Respondent is a nonprofit, educational corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia as "Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State." Its purpose is to defend and maintain religious liberty in the United States by the dissemination of knowledge concerning the constitutional principle of the separation of church and State. In 1950, the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling letter that respondent qualified as a tax-exempt organization under the predecessor provision to § 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the Code), 26 U. S. C. § 501 (c) (3).
The Service moved to dismiss the action, principally on the ground that the exception in the Declaratory Judgment Act for cases "with respect to Federal taxes,"
In our opinion in Bob Jones University v. Simon, ante, p. 725, we examined the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act and its interpretation in prior opinions of this Court, and we reaffirmed our adherence to the two-part test announced in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). To reiterate, the Court in Williams Packing unanimously held that a pre-enforcement injunction against the assessment or collection of taxes may be granted only (i) "if it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail. . . ," id., at 7, and (ii) "if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists." Ibid. Unless both conditions are met, a suit for preventive injunctive relief must be dismissed.
In the instant case the Court of Appeals recognized Williams Packing as controlling precedent for respondent's individual coplaintiffs and affirmed the dismissal of the suit as to them. 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 292, 477 F. 2d, at 1177. The court held that the relief requested by the individual plaintiffs "relate[d] directly to the assessment and collection of taxes" and that the allegations of
The court's conclusion with regard to respondent rested on the confluence of several factors. One was the constitutional nature of respondent's claims. As the court noted, the thrust of respondent's argument is not that it qualifies for a § 501 (c) (3) exemption under existing law but rather that that provision's "substantial part" test and proscription against efforts to influence legislation are unconstitutional. Id., at 293, 477 F. 2d, at 1178. Obviously, this observation could not have been dispositive to the Court of Appeals, for this factor does not differentiate respondent, which was allowed to sue, from the individual coplaintiffs, who likewise pressed constitutional claims but who were dismissed from the action. Furthermore, decisions of this Court make it unmistakably clear that the constitutional nature of a taxpayer's claim, as distinct from its probability of success, is of no consequence under the Anti-Injunction Act. E. g.,
The other three factors identified by the Court of Appeals are equally unpersuasive. First, the court noted that respondent "does not seek in this lawsuit to enjoin the assessment or collection of its own taxes." 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 292, 477 F. 2d, at 1177. Because respondent volunteered to pay FUTA taxes even if it obtained an injunction restoring its § 501 (c) (3) status, this observation, we may assume, is correct. It is also irrelevant. Section 7421 (a) does not bar merely a taxpayer's attempt to enjoin the collection of his own taxes. Rather, it declares in sweeping terms that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed."
Perhaps the real point of the court's observation about respondent's taxes was to set the stage for its more pertinent conclusion that restraining the assessment or collection of taxes was "at best a collateral effect" of respondent's action and that this suit arose "in a posture removed from a restraint on assessment or collection." 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 294, 477 F. 2d, at 1179. We disagree. Under any reasonable construction of the statutory term "purpose," the objective of this suit was to restrain the assessment and collection of taxes from respondent's contributors. The obvious
Finally, the Court of Appeals emphasized that respondent had no "alternate legal remedy in the form of adequate refund litigation . . . ." Id., at 295, 477 F. 2d, at 1180. The court recognized, of course, that respondent does have an opportunity to litigate its claims in an action for refund of FUTA taxes but dismissed this alternative with the statement that "it is subject to certain conditions and, we feel, is so far removed from the mainstream of the action and relief sought as to hardly be considered adequate." Id., at 294 n. 13, 477 F. 2d, at 1179 n. 13. The import of these comments is unclear. If they are taken to mean that a refund action is, as a practical matter, inadequate to avoid the decrease in respondent's contributions for the interim between the withdrawal of § 501 (c) (3) status and the final adjudication of its entitlement
If, on the other hand, the court's comments about the inadequacy of a refund action for FUTA taxes are interpreted to mean that respondent lacks an opportunity to have its claims finally adjudicated by a court of law, we think they are inaccurate. Respondent's liability for FUTA taxes hinges on precisely the same legal issue as does its eligibility for tax-deductible contributions under § 170, namely its entitlement to § 501 (c) (3) status. And respondent will have a full opportunity to litigate the legality of the Service's withdrawal of respondent's § 501 (c) (3) ruling letter in a refund suit following the payment of FUTA taxes. E. g., Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (CA10 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the decision of this case.
