do not conclusively establish a legal right or liability under the law applicable to that case (mediate data).

For example, in the instant case a finding of the existence or non-existence of a conspiracy in restraint of trade would be an ultimate fact. Because plaintiff claims that a restraint of trade was accomplished through a breach of the importer contract, a finding of the existence or non-existence of such a breach would be a mediate datum. It is a conclusion based on law applied to fact, but because the antitrust laws do not make breach of contract the occasion for imposition of sanctions, it is not an ultimate issue in this action. In the arbitration, however, such a finding would represent an ultimate fact. Finally, a finding that ANAU shipped Overseas x number of cars in 1969 is intrinsically non-legal and would therefore be evidentiary.

Viewed from this perspective, there are two polar positions as to the proper scope of issue preclusion in antitrust cases (with the parties apparently, and perhaps predictably, situated at the furthest reaches of each). At one extreme, collateral estoppel could be permitted as to all but ultimate facts. This is clearly unacceptable. Evidentiary and mediate findings, although never reaching the level of absolute foreclosure because they can never be per se dispositive, may nevertheless so undermine the factual and legal foundations of an opponent's case that he is left without any means of proving his contentions. At the other extreme, because the foreclosure of any issue creates some limitations on the evidence available to support the estopped party's contentions, it is possible that no collateral estoppel whatsoever should be permitted in antitrust cases. This position is equally unacceptable, for it fails to give proper weight to the important policies underlying the principles of res judicata.70

A rational middle ground is suggested by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co.:71

In this suit Overseas is acting as a private attorney-general, litigating issues in which there is a public as well as a private interest.73 As with any other litigant, the public is entitled to a "full and fair day in court". Because the public interest was neither represented nor considered in the arbitration proceedings, which resolved a purely private dispute, plaintiff may now be afforded an opportunity to relitigate certain previously decided issues. Those issues to whose determination a public interest attaches may be termed "antitrust issues", and as to them there can be no collateral estoppel.74

It does not follow, however, that anything which affects this case, however remotely, is thereby transmuted into an antitrust issue and open to redetermination. The range of foreclosable issues need only be narrowed sufficiently to assure plaintiff here a reasonable opportunity to vindicate the public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws. To go any further toward relieving plaintiff of the burden of the arbitration award would be to confer on it an undeserved benefit, unnecessary to protect the public's antitrust interests, and in direct contravention of the public interest in the finality of judgments which underlies the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

The line between foreclosable and non-foreclosable issues represents a balancing of these interests, and it is in the nature of any balancing test that it relies heavily upon the particular facts of each case. Still, the standard of foreclosability is likely in most cases to closely approximate a standard of centrality.

Conversely, where the prior decision is not intimately and inextricably bound up with the central issues in the antitrust case, but merely determines matters of fact and law which are incidental to the antitrust claim, the prior adjudication ought to be accorded effect as res judicata.76

It is worth noting that this standard produces a result which is at odds with the ordinary applications of collateral estoppel. Under this approach issues which are ultimate in the second (antitrust) action can never be foreclosed by estoppel; mediate and evidentiary issues may be, depending on their importance in the case. In the majority of cases, however, estoppel is applied to ultimate issues only. The estoppel is dispositive as a matter of law, and the prospect of imposing non-dispositive findings of fact upon the trier of the fact in the second action is one which courts have faced with some uneasiness. There is even authority for the proposition that collateral estoppel applies exclusively to issues which are ultimate in the second action.77 Nonetheless, although this point is little discussed in the cases reaching an inconsistent result, there are many instances in which the court has upheld an estoppel as to issues which were not ultimate in the later proceeding.78 The ultimate issue restriction has, in any event, little support in policy or logic.79 It is at best a device for restricting the doctrine's application to conceptually and administratively easy issues of law, avoiding the difficulties of imposing a partial limitation on the trier of fact. There is no good reason why, in appropriate circumstances, such limitations ought not to be imposed.80

Specific Preclusions

In the course of identifying the forecloseable issues in this case, three categories were established: (1) findings of the court of arbitration that for a variety of reasons other than the public interest in antitrust preemption, were considered inappropriate for estoppel; (2) findings too intimately connected with the central issues of this case to permit an estoppel; and (3) findings to which the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be applied without offense to the public interest.

