MORTON v. RUIZ

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a narrow but important issue in the administration of the federal general assistance program for needy Indians:

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona answered this question favorably to petitioner, the Secretary of the Interior, when, without opinion and on cross-motions for summary judgment, it dismissed the respondents' complaint. The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed. 462 F.2d 818 (CA9 1972). We granted certiorari because of the significance of the issue and because of the vigorous assertion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was inconsistent with long-established policy of the Secretary and of the Bureau. 411 U.S. 947 (1973).

I

The pertinent facts are agreed upon, although, as to some, the petitioner Secretary denies knowledge but does not dispute them. App. 45-48. The respondents, Ramon Ruiz and his wife, Anita, are Papago Indians and United States citizens. In 1940 they left the Papago Reservation in Arizona1 to seek employment 15 miles away at the Phelps-Dodge copper mines at Ajo. Mr. Ruiz found work there, and they settled in a community at Ajo called the "Indian Village" and populated almost entirely by Papagos.2 Practically all the land and most of the homes in the Village are owned or rented by Phelps-Dodge. The Ruizes have lived in Ajo continuously since 1940 and have been in their present residence since 1947. A minor daughter lives with them. They speak and understand the Papago language but only limited English. Apart from Mr. Ruiz' employment with Phelps-Dodge, they have not been assimilated into the dominant culture, and they appear to have maintained a close tie with the nearby reservation.3

In July 1967, 27 years after the Ruizes moved to Ajo, the mine where he worked was shut down by a strike. It remained closed until the following March. While the strike was in progress, Mr. Ruiz' sole income was a $15 per week striker's benefit paid by the union.4 He sought welfare assistance from the State of Arizona but this was denied because of the State's apparent policy that striking workers are not eligible for general assistance or emergency relief.5

On December 11, 1967, Mr. Ruiz applied for general assistance benefits from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). He was immediately notified by letter that he was ineligible for general assistance because of the provision (in effect since 1952) in 66 Indian Affairs Manual 3.1.4 (1965) that eligibility is limited to Indians living "on reservations" and in jurisdictions under the BIA in Alaska and Oklahoma.6 An appeal to the Superintendent of the Papago Indian Agency was unsuccessful. A further appeal to the Phoenix Area Director of the BIA led to a hearing, but this, too, proved unsuccessful. The sole ground for the denial of general assistance benefits was that the Ruizes resided outside the boundaries of the Papago Reservation.

The respondents then instituted the present purported class action against the Secretary, claiming, as a matter of statutory interpretation, entitlement to the general assistance for which they had applied, and also challenging the eligibility provision as a violation of Fifth Amendment due process and of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, of the Constitution.

The Court of Appeals' reversal of the District Court's summary judgment for the Secretary was on the ground that the Manual's residency limitation was inconsistent with the broad language of the Snyder Act, 25 U. S. C. § 13, "that Congress intended general assistance benefits to be available to all Indians, including those in the position" of the Ruizes, 462 F. 2d, at 821, and that subsequent actions of Congress in appropriating funds for the BIA general assistance program did not serve to ratify the imposed limitation. The dissent took the position that the Secretary's policy was within the broad discretionary authority delegated to the Secretary by Congress with respect to the allocation of limited funds.

II

The Snyder Act,7 42 Stat. 208, 25 U. S. C. § 13, approved November 2, 1921, provides the underlying congressional authority for most BIA activities including, in particular and importantly, the general assistance program. Prior to the Act, there was no such general authorization. As a result, appropriation requests made by the House Committee on Indian Affairs were frequently stricken on the House floor by point-of-order objections. See H. R. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); S. Rep. No. 294, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); 61 Cong. Rec. 4659-4672 (1921). The Snyder Act was designed to remedy this situation. It is comprehensively worded for the apparent purpose of avoiding these point-of-order motions to strike. Since the passage of the Act, the BIA has presented its budget requests without further interruption of that kind and Congress has enacted appropriation bills annually in response to the requests.

