MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case and Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., post, p. 752, involve the application of the Anti-Injunction
I
Section 501 (a) of the Code exempts from federal income taxes organizations described in § 501 (c) (3). The latter provision encompasses:
Section 501 (c) (3) organizations are also exempt from federal social security (FICA) taxes by virtue of Code § 3121 (b) (8) (B), 26 U. S. C. § 3121 (b) (8) (B), and from federal unemployment (FUTA) taxes by virtue of § 3306 (c) (8), 26 U. S. C. § 3306 (c) (8). Donations
As a practical matter, an organization hoping to solicit tax-deductible contributions may not rely solely on technical compliance with the language of §§ 501 (c) (3) and 170 (c) (2). The organization must also obtain a ruling letter from the Service, pursuant to Rev. Procs. 72-3 and 72-4, 1972-1 Cum. Bull. 698, 706, declaring that it qualifies under § 501 (c) (3). Receipt of such a ruling letter leads, in the ordinary case, to inclusion in
Because of the importance of inclusion in the Cumulative List, revocation of a § 501 (c) (3) ruling letter and consequent removal from the Cumulative List is likely to result in serious damage to a charitable organization.
The pressures operating on organizations facing revocation of § 501 (c) (3) status to seek injunctive relief against the Service pending judicial review of the proposed action conflict directly with a congressional prohibition of such pre-enforcement tax suits. In force continuously since its enactment in 1867, the Anti-Injunction Act, now Code § 7421 (a), provides in pertinent part that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court . . . ."
In the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed the majority view. Bob Jones University v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903, petition for rehearing denied, 476 F.2d 259 (1973). In light of the contrary result reached by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 284, 477 F.2d 1169 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., post, p. 752, we granted Bob Jones University's petition for certiorari. 414 U.S. 817 (1973).
II
Petitioner refers to itself as "the world's most unusual university." Founded in 1927 and now located in Greenville, South Carolina, the University is devoted to the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist religious beliefs. All classes commence and close with prayer,
In 1942, the Service issued petitioner a ruling letter under § 101 (6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the predecessor of § 501 (c) (3). In 1970, however, the Service announced that it would no longer allow § 501 (c) (3) status for private schools maintaining racially discriminatory admissions policies and that it would no longer treat contributions to such schools as tax deductible. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230. The Service requested proof of a nondiscriminatory admissions policy from all such schools and warned that tax-exempt ruling letters would be reviewed in light of the information provided. At the end of 1970, petitioner advised the Service that it did not admit Negroes, and in September 1971, further stated that it had no intention of altering this policy. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue therefore instructed the District Director to commence administrative procedures leading to the revocation of petitioner's § 501 (c) (3) ruling letter.
Petitioner brought these administrative proceedings to a halt by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing the Service from revoking or threatening to revoke petitioner's tax-exempt status. Petitioner alleged irreparable injury in the form of substantial federal income tax liability and the loss of
The District Court rejected a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and it preliminarily enjoined the Service from revoking or threatening to revoke petitioner's tax-exempt status and from withdrawing advance assurance of the deductibility of contributions made to petitioner. Bob Jones University v. Connally, 341 F.Supp. 277 (1971). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, with one judge dissenting. 472 F.2d 903, reh. den., 476 F.2d 259 (1973). That court held that petitioner's suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act as interpreted by this Court in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1. (1962).
III
The Anti-Injunction Act apparently has no recorded legislative history,
In furtherance of these goals, the Court in its most recent reading gave the Act almost literal effect. In Williams Packing, an employer sought to enjoin the collection of FICA and FUTA taxes that the employer alleged were not owed and would destroy its business. The Court held unanimously that the suit was barred by the Act. Only upon proof of the presence of two factors could the literal terms of § 7421 (a) be avoided: first, irreparable injury, the essential prerequisite for injunctive relief in any case; and second, certainty of success on the merits. Id., at 6-7. An injunction could issue only "if it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail . . . ." Id., at 7. And this determination would be made on the basis of the information available to the Government at the time of the suit. "Only if it is then apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States cannot establish its claim, may the suit for an injunction be maintained." Ibid.