Finding myself in solitary dissent in this "tax" case, I am somewhat diffident about expressing views contrary to those the Court apparently has reached so easily. I do so only because I am disturbingly aware of the overwhelming power of the Internal Revenue Service. This power is such that its mere exercise often freezes tax status so as to endanger the existence of philanthropic organizations and the public benefits they secure, merely because the path to judicial review is so discouragingly long and expensive. I write primarily, therefore, to express what I feel is a needed word of caution about governmental power where the means to challenge that power are unfavorable and unsatisfactory at best.
I
"Americans United" Inc. (AU) is a District of Columbia nonprofit educational corporation organized in 1948. For almost 18 years AU was formally recognized by the Service as exempt from federal income tax under § 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 501 (c) (3),
On April 25, 1968, however, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue revoked AU's letter-ruling exemption on the ground that the organization no longer met the requirements of § 501 (c) (3) and, instead, was an "action" organization, within the definition of Treasury Regulations §§ 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (c) (3) (i) and (iv), in that a substantial part of its activities was devoted to the pursuit of objectives to influence legislation App. 7-10. The loss of its § 501 (c) (3) status, however, did not result
The result, nevertheless, was distinctly adverse to AU in two respects. A contribution to the organization no longer was deductible by the donor under §§ 170 (a) (1) and (c) (2) (D) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 170 (a) (1) and (c) (2) (D), the latter of which closely parallels but is not identical with § 501 (c) (3). As a matter of much less concern, AU also became subject to federal unemployment tax under § 3301 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 3301, for exemption therefrom for § 501 organizations is limited to those that qualify under § 501 (c) (3). § 3306 (c) (8) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 3306 (c) (8).
II
The Anti-Injunction Act, § 7421 (a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7421 (a), reads in part:
In considering § 7421 (a), a two-step analysis is necessary: (1) When does the statute apply? (2) When it is applicable, under what circumstances is an exception permitted? It seems to me that the Court overlooks the first question in order to apply mechanically the criteria for an exception to the application of § 7421 (a).
The threshold question, obviously, is whether the present litigation is a "suit for the purpose of restraining" any tax. It is conceded that AU has no income tax liability and will have none regardless of the outcome of this litigation. AU has paid, and will continue to pay, federal unemployment taxes. Its assumption of FICA tax liability is frozen and cannot now be terminated.
It is in the context of this fixed and certain status as to all these federal taxes—income, unemployment, FICA—that "the purpose" of the present litigation, within the meaning of § 7421 (a), must be ascertained. AU asserts that the purpose is to determine its charitable status so far as benefactors are concerned. Indeed, one
I would not attribute to Congress, however, so simplistic a prohibition in § 7421 (a) as to enable an organization to circumvent the statutory barrier by a subjective protestation of the purpose for which an injunction is sought. In order to ascertain legislative intent, it is necessary to consider effect as well as purpose and thus to bring objective criteria into the analysis. See Recent Development, 73 Col. L. Rev. 1502, 1508-1510 (1973).
In Bob Jones University v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903, 906 (1973), the Fourth Circuit concluded that when the withdrawal of an exemption "would ultimately result in potentially greater tax revenues," the obvious purpose of a suit to enjoin the withdrawal is to prevent the assessment of tax, and § 7421 (a) would be applicable. Thus, "purpose" was equated with ultimate tax effect. Crenshaw County Private School Foundation v. Connally, 474 F.2d 1185, 1188 (CA5 1973), pet. for cert. pending No. 73-170, has a similar focus. In the present case the Court of Appeals took a different approach:
In this view, applicability of the statute depends on the direct effect the relief sought would have on the plaintiff and not on the system as a whole.
In Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), this Court observed that the object of § 7421 (a) "is to withdraw jurisdiction from the . . . courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of federal taxes," and "to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund." Id., at 5 and 7. There undoubtedly is appropriate concern about the underlying danger that a multitude of spurious suits, or even of suits with possible merit, would so interrupt the free flow of revenues as to jeopardize the Nation's fiscal stability. See, e. g., State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 613-614 (1876); Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 89 (1876). Certainly, precollection suits could threaten planning and budgeting. But I do not perceive how the injunction desired in this case interferes with the area of concern that is the subject of § 7421 (a). Any potential
I do not wish to indicate disapproval of Williams Packing. There a taxpayer sought to enjoin the collection of taxes. As the basis for equitable jurisdiction, it asserted that it would be thrown into bankruptcy if it were required to pay the taxes it challenged. The Court carefully noted that there may well be situations where "the central purpose of the Act is inapplicable and . . . the attempted collection may be enjoined." 370 U. S., at 7. To be sure, the Court narrowly confined exceptions to § 7421 (a) to instances where the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury and where it was "clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail." Ibid. If, however, this test is met, then the "manifest purpose" of the statute—to permit the collection of taxes without judicial intervention—is "inapplicable." The Court thus made it clear that there was an element, in addition to the traditional equity considerations previously spelled out in Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932), that must be present in order to avoid the proscription of the Anti-Injunction Act.