The appropriation legislation at issue here, Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1968, Pub. L. 90-28, 81 Stat. 59, 60 (1967), recited:

"BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS "Education and Welfare Services

This wording, except for the amount, is identical to that employed in similar legislation for prior fiscal years8 and, indeed, for subsequent ones.9 It is to be noted that neither the language of the Snyder Act nor that of the Appropriations Act imposes any geographical limitation on the availability of general assistance benefits and does not prescribe eligibility requirements or the details of any program. Instead, the Snyder Act states that the BIA (under the supervision of the Secretary) "shall direct, supervise, and expend . . . for the benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United States" for the stated purposes including, as the two purposes first described, "[g]eneral support" and "relief of distress." This is broadly phrased material and obviously is intended to include all BIA activities.10

The general assistance program is designed by the BIA to provide direct financial aid to needy Indians where other channels of relief, federal, state, and tribal, are not available. Benefits generally are paid on a scale equivalent to the State's welfare payments. Any Indian, whether living on a reservation or elsewhere, may be eligible for benefits under the various social security programs in which his State participates and no limitation may be placed on social security benefits because of an Indian claimant's residence on a reservation.11

In the formal budget request submitted to Congress by the BIA for fiscal 1968, the program was described as follows:

III

We are confronted, therefore, with the issues whether the geographical limitation placed on general assistance eligibility by the BIA is consistent with congressional intent and the meaning of the applicable statutes, or, to phrase it somewhat differently, whether the congressional appropriations are properly limited by the BIA's restrictions, and, if so, whether the limitation withstands constitutional analysis.

On the initial question, the Secretary argues, first, that the Snyder Act is merely an enabling act with no definition of the scope of the general assistance program, that the Appropriation Act did not provide for off-reservation Indian welfare (other than in Oklahoma and Alaska), and that Congress did not intend to expand the program beyond that presented to it by the BIA request. Secondly, he points to the "on reservations" limitation in the Manual and suggests that Congress was well acquainted with that limitation,13 and that, by legislating in the light of the Manual's limiting provision, its appropriation amounted to a ratification of the BIA's definitive practice. He notes that, in recent years, Congress has twice rejected proposals that clearly would have provided off-reservation general assistance for Indians.14 Thus, it is said, Congress has appropriated no funds for general assistance for off-reservation Indians and, as a practical matter, the Secretary is unable to provide such a program.

The Court of Appeals placed primary reliance on the Snyder Act's provision for assistance to "the Indians throughout" the United States. It concluded that the Act envisioned no geographical limitations on Indian programs and that, absent a clear congressional ratification of such a policy, the Secretary was powerless to shrink the coverage down to some lesser group of Indian beneficiaries.

Although we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and its reversal of the judgment of the District Court, we reach its result on a narrower ground. We need not approach the issue in terms of whether Congress intended for all Indians, regardless of residence and of the degree of assimilation, to be covered by the general assistance program. We need only ascertain the intent of Congress with respect to those Indian claimants in the case before us. The question, so limited, is whether Congress intended to exclude from the general assistance program these respondents and their class, who are full-blooded, unassimilated Indians living in an Indian community near their native reservation, and who maintain close economic and social ties with that reservation. Except for formal residence outside the physical boundaries of the Papago Reservation, the respondents, as has been conceded, meet all other requirements for the general assistance program.

IV

There is, of course, some force in the Secretary's argument and in the facts that the BIA's budget requests consistently contained "on reservations" general assistance language and that there was testimony before successive appropriations subcommittees to the effect that assistance of this kind was customarily so restricted. Nonetheless, our examination of this and other material leads us to a conclusion contrary to that urged by the Secretary.

A. In actual practice, general assistance clearly has not been limited to reservation Indians. Indeed, the Manual's provision, see n. 6, supra, so heavily relied upon by the Secretary, itself provides that general assistance is available to nonreservation Indians in Alaska and Oklahoma. The rationale proffered for this is:

While this exception is not necessarily irrational, it definitely demonstrates that the limitation in the budget requests is not rigidly followed by the BIA, inasmuch as most off-reservation Indians in the two named States are regarded as eligible for general assistance funds. If, as the Secretary urges, we are to assume that Congress has been aware of the Manual's provision, Congress was just as clearly on notice that the words "on reservations" did not possess their literal meaning in that context. Surely, some of the reasons for the Alaska-Oklahoma exception are equally applicable to Indians of the Ruiz class.

B. There was testimony in several of the hearings that the BIA, in fact, was not limiting general assistance to those within reservation boundaries and, on more than one occasion, Congress was notified that exceptions were being made where they were deemed appropriate. Notwithstanding the Manual, at least three categories of off-reservation Indians outside Alaska and Oklahoma have been treated as eligible for general assistance. The first is the Indian who relocates in the city through the BIA relocation program and who then is eligible for general assistance for the period of time required for him, under state law, to establish residence in the new location.15 The second evidently is the Indian from the Turtle Mountain Reservation in North Dakota who lives on trust land near but apart from that reservation.16 The third appears to be the Indian residing in Rapid City, South Dakota.17

In addition, although not controlling, it is not irrelevant that the "on reservations" limitation in the budget requests has never appeared in the final appropriation bills.