Miscellaneous Nonbinding Determinations — Finding number 3 merely confirms a previous decision of this court. In any event, both 3 and 4 are matters of law as to which there can technically be no estoppel. Numbers 11, 18, 26, 27 and 30 concern rights and liabilities under the contract which are irrelevant to the issues in this case. Several others are adequately covered by other findings. Number 24 is merely a confusing summation of numbers 21, 22 and 34. Number 28 is irrelevant except to the extent it is subsumed under number 29, and numbers 16, 31 and 35 are relevant only insofar as they are included in finding number 12. Numbers 19 and 21 are too imprecise and ambiguous. Finally, numbers 20 and 34 relate to matters not clearly put in issue, at least during plaintiff's case, and thus are not appropriate for presentation to the trier of fact at this stage of the case.

Issues to Which a Public Interest Attaches — Findings dealing with orders, production, letters of credit and emission standards tread too near a central issue of plaintiff's case — the "pinching off" of its supply of cars and the reasons for it. Whether the diminished supply was (or at least could be) part of a conspiracy to restrain trade or monopolize is an issue central to the antitrust case. Findings number 9, 10, 14, 22, 32 and 33 all come too close to foreclosing that issue from any serious dispute.

In a similar fashion defendants seek through finding number 13, and to a lesser extent number 14, to exclude the Ro-80 model NSU automobile from the ambit of the importer contract and effectively from this case. Plaintiff relies heavily on ANAU's use of the Ro-80 as a "carrot on a stick", employed as a means of manipulating Overseas and effecting the defendants' conspiracy to restrain trade. It is also an important though undeveloped element of the charge of bad faith dealing under Count III. The trier of fact ought not to be limited by the implications of finding number 13 that Overseas could have no right or interest in the Ro-80, even though a very narrow construction of it might arguably be acceptable. Finding number 8, stating simply that "ANAU has performed its obligations under the Importer Contract", may be characterized as the ultimate finding of the court of arbitration. It is far too broad and the issue far too important to permit foreclosure.

Binding Determinations — The remainder of the proposed findings — numbers 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 15, 17, 23, 25 and 29 — help define "what the parties have promised each other or the action to which they are presently bound", without deciding "crucial factual antitrust issues".81 They are binding upon both court and jury, and may not be controverted.

Directed Verdict

Procedure — After approximately five weeks of trial, it appeared that the plaintiff's remaining proof consisted of some fifteen depositions and several hundred exhibits. Colloquy in chambers at that time developed the certainty that defendants' counsel would present and argue a motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's proofs. The court then suggested and counsel agreed that the jury should be given a short recess while the court read the remaining depositions and studied the exhibits not yet offered by plaintiff. Counsel agreed to an arrangement by which these materials could be considered along with the evidence already presented to the jury in determining defendants' motion. It should be noted that while counsel for defendants agreed to the procedure, they did not necessarily agree to the ultimate admissibility of either the deposition testimony or the exhibits. Equally important, while the court notified counsel for the defendants that for the purpose of the motion it would consider all of the testimony offered by the plaintiff, including testimony concerning settlement discussions (a portion of which had been excluded by the court during trial), it did so without prejudice to the defendants' right to continue their objections to any evidence they considered inadmissible in the event the motion for directed verdict was denied.

Standards for Directing a Verdict82 — A directed verdict is appropriate where there is a complete absence of proof on an essential element of a party's cause of action or defense,83 or where the proofs adduced in support of that element are so insignificant as to be the equivalent of no proof.84 The precise level of non-persuasion required has been variously described, but in essence is reached whenever the facts, and any inferences which may reasonably be drawn from them, point so strongly toward the non-existence of an essential element that no reasonable man could find for its existence.85

Of course it is a well-established rule that the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.86 Thus, no rational inference favoring the plaintiff may be rejected because of conflicting evidence or inferences or questions as to a source's credibility.87 Even so, once a conclusive deficiency of proof is shown, the court is obligated to direct a verdict. Justice and the integrity of the law itself permit nothing less.

The Complaint — In the catalog of grievances which constitutes Count I of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to force it out of business as an importer-distributor of NSU automobiles by inducing ANAU to breach its importer contract with plaintiff. In furtherance of the conspiracy ANAU is alleged to have engaged in a "pinching off" of plaintiff's supply of automobiles; refused to market the Ro-80 (a wankel engine car developed by NSU) in the United States, even after plaintiff had been led to believe that it would get the Ro-80 and had expended time and effort in promoting it and aiding in emissions testing; and refused to recognize plaintiff's right under the importer contract to import and distribute Audi automobiles. Based on these actions, defendants are charged with a violation of Sections 1 through 7 of the Sherman Act. Count II alleges a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act based on a merger between ANAU and VWAG in July of 1970. Count III is a claim under the Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act for defendants' failure to comply in good faith with the terms of the importer contract.