Williams Packing, of course, on its facts, is clearly distinguishable from this case. There the purpose of the suit was directly to restrain the collection of social security and unemployment taxes allegedly past due from that taxpayer. Here the avowed purpose is not to restrain tax collection but to assure AU's restoration to the Cumulative List. In Williams Packing it was the incidence of taxation that was challenged and the irreparable
There is a further consideration. Arguably, where the challenged governmental action is not one intended to produce revenue but, rather, is one to accomplish a broadbased policy objective through the medium of federal taxation, the application of § 7421 (a) is inappropriate.
AU has charged unconstitutional treatment pursuant to an unconstitutional provision. These are claims peculiarly within the province of courts and not of the Executive's administrative officers. The Court's opinion makes clear that a claim of this kind is now precluded from judicial determination until such time as the Court concludes that the Government could not ultimately prevail on the merits. Unless and until that conclusion is reached, the philanthropic organization is at the mercy of the Commissioner for the period of time—usually a
The Court in Bob Jones University, ante, at 729-730, acknowledges that "appearance on the Cumulative List is a prerequisite to successful fund raising for most charitable organizations." The program of exemption by letter ruling, therefore, is tantamount to a licensing procedure. If the Commissioner's authority were limited by a clear statutory definition of § 501 (c) (3)'s requirement of "no substantial part," or by an objective definition of what is "charitable," there would be less concern about possible administrative abuse.
When an organization which has appeared on the Cumulative List seeks to enjoin what it claims is its illegal removal from that List and has no direct income tax liability or a de minimis collateral liability, the injunction, in my view, should not be within the prohibition of § 7421 (a).
III
Concluding, as I have, that § 7421 (a) is not a bar to an injunction by AU, the traditional equitable considerations
In addition to irreparable injury, the plaintiff must show that he has no adequate remedy at law. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 31 (1907). The Commissioner suggests that a plaintiff organization usually has three alternative remedies, any one of which is adequate: an income tax refund suit, a federal unemployment tax or FICA tax refund suit, and an accommodation suit by a selected donor in the form of testing his claim to a charitable deduction under §§ 170 (a) (1) and (c) (2) (D).
In AU's case the Commissioner, of course, cannot and does not contend that the income tax refund suit alternative is available. AU received § 501 (c) (4) status upon
An FICA tax refund suit is not available as an alternative to AU, since AU has made its election under § 3121 (k) (1) (A) and that election is now irrevocable. See n. 3, supra. Although AU conceivably might bring a refund suit for federal unemployment taxes,
A suit for refund of federal unemployment tax, authorized under § 7422 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7422, and with a period of limitations imposed by § 6532 (a), is directly geared to a determination of the technical
The suit for refund may not be maintained until a claim for refund has been filed. § 7422. The federal unemployment tax is imposed on an annual basis; thus, no refund can be claimed until the expiration of the year for which the tax is paid. Section 6532 (a) (1), as usual, precludes the suit until the claim is denied or six months have passed from the date of filing. Once suit is instituted, the Government has at least 60 days to answer the complaint. Under optimum conditions and with cooperation, the minimum period of time required to achieve the objective through the refund suit is one to two years from the time of revocation.
There are still other hazards. When small sums are at issue, as with AU's FUTA liability, the Government inadvertently or intentionally may concede the refund. This is not unlikely, for sound administration may not warrant the time and expense necessary to contest a claim of small amount when vital issues and conceivably profound precedents are at stake. Church of Scientology v. United States, 485 F.2d 313 (CA9 1973), illustrates the Government's effort to win dismissal of a case when a refund had been made. See also Mitchell v. Riddell, 402 F.2d 842 (CA9 1968), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 394 U.S. 456 (1969). There is little doubt that the Commissioner possesses the authority to make the refund and moot the suit if he chooses not to litigate the underlying issues. Although I agree with the Commissioner
Additionally, there is a substantial question whether an organization's eventual victory in a refund suit would accomplish its goal. The Commissioner has asserted that "normal practice is to issue a favorable ruling upon the application of an organization which has prevailed in a court suit," Reply Brief for Petitioner 34-35, n. 31. Still, the IRS Exempt Organizations Handbook states:
Whatever the internal practice may be, the published procedures cast serious doubt on the adequacy of the refund suit to resolve the organization's urgent problem. The revenue ruling has prospective application, whereas a court determination operates retrospectively to the extent the pleadings and proof and the applicable statute of limitations permit.