C. Even more important is the fact that, for many years, to and including the appropriation year at issue, the BIA itself made continual representations to the appropriations subcommittees that nonurban Indians living "near" a reservation were eligible for BIA services. Although, to be sure, several passages in the legislative history and the formal budget requests have defined eligibility in terms of Indians living "on reservations," the BIA, not infrequently, has indicated that living "on or near" a reservation equates with living "on" it.

An early example of this appears at the fiscal 1948 Senate Hearing. The following colloquy between Senator McCarran and Assistant Commissioner Zimmerman is one of the stronger statements made to Congress concerning the BIA's policy of limiting general assistance to reservation Indians and yet, within this very dialogue, relied on explicitly by the Secretary, is an indication that "on reservations" is not given a rigid interpretation:

The interchangeability of "on" and "on or near" appears more directly in later years. In the relocation services section of the BIA's budget justification for fiscal 1959 it is stated:

The relocation program is covered by the welfare appropriation. It is designed to provide short-term assistance to the needy Indian who leaves the reservation area and thereby disqualifies himself for the general assistance program. By describing the Indians who "live on or adjacent to reservations" as those entitled to relocation services when they depart, the BIA in effect was telling Congress that "moving away from the reservation" was a possibility even though the Indian lives only "adjacent to" the reservation, and it would seem to follow that the Indian living "adjacent to" the reservation was also eligible for general assistance.

At the fiscal 1962 hearing, Congressman Fenton inquired of Assistant Commissioner Gifford as to the Indian population in the United States. She replied:

The foregoing statement by the Assistant Commissioner, of course, is not in itself particularly revealing on the issue that confronts us. As can be seen from subsequent hearings, however, the stated figure includes Indians "on or near the reservations" and is not restricted to Indians who live "on." Also, this "on or near" group, in contrast to those who live "off" the reservation, are within the group for whom the BIA assumed "direct responsibility." Obviously, one can never be certain whether this expanded reading of "on" is the result of the BIA's desire, when seeking appropriations, to represent its jurisdiction and function somewhat more broadly than it actually was, or whether it reflects actual policy.

The "on or near" representations continued to be made to Congress. At the fiscal 1963 House hearing, Congressmen questioned Commissioner Nash, Associate Commissioner Officer, and Assistant Commissioner Gifford as to the Indian population served by the BIA:

.....

.....

.....

It is interesting to note that the Subcommittee was advised that Alaska and Oklahoma Indians are subsumed in the "on or near" category rather than placed in the pure "on" group, and, admittedly, they are entitled to general assistance. The figures stated also indicate that the number quoted the preceding year by Miss Gifford as the number "on the reservation" actually referred to those "on or near".

A nearly identical dialogue occurred in 1964 at the Senate Subcommittee:

The now-familiar BIA representations appear again at the House hearing for fiscal 1967:

.....

At the hearing for fiscal 1968, the appropriation year directly at issue, Commissioner Bennett made like representations to the Senate Subcommittee. These could have led Congress to believe that there are only two relevant classes of Indians so far as non-land-related BIA services are concerned, those living "off" the reservation and those living "on or near":

Another recurring representation made by the BIA throughout the annual hearings is that whenever it was asked about those Indians who were outside the agency's service area, that is, "off" the reservations, the answer would refer to Indians who had left the reservations and moved to urban areas or who had attempted to be assimilated by the general population. Certainly, none of the references to those outside the service area seem appropriately applied to Indians of the Ruiz class.

During the fiscal 1950 Senate hearing, when the question arose as to the status of Indians who had left the reservation, Assistant Commissioner Zimmerman stated:

At the fiscal 1952 hearing, the following exchange between Senator Young and Commissioner Myer gives some indication of what Congress had in mind with respect to Indian beneficiaries "leaving the reservation":

The following representation by Acting Commissioner Crow to the House Subcommittee in 1961 seems to indicate that general assistance, although tied to residence, is concerned with those Indians who have not been assimilated:

In the fiscal 1964 hearings, Commissioner Nash made the following statements indicating that "leaving the reservation" meant something far different from moving 15 miles to a nonurban Indian village while still maintaining close ties with the native reservation:

See also Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1967, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 295-300 (1966).