The Evidence — To assist in its review of the evidence, the court asked plaintiff's counsel to summarize in a memorandum the testimony and exhibits which plaintiff contended supported its prima facie case. Careful attention has been given to these materials.

Of course the eleven findings of the court of arbitration form a core of established and uncontrovertable fact. No inference may be drawn which is inconsistent with them. Within these limitations, and viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence permissibly supports the following findings:

1. In the months of January through August, 1969, plaintiff ordered approximately 2,140 cars and received 200. The merger of NSU and Auto Union was completed on August 21, 1969, the date on which plaintiff claims the "pinching off" was begun. In the remainder of 1969 plaintiff ordered 550 cars and received 70. In 1970 approximately 208 cars were received out of a total of 2,065 ordered. In 1971 and 1972 the orders totaled 1,570 and 1,727 respectively; no cars were received.89 It may therefore be permissible to conclude that Overseas' supply of cars dried up following the merger. However, because the ratio of cars received to cars ordered increased for more than a year after the merger before dropping off drastically, it cannot be said that the "pinching off" itself actually began or directly coincided with the merger.

It is important to note that plaintiff has not demonstrated that the failure of ANAU to confirm Overseas' orders was unjustified under the contract. Although the court of arbitration determined that ANAU did not breach the contract by its non-deliveries, those findings were not accepted as binding on this court, and the issue remained open, susceptible of proof by plaintiff. It was accepted, however, that the importer contract by itself did not constitute an order for the delivery of specific cars and parts nor did it create an obligation on the part of ANAU to deliver all cars plaintiff ordered.90 There were qualifications on plaintiff's right to receive cars. There is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that ANAU's failure to deliver any or all of the cars ordered by plaintiff was a violation of the importer contract.91

2. Plaintiff has argued at length that the Ro-80 was an "NSU automobile" within the meaning of the importer contract and despite contrary evidence a jury could reasonably so conclude. Both NSU and ANAU presented the Ro-80 as a revolutionary vehicle with tremendous sales potential, particularly in view of its wankel engine. A flood of evidence was offered to show the enthusiasm of NSU, ANAU and Overseas for the Ro-80. Plaintiff exerted its best efforts to promote this and other NSU vehicles and to create a market for them in this country, and assisted NSU in a series of emissions tests designed to qualify its cars (particularly the Ro-80) for importation in the United States. From all of this one might conclude, as plaintiff urges, that it was encouraged to believe that it would be heavily involved in distribution of the Ro-80 in this country. This "carrot on a stick" was held out to plaintiff by both NSU and ANAU throughout their relationship, even after serious problems had developed between Overseas and ANAU. It is admitted that the Ro-80 has never been marketed in the United States. However, there is little evidence to show why this was not done. Plaintiff has on occasion alleged that ANAU sought to license the wankel engine to domestic automakers in preference to importing the Ro-80, but this assertion is totally without support.92 In some of plaintiff's exhibits there are references to certain serious economic and technical problems.93 At the very least, however, it is certain that a certificate of compliance with emissions standards was required before it could be imported and no such certificate was ever produced.93a

In sum, although a jury could reasonably conclude that the Ro-80 was dangled before plaintiff as a "carrot on a stick", there is no evidentiary basis for concluding that the Ro-80 was ever improperly or in bad faith withheld from the United States market. At best plaintiff has shown unbusinesslike enthusiasm on the part of ANAU in vigorously promoting this car without any real assurance that it could deliver the Ro-80 to the United States in even a limited quantity.

3. Plaintiff is bound by the finding of the court of arbitration as well as the plain language of the importer contract to the effect that it was only entitled to NSU automobiles. By negative implication this excludes any right to import and distribute Audi automobiles in this country. Although plaintiff has attempted to prove that the merger of NSU and Auto Union effected a merger of their product lines as well, and thus that plaintiff had a right to sell the Audi, the evidence does not support such a conclusion.94

4. There is evidence to the effect that VWAG was the sole owner of Auto Union and after its merger with NSU controlled 59.5 percent of the stock of ANAU.95 That percentage has since risen to about 99 percent.96 The president of VWAG is president of the ANAU board of directors, and the present export manager of ANAU previously held important positions in VWAG, VWOA, and Auto Union.97 As previously noted, VWOA is a wholly owned subsidiary of VWAG, and Import is an independently owned member of the Volkswagen distribution network in this country.