The staged suit by a "friendly" donor is the Commissioner's other suggestion. The donor's suit suffers the same time problems. The organization is off the Cumulative List at least until the donor establishes his entitlement to a §§ 170 (a) (1) and (c) (2) (D) deduction. This suit also may be mooted. Moreover, litigation by the accommodating donor does not permit the organization to assert its rights and interests. Could the donor make the First Amendment and equal protection claims that AU seeks to have determined? Not only must AU rely on a contributor to raise issues for it, but it must find a donor who is willing both to contribute and to undertake the task of litigation. This strains largesse to the extreme, particularly since the suit will subject the donor to routine full audit of his own return.
I conclude that neither course is an adequate remedy for an irreparably harmed organization to vindicate its claims.
IV
The last issue is whether the amended complaint presented a substantial constitutional question on the merits justifying the convening of a three-judge court under 28 U. S. C. § 2282. The test was enunciated in Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933), and restated in Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973), and in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542-543 (1974). The Court of Appeals in the present case said that "the possibility of success is not so certain as to merit the Enochs exception with respect to § 7421 (a), yet not so frivolous or foreclosed as to merit denial of the § 2282 motion." 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 298, 477 F. 2d, at 1183. I do not differ with that determination.
I, of course, imply no opinion on the merits of the underlying controversy.
Since I cannot join the Court's reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment, I respectfully dissent.
FootNotes
"Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."
"A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation—
"(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States;
"(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
"(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and
"(D) no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."
The differences between the requirements of §§ 501 (c) (3) and 170 (c) (2) are minor and are not involved in this litigation.
"Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes."
Ordinarily, respondent's shift from § 501 (c) (3) status to § 501 (c) (4) status would also have meant that it would become subject to federal social security (FICA) taxes, since § 501 (c) (3) organizations are exempt from such taxes but § 501 (c) (4) organizations are not. Code § 3121 (b) (8) (B), 26 U. S. C. § 3121 (b) (8) (B). This distinction is not involved here, however, because respondent in prior years voluntarily elected to pay FICA taxes although it held § 501 (c) (3) status. This election had been in effect for more than eight years, which rendered respondent incapable of terminating its election to pay FICA taxes even if it had retained its § 501 (c) (3) status. Code § 3121 (k) (1) (D), 26 U. S. C. § 3121 (k) (1) (D).
"In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such." (Emphasis added.)
"Except as provided in sections 6212 (a) and (c), 6213 (a), and 7426 (a) and (b) (1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed."
None of the exceptions is relevant to this case.
It should also be noted that this case cannot be distinguished from Bob Jones, ante, p. 725, on the ground that petitioner in that case in theory will be subject to federal income taxes upon termination of its § 501 (c) (3) status, whereas respondent in this case will not, given that it has established § 501 (c) (4) status. Refund suits for federal income taxes and for FUTA (or FICA) taxes are fungible in the present context. So long as the imposition of a federal tax, without regard to its nature, follows from the Service's withdrawal of § 501 (c) (3) status, a refund suit following the collection of that tax is an appropriate vehicle for litigating the legality of the Service's actions under § 501 (c) (3). As noted in Bob Jones, ante, at 748 n. 22, we need not decide now the range of remedies available in such a refund suit, which, unlike this suit, is brought pursuant to congressionally authorized procedures.
"§ 501. Exemption from tax on corporations, certain trusts, etc.
"(a) Exemption from taxation.
"An organization described in subsection (c) . . . shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.
.....
"(c) List of exempt organizations.
"The following organizations are referred to in subsection (a):
.....
"(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."
"(4) Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes."
The Commissioner has asserted that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201-2202, also provides a jurisdictional barrier to the suit because its general applicability is limited by the phrase, "except with respect to Federal taxes." While not reaching the question, I would agree with the Court's observation in the companion case, Bob Jones University v. Simon, ante, at 732-733, n. 7, that questions exist as to the scope of § 2201 and as to whether it is coterminous with § 7421 (a).