It apparently was not until 1971, four years after the appropriation for fiscal 1968, that anyone in Congress seriously questioned the BIA as to its precise policy concerning the "off-on" dichotomy. The following dialogue between Senator Bible, long a member of the Senate Subcommittee, and Commissioner Bruce is instructive:

.....

At this point a recess was taken and the Commissioner was instructed to present the Committee with a more precise breakdown. The dialogue continued:

Although most of these passages refer to the BIA's overall jurisdiction and not to the scope of the general assistance program, there is nothing to indicate that general assistance would not be made available for all within the service area. Unlike programs such as law enforcement and land projects, general assistance is not tied inherently or logically to the physical boundaries of the reservation. And programs, such as relocation, that explicitly extend beyond the reservation are not limited to "on or near." So it is difficult to ascertain precisely what relevance the "on or near" category would have if it did not relate to programs such as general assistance. Nowhere in the hearings had the BIA ever indicated which non-land-oriented programs are available to those "on" as opposed to those "on or near," and the only conclusion that is to be drawn from the representations to Congress is that those Indians who fit the "on or near" category are eligible for all BIA services not directly tied to the physical boundaries.

Thus, the usual practice of the BIA has been to represent to Congress that "on or near" is the equivalent of "on" for purposes of welfare service eligibility, and that the successive budget request were for a universe of Indians living "on or near" and not just for those living directly "on." In addition, the BIA has continually treated persons "off" the reservations as not "on or near." In the light of this rather consistent legislative history, it is understandable that the Secretary now argues that general assistance has not been available to those "off" the reservation. We do not accept the argument, however, that the history indicates that general assistance was thereby restricted to those within the physical boundaries. To the contrary, that history clearly shows that Congress was led to believe that the programs were being made available to those unassimilated needy Indians living near the reservations as well as to those living "on." Certainly, a fair reading of the congressional proceedings up to and including the fiscal 1968 hearing can lead only to the conclusion that Indians situated near the reservation, such as the Ruizes, were covered by the authorization.24

D. Wholly aside from this appropriation subcommittee legislative history, the Secretary suggests that Congress, each year since 1952, appropriated only in accord with the "on reservations" limitation contained in the BIA Manual. By legislating annually "in the light of [this] clear provision," the Secretary argues, Congress implicitly ratified the BIA policy. This argument, also, is not convincing. The limitation has not been published in the Federal Register or in the Code of Federal Regulations, and there is nothing in the legislative history to show that the Manual's provision was brought to the subcommittees' attention, let alone to the entire Congress. To assume that Congress was aware of this provision, contained only in an internally circulated BIA document, would be most strained. But, even assuming that Congress was fully cognizant of the Manual's limitation when the 1958 appropriation was made, the language of geographic restriction in the Manual must be considered in conjunction with the representations consistently made. There is no reason to assume that Congress did not equate the "on reservations" language with the "on or near" category that continuously was described as the service area. In the light of the Manual's particular inclusion of Oklahoma and Alaska off-reservation Indians, it would seem that this interpretation of the provision would have been the logical one for anyone in Congress, who in fact was aware of it, to accept.

V

A. Having found that the congressional appropriation was intended to cover welfare services at least to those Indians residing "on or near" the reservation, it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary is without power to create reasonable classifications and eligibility requirements in order to allocate the limited funds available to him for this purpose. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). Thus, if there were only enough funds appropriated to provide meaningfully for 10,000 needy Indian beneficiaries and the entire class of eligible beneficiaries numbered 20,000, it would be incumbent upon the BIA to develop an eligibility standard to deal with this problem, and the standard, if rational and proper, might leave some of the class otherwise encompassed by the appropriation without benefits. But in such a case the agency must, at a minimum, let the standard be generally known so as to assure that it is being applied consistently and so as to avoid both the reality and the appearance of arbitrary denial of benefits to potential beneficiaries.

Assuming, arguendo, that the Secretary rationally could limit the "on or near" appropriation to include only the smaller class of Indians who lived directly "on" the reservation plus those in Alaska and Oklahoma, the question that remains is whether this has been validly accomplished. The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. In the area of Indian affairs, the Executive has long been empowered to promulgate rules and policies,25 and the power has been given explicitly to the Secretary and his delegates at the BIA.26 This agency power to make rules that affect substantial individual rights and obligations carries with it the responsibility not only to remain consistent with the governing legislation. FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965); Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952), but also to employ procedures that conform to the law. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (plurality opinion). No matter how rational or consistent with congressional intent a particular decision might be, the determination of eligibility cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by the dispenser of the funds.