5. A jury might reasonably conclude that following the merger, ANAU intended and actively sought to transfer the distribution of NSU automobiles to the Volkswagen group, either by terminating the contracts of present NSU distributors or by including them within the VW organization (or both).98

6. In April of 1971 ANAU informed plaintiff that because the United States market for NSU automobiles had not developed as expected, it intended to abandon it entirely. Accordingly, ANAU notified plaintiff that the importer contract would be terminated effective December 31, 1973, "since it will have lost its substance by then". The letter also offered plaintiff the opportunity to terminate sooner if it so desired.99 In its reply plaintiff indicated that it did not wish to continue, but pursuant to an earlier suggestion by ANAU it requested inclusion in the VW distribution network as compensation for the termination.100

7. Settlement Evidence — ANAU then suggested that plaintiff reapply to Import for a Porsche-Audi retail franchise, which it did. Its earlier application had been shelved, but this application received immediate attention and was eventually approved by Import. Plaintiff had discussed the termination of its relationship with ANAU during the negotiations with Import. Upon the latter's approval, the proposed franchise package was sent to VWOA, accompanied by a letter from plaintiff indicating that it would attempt to "resolve our relationship with [ANAU] along the lines already suggested by us." It appears, however, that plaintiff refused to accept the Porsche-Audi dealership as full consideration for its termination of the importer contract, and VWOA refused to give final approval to the application.101

The Necessary Elements of Plaintiff's Cause of Action — Count I — Sherman Act Section 1 — There are two essential elements to any Section 1 offense: (1) a contract, combination or conspiracy, resulting in (2) an unreasonable restraint of trade.102 The second element may be established by proof that the contract, combination or conspiracy was of a type the law finds to be inherently unreasonable (per se violations), or it may rest upon a showing of anticompetitive motive or effect in the particular case.

Contract, Combination or Conspiracy — Section 1 of the Sherman Act is not concerned with individual conduct, no matter how anticompetitive. It requires some sort of deliberately coordinated or agreed upon behavior, though this need not take the form of an explicit, formalized agreement. It is enough that the plaintiff establish "a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement."103

Because such understandings are seldom capable of proof by direct testimony, they may be inferred from the things actually done.104 The circumstances surrounding a particular course of conduct may justify an inference of collusion even though there is no evidence of the acts by which the conspiracy was formed.105 There is a limit, however, to the degree of indirection and innuendo which the law will tolerate. Where, as here, the plaintiff's case is based entirely on such circumstantial evidence, the court must be especially vigilant to insure that liberal modes of proof do not become the pretext for unfounded speculation.

Establishing conspiracy as a permissible inference, like any empirical inquiry, is merely an exercise in inductive reasoning — inference based upon the cumulation of consistent data. It is true, as plaintiff points out, that the evidence should not be compartmentalized but should be viewed as a whole when making this determination.106 Certainly each fact is meaningful primarily as part of a pattern, and the total pattern is the most important datum of all. But for the system to be workable the units of cumulation must begin at a less ambitious and more manageable level than the "totality of the evidence" which plaintiff has so often urged to be the only proper measure of its case. Examination of the cases reveals several dimensions along which the evidence can profitably be analyzed. These may be characterized as motive, opportunity, and consistency of overt acts.

Motive — One way of understanding and explaining any given course of conduct is by analyzing the actor's objectives. The Supreme Court's opinion in First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968), upholding a summary judgment against the plaintiff, is an excellent example of the application of motive analysis to Section 1 cases. The relevant facts in that case are not unlike those involved here. The petitioner alleged that Cities Service had conspired with other oil companies to boycott his supply of Iranian oil in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, he introduced no evidence of any collusion between the respondent and any other companies, but merely offered theories to explain the bare fact of the oil companies' refusal to deal with him.

In the instant case Overseas has been similarly unable to articulate a satisfactory motive for the alleged conspiracy. At one point plaintiff compiled a list of "benefits" which it suggested would be derived by the defendants from ANAU's refusal to deal, but they do not withstand even the most casual scrutiny.