The Commissioner also asserts that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the present action. I do not agree. The suit, as the Court of Appeals noted, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 284, 295, 477 F.2d 1169, 1180, falls within the immunity doctrine's exceptions enunciated in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-622 (1963): "(1) action by officers beyond their statutory powers and (2) even though within the scope of their authority, the powers themselves or the manner in which they are exercised are constitutionally void." Here, the claim is made that § 501 (c) (3) is unconstitutional and that the Commissioner administers the section in an unconstitutional manner.
In Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (DC 1971), the court granted relief against Treasury officials comparable to that sought here. Inasmuch as the defense of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941), this Court's summary affirmance of the Green case sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), affords pertinent precedent.
"Plaintiff's action has nothing to do with the collection or assessment of taxes. He does not contest the amount of his own tax, nor does he seek to limit the amount of tax revenue collectible by the United States. . . . In the present case, the central purpose [of the statute] is clearly inapplicable." Id., at 453-454 (footnotes omitted).
See also Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (DC), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), where the three-judge court did not mention § 7421 (a) specifically but permitted the suit and granted relief; Bob Jones University v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903, 907-908 (CA4 1973) (dissenting opinion). And see the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the present case. 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 293-294, 477 F. 2d, at 1178-1179.
The purpose of the IRS action of itself is not controlling. The Court has found that "taxes" in the nature of a penalty were not within the meaning of § 7421 (a), Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922), and has rejected, as well, the contention that an injunction could issue against a regulatory tax as opposed to a revenue measure. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). The Court relies on Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922), for the principle that even the collection of an unconstitutional tax cannot be enjoined. All these situations, however, have a factor in common with Williams Packing that is absent from the present suit: AU does not seek to restrain the Government's act of collecting any tax that it owes.
"The IRS recognizes that the exempt organization provisions of the law must be interpreted and administered in light of their special purpose and their place in the tax law. Their purpose is not to raise revenue. Rather, they are designed to act as a guardian. They insure that exempt organization assets will be put to the approved uses contemplated in the law. Their application calls for an extraordinary degree of care and judgment." BNA Daily Tax Report, Aug. 30, 1973, p. J-1.
"Private philanthropic organizations can possess important characteristics which modern government necessarily lacks. They may be many-centered, free of administrative superstructure, subject to the readily exercised control of individuals with widely diversified views and interests. Such characteristics give these organizations great opportunity to initiate thought and action, to experiment with new and untried ventures, to dissent from prevailing attitudes, and to act quickly and flexibly. Precisely because they can be initiated and controlled by a single person or a small group, they may evoke great intensity of interest and dedication of energy. These values, in themselves, justify the tax exemptions and deductions which the law provides for philanthropic activity.
"Private foundations play a significant part in the work of philanthropy. While the foundation is a relatively modern development, its predecessor, the trust, has ancient vintage. Like its antecedent, the foundation permits a donor to commit to special uses the funds which he gives to charity. . . . In these ways, foundations have enriched and strengthened the pluralism of our social order.
"Private foundations have also preserved fluidity and provided impetus for change within the structure of American philanthropy. Operating charitable organizations tend to establish and work within defined patterns. . . . The assets of private foundations, on the other hand, are frequently free of commitment to specific operating programs or projects; and that freedom permits foundations relative ease in the shift of their focus of interest and their financial support from one charitable area to another. New ventures can be assisted, new areas explored, new concepts developed, new causes advanced. Because of its unique flexibility, then, the private foundation can constitute a powerful instrument for evolution, growth, and improvement in the shape and direction of charity." Senate Committee on Finance, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 (Comm. Print 1965).
"There is no practical possibility of quick judicial appeal at the present. If we deny tax exemption or the benefit to the organization of its donors having the assurance of deductibility of contributions, the organization must either create net taxable income or other tax liability for itself as a litigable issue, or find a donor who as a guinea pig is willing to make a contribution, have it disallowed, and litigate the disallowance." Thrower, IRS Is Considering Far Reaching Changes in Ruling on Exempt Organizations, 34 J. of Taxation 168 (1971).
Whether procedurally feasible or not, there is some indication that such suits are not common practice.
The former Commissioner also made significant remarks with respect to the need for judicial determination of issues involved in this case that will be precluded by the Court's interpretation of § 7421:
"This is an extremely unfortunate situation for several reasons. First, it offends my sense of justice for undue delay to be imposed on one who needs a prompt decision. Second, in practical effect it gives a greater finality to IRS decisions than we would want or Congress intended. Third, it inhibits the growth of a body of case law interpretive of the exempt organization provisions that could guide the IRS in its further deliberations." Ibid.
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