DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing appellants' action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
Appellants, purporting to sue on behalf of themselves and a class of persons similarly situated, filed this action in 1971 in California Superior Court, Los Angeles County, against 26 named defendants, 18 of which were alleged to be state chartered savings and loan associations and 8 of which—the present appellees—are federally chartered savings and loan associations. The complaint challenged the validity of certain prepayment penalty provisions in the loan agreements customarily entered into by appellees with borrowers in connection with real estate loans. These provisions fix the amount of money to be paid by the borrower in the event that the loan is paid off before its normal maturity
The action was removed to federal district court upon petition by the original defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), on the ground that appellants' action raised questions involving the interpretation of federal statutes. Appellants moved to remand. The district court severed appellants' claims against the state chartered savings and loan associations and corporations from the claims against appellees, and remanded the former to the Los Angeles County Superior Court for further proceedings; the claims against the federally chartered appellees were retained.
Appellees then moved, pursuant to F. R.C.P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and ultimately dismissed the action on the ground that federal law has preempted the area of prepayments of real estate loans to federally chartered savings and loan associations. Appellants appeal from this judgment. We agree with the reasoning of the district court and affirm.
The doctrine of federal preemption stems from the supremacy clause of the Constitution: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . ." U.S.Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Under that clause, "[o]ccupation of a legislative `field' by Congress in the exercise of a granted power is a familiar example of its constitutional power to suspend state laws." Parker v. Brown, 1942, 317 U.S. 341, 350, 63 S.Ct. 307, 313, 87 L.Ed. 315. When such preemption occurs, any state law is inapplicable to an issue which arises in that "field." Moreover, "[i]t has long been the rule that exclusion of state action may be implied from the nature of the [Congressional] legislation and the subject matter although express declaration of such result is wanting." Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 1947, 330 U.S. 767, 772, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 1029, 91 L.Ed. 1234.
With this background, we turn to the question whether the area of prepayments of real estate loans to federally chartered savings and loan associations is preempted by federal law. All of the appellee federal savings and loan associations operate and are organized and chartered under the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq. This Act established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which "is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as `Federal Savings and Loan Associations', and to issue charters therefor. . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a). Congress' power to legislate in this broad area is manifest,
Pursuant to its valid statutory authority, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Section 545.6-12(b) represents a valid exercise