Points 1 through 9107 may be summarized in a single proposition: by refusing to deal with Overseas the defendants were able to effectively terminate the importer contract and plaintiff's business as an importer-distributor of NSU automobiles, and thereby free defendants to market and distribute ANAU products through their own outlets (or to withdraw NSU cars from the market altogether). But the conclusion that any of this could constitute a motive for the alleged conspiracy is a non sequitur. ANAU was not obligated to deliver cars to plaintiff even while the contract was in force, and in any event the contract was terminable at will on relatively short notice. No elaborate conspiracy such as plaintiff alleges was necessary to secure termination of the contract or effect a withdrawal of NSU products from the American market. Plaintiff has never had a colorable claim to any distribution rights in the Audi. The defendants were free to make whatever arrangements they wished for its importation and distribution in this country, and whatever rights plaintiff may have had in the NSU product line were irrelevant. The only conceivable motive for forcing plaintiff to abandon its exclusive distributorship would have been a desire to transfer the right to import and distribute NSU cars within its territory to someone else (presumably VWOA and Import). However, in view of the undisputed fact that the NSU product line has been withdrawn from the American market, the right to distribute it has become totally meaningless.

This leaves one further "benefit", which does perhaps raise a more realistic suggestion of motive:

There are, however, two fatal defects in plaintiff's contention. First, article 3, paragraph 4 of the importer contract explicitly provides that "[t]he right of NSU to grant licenses for the manufacture of contract goods and for the sale of such contract goods by the manufacturer within the sales territory remains unaffected . . . ." The only "rights" which plaintiff had in any such licensing arrangements were contained in the contractual assurance that "NSU will, however, duly consider the interests of the importer". And if this is not enough to neutralize number 10 as a possible motive, plaintiff's complete lack of support for its assertion clearly is. There is no evidence that defendants sought such a licensing arrangement sufficient to justify the proposed inference,108 and thus it cannot be considered.

It can only be concluded that, as in Cities Service, there is no evidence of a possible motive for the claimed conspiracy. Although this deficiency is not conclusive, it is extremely damaging to plaintiff's case.

Opportunity — Opportunity evidence may be arranged along a continuum of persuasiveness, from that which merely prevents a negative inference by demonstrating that communication and thus agreement were physically possible, to evidence of specific contacts and exchanges of information or suggestion which makes agreement in some measure more probable. Much of the evidence plaintiff has offered which it argues is probative of conspiracy is on the opportunity dimension, and most of this is clustered around the bottom ("mere possibility") range of such evidence. The following facts may be so characterized: (1) VWAG owns 99 percent of the stock of ANAU; (2) VWOA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of VWAG; (3) the president of VWAG is the president of the board of control of ANAU; (4) the present export manager of ANAU has at various times worked for both VW's and Auto Union; (5) Import is a member of the VW distribution network. This is in sharp contrast to cases in which exchanges of price information or other production data,109 meetings between company officials,110 or specific invitations to engage in illegal activities111 have been shown.112 While it must be conceded that the defendants could easily have communicated, the bare physical possibility of agreement has no affirmative probative value. A jury must have some probability evidence with which to work; if not, the plaintiff has totally failed to meet its burden of proof.113

Consistency of Overt Acts — In nearly all cases in which a combination or conspiracy is established through circumstantial evidence, the alleged conspirators have engaged in conduct which is in some sense congruent, compatible, or harmonious. Standing alone, such parallel behavior is not enough to establish agreement.114 It will suffice, however, where the surrounding circumstances indicate that the parallelism is consistent with a theory of deliberately concerted activity and inconsistent with the theory that it represents merely a fortuitous convergence of independent decisions.115 This may be inferred from factors such as the complexity, originality, unanimity, or exacting correspondence of the overt acts,116 especially when they represent abnormal reactions to market stimulii and are inconsistent with each actor's economic self-interest.117 Succinctly put, the rule is that conspiracy may be inferred where the surrounding circumstances make it unlikely that the parallelism of action was purely coincidental.118

Yet on this critical dimension plaintiff does not even have the usual parallel conduct to rely on. There are few, if any, overt acts by the defendants which give the appearance of possible coordination. Only ANAU was involved in the alleged "pinching off" of plaintiff's supply of cars. Import, and later VWOA, did refuse to grant plaintiff a Porsche-Audi franchise, but at least on the face of it that is hardly evidence of a course of conduct similar to that of ANAU.