The Administrative Procedure Act was adopted to provide, inter alia, that administrative policies affecting individual rights and obligations be promulgated pursuant to certain stated procedures so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations. See generally S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 (1945); H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 21-23 (1946). That Act states in pertinent part:

.....

The sanction added in 1967 by Pub. L. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, provides:

In the instant case the BIA itself has recognized the necessity of formally publishing its substantive policies and has placed itself under the structure of the APA procedures. The 1968 introduction to the Manual reads:

Unlike numerous other programs authorized by the Snyder Act and funded by the annual appropriations, the BIA has chosen not to publish its eligibility requirements for general assistance in the Federal Register or in the CFR. This continues to the present time.28 The only official manifestation of this alleged policy of restricting general assistance to those directly on the reservations is the material in the Manual which is, by BIA's own admission, solely an internal-operations brochure intended to cover policies that "do not relate to the public." Indeed, at oral argument the Government conceded that for this to be a "real legislative rule," itself endowed with the force of law, it should be published in the Federal Register. Tr. of Oral Arg. 20.

Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-540 (1959). The BIA, by its Manual, has declared that all directives that "inform the public of privileges and benefits available" and of "eligibility requirements" are among those to be published. The requirement that, in order to receive general assistance, an Indian must reside directly "on" a reservation is clearly an important substantive policy that fits within this class of directives. Before the BIA may extinguish the entitlement of these otherwise eligible beneficiaries, it must comply, at a minimum, with its own internal procedures.

The Secretary has presented no reason why the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act could not or should not have been met. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). The BIA itself has not attempted to defend its rule as a valid exercise of its "legislative power," but rather depends on the argument that Congress itself has not appropriated funds for Indians not directly on the reservations. The conscious choice of the Secretary not to treat this extremely significant eligibility requirement, affecting rights of needy Indians, as a legislative-type rule, renders it ineffective so far as extinguishing rights of those otherwise within the class of beneficiaries contemplated by Congress is concerned.

The overriding duty of our Federal Government to deal fairly with Indians wherever located has been recognized by this Court on many occasions. See, e. g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942); Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943). Particularly here, where the BIA has continually represented to Congress, when seeking funds, that Indians living near reservations are within the service area, it is essential that the legitimate expectation of these needy Indians not be extinguished by what amounts to an unpublished ad hoc determination of the agency that was not promulgated in accordance with its own procedures, to say nothing of those of the Administrative Procedure Act. The denial of benefits to these respondents under such circumstances is inconsistent with "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people." Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S., at 296; see Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956). Before benefits may be denied to these otherwise entitled Indians, the BIA must first promulgate eligibility requirements according to established procedures.

B. Even assuming the lack of binding effect of the BIA policy, the Secretary argues that the residential restriction in the Manual is a longstanding interpretation of the Snyder Act by the agency best suited to do this, and that deference is due its interpretation. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-434 (1971). The thrust of this argument is not that the regulation itself has created the "on" and "near" distinction, but that Congress has intended to provide general assistance only to those directly on reservations, and that the Manual's provision is simply an interpretation of congressional intent. As we have already noted, however, the BIA, through its own practices and representations, has led Congress to believe that these appropriations covered Indians "on or near" the reservations, and it is too late now to argue that the words "on reservations" in the Manual mean something different from "on or near" when, in fact, the two have been continuously equated by the BIA to Congress.

We have recognized previously that the weight of an administrative interpretation will depend, among other things, upon "its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements" of an agency. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). See generally 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 5.03-5.06 (1958 ed. and Supp. 1970). In this instance the BIA's somewhat inconsistent posture belies its present assertion. In order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be consistent with the congressional purpose. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). It is evident to us that Congress did not itself intend to limit its authorization to only those Indians directly on, in contrast to those "near," the reservation, and that, therefore, the BIA's interpretation must fail.

We emphasize that our holding does not, as was suggested at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 3, 5, and in the Brief for Petitioner 2, make general assistance available to all Indians "throughout the country." Even respondents do not claim this much. Brief for Respondents 23; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. The appropriation, as we see it, was for Indians "on or near" the reservation. This is broad enough, we hold, to include the Ruizes who live where they found employment in an Indian community only a few miles from their reservation, who maintain their close economic and social ties with that reservation, and who are unassimilated. The parameter of their class will be determined, to the extent necessary, by the District Court on remand of the case. Whether other persons qualify for general assistance will be left to cases that arise in the future.

In view of our disposition of the statutory issue, we do not reach the respondents' constitutional arguments. We intimate no views as to them.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.