Plaintiff also argues that there is evidence which could be conceivably construed as suggesting agreement — that discussed previously under the heading of Settlement Evidence.119 Certainly the events recited are consistent with a theory of cooperation among the defendants. The difficulty is that they are no less consistent with the possibility of independent action. There would be nothing unusual in ANAU recommending that Overseas again approach Import, for that would be the normal and necessary procedure for anyone in this area wishing to become part of the VW distribution network. The treatment of Overseas as a "special case" is hardly surprising in view of its then-current status as an importer-distributor of NSU products. And the ultimate refusal of VWOA to approve the application is unexceptional in view of plaintiff's unwillingness to sever its connections with ANAU. Even if that were shown to have been the reason for the denial (which it was not), such a condition would be good business policy and would likely be insisted upon by any franchiser. It is not necessarily indicative of cooperation with ANAU. Finally, even if these assertions were thought to constitute some evidence of conspiracy, they are inadmissible.

Admissibility of the Settlement Evidence — This evidence was excluded at trial on two grounds: (1) it concerned conduct and statements made in negotiations attempting to compromise a disputed claim, and (2) it included statements of alleged co-conspirators offered to prove the existence of the conspiracy without prior independent proof of its existence.

It is undisputed that the negotiations concerning the Porsche-Audi franchise represented an attempt by the parties to resolve certain differences existing between them. It is also undisputed that an offer to settle or compromise a disputed claim, along with direct suggestions or overtures of settlement, will not be received in evidence as an admission of liability on the part of the party making the offer.120 Just how far this principle extends in practice is, however, subject to disagreement.

There are two distinct rationales for this rule; its ambit will vary according to which prevails.121 An offer to settle may be excluded on grounds of relevancy. In theory, any admission of fact or liability which is made hypothetically for purposes of "buying peace" rather than as an objective statement of fact is inherently unreliable and irrelevant to the truth-finding process. But as a corollary to this theory, whenever there is an admission by a party which may reasonably be interpreted as having been offered for the truth of its content rather than proposed arguendo, it will be admissible, even if it occurs in the course of settlement discussion. Most American courts seem to have adopted this view, and have regularly admitted a wide variety of these "independent admissions of fact".122

A second basis for excluding offers to compromise is the public policy favoring private resolution of disputes over resolution through litigation. This theory produces somewhat different results than the first, for according to this latter view, all acts and statements incidental to an offer to compromise must be excluded from evidence. This is true even though they might constitute independent admissions of fact under the former theory, as long as they were a legitimate part of the settlement effort.123

Although plaintiff urges strongly the necessity of culling out of the settlement evidence certain independent admissions of fact, this is an invitation which must be declined. This court agrees with the authors of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence that the policy rather than the relevancy theory is the better raison d'etre for the rule and thus a better guide as to its proper bounds.124 The exceptions and permutations of the rule required to fit it into the relevancy model have produced predictably erratic and inconsistent results, many of which are at odds with important public interests.125 Moreover, it is highly questionable whether the relevancy theory accurately reflects the realities of the settlement process. For these reasons the exclusion must extend to all "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations",126 and this encompasses the whole of the settlement evidence.

The one remaining question is whether the allegation that the settlement negotiations and their ultimate failure were an integral part of the conspiracy dictates an exception to the normal rule of exclusion. It is generally recognized that offers in compromise are inadmissible only when offered to demonstrate some element of liability in the case at hand. They may be received for other purposes such as proof of costs, due diligence, explanation for delay, etc.127 Although there is little authority on the point, it would also seem reasonable to admit such evidence where the settlement negotiations are themselves subjects of the lawsuit — i.e., operative facts.128

This case might arguably fall within such an exception were it not for the additional fact that plaintiff has had such a large hand in creating this settlement evidence. There is obviously nothing illegal about collaborating in order to meet the threat of a common lawsuit, and plaintiff's own proofs show that very early in this series of events it wrote to these defendants threatening an antitrust action and suggesting a Porsche-Audi dealership as one step in a possible settlement.129 This in itself raises a question of relevance, for proof that defendants may have communicated with each other and with plaintiff in an attempt to forestall this suit is not probative of a conspiracy to restrain trade. In addition, permitting proof of such activity could easily mislead a jury into finding a Sherman Act conspiracy based on the defendants' cooperation in defending this suit. The danger that plaintiff might bootstrap itself into a case by its own efforts to extort a settlement of a meritless claim is very real, and tips the scales in favor of excluding all evidence of the attempted settlement.

The settlement evidence is largely testimonial in nature. When this is offered for the purpose of proving the existence of the alleged conspiracy, it presents a distinct but equally pernicious danger of bootstrapping the plaintiff into a conspiracy case through the use of unexamined and uncorroborated hearsay. Thus it is a nearly universal rule of law that in order for the extrajudicial statements of one alleged conspirator to be admitted in evidence against another, the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it must be shown by independent evidence.130 Once the conspiracy is established, each conspirator is

The problem raised here is whether, assuming there is no other evidence of a conspiracy, the acts and declarations of each defendant individually considered may suffice to establish the conspiracy.

Assuming arguendo that the acts and declarations involved in the settlement negotiations would, if considered collectively, support an inference of conspiracy, the necessity of establishing the conspiracy separately and exclusively from each party's own acts and declarations precludes such an inference against any of the defendants. The facts simply do not support such an inference based on any one party's acts and declarations when considered along with the other, independent evidence in the case. The requisite proof of conspiracy therefore becomes a logical impossibility: a prima facie showing of conspiracy is factually possible only if the various party admissions can be connected up, i. e., admitted for use against all of the defendants; however, a precondition to such use is a prima facie showing of conspiracy. The existence of the conspiracy is a fact that must be proved by evidence the competency of which does not depend upon an assumption that the conspiracy exists, and for that reason the settlement evidence is necessarily inadmissible.

Restraint of Trade — Agreement is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a Section 1 violation. Plaintiff must also prove that the agreement was "in restraint of trade or commerce", either by showing it was of a type which the law condemns as per se illegal, or by demonstrating an "unreasonable" anti-competitive effect or motive in the particular case.

Per Se Violations — Price Fixing — Plaintiff contends that ANAU, in concert with the other defendants, raised the price of its products to levels which made it impossible for Overseas to resell them at a profit, and that this represents illegal price fixing. Both horizontal price fixing132 and resale price maintenance133 (vertical price fixing) are classic per se offenses. Although it is somewhat uncertain which of these plaintiff is alleging,134 it is certain that neither is revealed in this record.

On the one hand, plaintiff's emphasis on the rapid rise in the prices charged by ANAU and the coercive effect of these increases on Overseas implies a theory of resale price maintenance. It is true that restriction of the dealer's pricing freedom is the essence of the offense135 and that setting an initial price for a product does inevitably affect his freedom to set a resale price by limiting the range of prices at which a profit can be made. However, this is not the sort of restraint at which the antitrust laws are directed.136 To the contrary, it is an inherent part of the freely competitive economy which they seek to preserve. It follows that there can be no vertical price fixing absent an attempt to control resale prices through non-market means,137 which is not alleged in this case.

On the other hand, if plaintiff is primarily concerned with the possible participation of the other defendants in ANAU's pricing decisions, its problem is one of fact rather than law. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff has established some form of collusion among the defendants, there is absolutely no evidence to show that it involved an agreement to fix prices. Plaintiff has proved only that it was quoted sharply higher prices for NSU cars. While it now argues that this must have been part of the conspiracy, such a conclusion would be pure conjecture.

Group Boycott — It is undenied that several of the defendants have declined to do business with the plaintiff. Even if these actions represent a group refusal to deal, however, they are not "naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition"138 which properly belong within the group boycott category of per se illegality. It is clearly not a per se offense for a manufacturer to agree with a distributor upon an exclusive franchise, even if this means cutting off another distributor.139 At best plaintiff has shown that following the merger of NSU and Auto Union, ANAU agreed with members of the Volkswagen group to transfer the distribution of its products to them, thereby cutting off plaintiff. Although literally a concerted refusal to deal, such an arrangement is uniformly recognized to be impermissible only where it involves an anti-competitive motive or effect.140 Indeed, an examination of the cases purporting to apply a rule of per se illegality to group boycotts reveals that:

This observation indicates that the exclusive dealership is not an isolated exception from the strict per se approach, but that in all cases involving concerted refusals to deal some degree of anticompetitive effect or intent must be shown.142 There are sound policy reasons favoring such a construction.143 Applying it here, it appears that the defendants' refusal to deal with plaintiff is more appropriately considered incident to the rule of reason analysis, infra.144

The Rule of Reason — The remainder of plaintiff's late-blooming attempts to fit within the per se rule are without merit.145 Having failed to prove a per se violation, plaintiff must establish that the defendants intended to or did in fact restrain competition, and that such a restraint of trade was or would have been "unreasonable".146

This record contains absolutely no indication (other than the plaintiff's allegations) that the defendants were possessed of a "purpose to coerce the trade policy of third parties or to secure their removal from competition."147 Proof that a former supplier has agreed to take its business elsewhere cannot, without more, be equated with a desire to control the dealer's operations or put him out of business. Plaintiff has not shown any anticompetitive motive behind defendants' conduct, and this case therefore does not fall within the class of cases that condemns "bad actors" with obviously predatory motives even where there is little evidence of anticompetitive effect.148

Yet plaintiff has also failed to introduce any evidence as to the market impact of the alleged conspiracy. That the antitrust laws are designed to protect competition, not individual competitors,149 is a truism of which plaintiff has remained determinedly unaware. Whether foreclosing Overseas from handling certain product lines effected a restraint of trade can be determined only by reference to a relevant market. Without some form of market definition there is no yardstick for measuring the overall impact of the alleged restraint.150 Here there is a complete absence of market data; indeed, plaintiff has never even identified the market(s) in which it claims trade was restrained.151 As a result there is no basis upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that the acts in question produced any restraint of trade whatsoever. Since there were no rational grounds for rejecting the hypothesis of no restraint, plaintiff's additional failure to produce evidence of unreasonableness152 is a merely cumulative deficiency.

Neither agreement nor restraint of trade may be inferred from the evidence, and plaintiff therefore has no case under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Insofar as plaintiff may still maintain a claim under Section 2 of the Act, it is wholly without support.153

Count II — Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits a corporation engaged in commerce from acquiring the stock or assets of another corporation engaged in commerce where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Plaintiff has largely ignored this part of the complaint, both in its proof and in argument. This has left many holes in its case, not the least of which is its failure to develop a consistent theory of what merger between what parties constituted the alleged violation.154 Perhaps the clearest deficiency, however, is the complete lack of evidence demonstrating a substantial lessening of competition. Market analysis is especially important under Section 7, which by its terms requires an anticompetitive impact in a "line of commerce" (product market) in a "section of the country" (geographic market).155 Here there is no evidence of market structure, market shares, barriers to entry, fluidity and expansion, or any of the multitude of other economic factors from which one might find a lessening of competition, and there is obviously no evidence upon which a finding of a substantial lessening of competition could be based.

Count III — 15 U.S.C. § 1222 authorizes an automobile dealer to sue a manufacturer for his failure to act in good faith in complying with or terminating a franchise agreement. It may be assumed that the importer contract was such a franchise. However, only ANAU and anyone acting for and under the control of ANAU can be held liable for any bad faith conduct relating to its performance or termination.156 Plaintiff's failure to prove a conspiracy under Count I mirrors its failure to prove such a relationship between ANAU and the other defendants with respect to Count III, and thus only ANAU is potentially liable under Section 1222.

As to ANAU, plaintiff has not demonstrated the necessary lack of good faith. Under the Act "good faith" is narrowly defined:

Here there is insufficient proof of coercion on which to go to the jury. There is no showing that ANAU ever engaged in conduct which could reasonably be considered a threat — "a wrongful demand which will result in sanctions if not complied with."158 Although there were discussions concerning termination of the importer contract, ANAU at no time expressly threatened to cut off plaintiff's supply of cars unless it voluntarily abandoned the contract. Plaintiff may well have viewed the "pinching off" as coercive in nature, but that is not the test.

The conduct must be such as would threaten a reasonable man in the dealer's position. Here there is absolutely no evidence which would link the "pinching off" to ANAU's desire to terminate the contract in the mind of the average man. This is especially true in view of the ease with which the contract could by its own terms have been legally terminated by ANAU. Any number of alternative explanations may be made of the sudden decline in the number of cars received by plaintiff, with no basis in the evidence for choosing rationally between them. Therefore the proof under Count III is also deficient.

Conclusion

The overwhelming reality which emerges from the many weeks of testimony and the hundreds of exhibits in this case is the total failure of the plaintiff to even address many of the central questions raised by the law it has invoked, and its complete lack of concrete evidence as to those elements with which it has concerned itself. As to Counts I and II, plaintiff has fundamentally misconceived the nature of its cause of action.

The antitrust laws are simply not a high-powered version of the laws relating to breach of contract, to be used whenever one is possessed of a particularly passionate grievance growing out of a business relationship. In Count III plaintiff has stated a claim which more closely approximates the nature of its proofs, but it has failed to translate personal indignation into objective evidence.

In sum, a directed verdict is necessitated by the complete failure of proof on all counts. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial raised no new arguments or evidence and has been treated as a motion for reconsideration of prior rulings. It must also be denied for the reasons stated above.

An appropriate order may be submitted.