Perhaps in recognition of the stringent nature of the Williams Packing standard and its implications for this case, petitioner makes little effort to argue that it can meet that test. Rather, it asserts that the Anti-Injunction Act, properly construed, is not applicable, that Williams Packing is not the controlling reading of the Act, and that rejection of both these contentions would work a denial of due process of law. We find these arguments unpersuasive.
First, petitioner contends that the Act is inapplicable because this is not a suit "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax . . . ." Under petitioner's theory, its suit is intended solely to compel the Service to refrain from withdrawing petitioner's § 501 (c) (3) ruling letter and from depriving petitioner's donors of advance assurance of deductibility. Petitioner describes its goal as the maintenance of the flow of contributions, not the obstruction of revenue.
Petitioner's complaint and supporting documents filed in the District Court belie any notion that this is not a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of federal taxes from petitioner. In support of its claim of irreparable injury, petitioner alleged in part that it would be subject to "substantial" federal income tax liability if the Service were allowed to carry out its threatened action. App. 6. Petitioner buttressed this contention with sworn affidavits alleging federal income tax liability of three-quarters of a million dollars for one year and in excess of half a million dollars for another and stressing the detrimental effect such tax liability would have on petitioner's capacity to operate its institution, to support its personnel, and to continue with its expansion plans. Id., at 10-11, 43-44. These allegations leave little doubt that a primary purpose of this lawsuit is to prevent the Service from assessing and collecting income taxes from petitioner.
We recognize that petitioner's assertions that it will owe federal income taxes should its § 501 (c) (3) status be revoked are open to debate, because they are based in part on a failure to take into account possible deductions for depreciation of plant and equipment. Even if it could be shown, however, that petitioner would owe no federal income taxes if its § 501 (c) (3) status were
Petitioner further contends that the Service's actions do not represent an effort to protect the revenues but an attempt to regulate the admissions policies of private universities. Under this line of argument, the Anti-Injunction
The Service bases its present position with regard to the tax status of segregative private schools on its interpretation of the Code.
Petitioner also argues that § 7421 (a) is not controlling because when the Act was passed in 1867 Congress could not possibly have foreseen something as sophisticated as the comparatively recent ruling-letter program
B
Petitioner next argues that Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., supra, does not constitute an all-encompassing reading of the Act. Petitioner contends, on the basis of prior precedents, that § 7421 (a) is subject to judicially created exceptions other than the "under no circumstances" test announced in Williams Packing. But the Court's unanimous opinion in Williams Packing indicates that the case was meant to be the capstone to judicial construction of the Act. It spells an end to a cyclical pattern of allegiance to the plain meaning of the Act, followed by periods of uncertainty caused by a judicial departure from that meaning, and followed in turn by the Court's rediscovery of the Act's purpose.
During the first half century of the Act's existence, the Court gave it literal force, without regard to the character of the tax, the nature of the pre-enforcement challenge to it, or the status of the plaintiff. See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., at 613-614; Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883); Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 447 (1903); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118 (1916); Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922).
Standard Nut was such a significant deviation from precedent that it was referred to by a commentator at the time as "a tribute to the tenacity of the American taxpayer" and "little short of phenomenal."
Williams Packing switched the focus of the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances test from a showing of the degree of harm to the plaintiff absent an injunction to the requirement that it be established that the Service's action is plainly without a legal basis. The Court in essence read Standard Nut not as an instance of irreparable injury but as a case where the Service had no chance of success on the merits. 370 U. S., at 7. And the Court explicitly held that the Act may not be evaded "merely because collection would cause an irreparable injury, such as the ruination of the taxpayer's enterprise." Id., at 6. Yet petitioner's argument that we should find Williams Packing inapplicable turns, in the last analysis, on its claim that to do otherwise would subject it to great harm. The Court rejected that consideration in Williams Packing itself, and we reject it as a reason for finding that case not controlling. Under the language of the Act, the degree of harm is not a factor, and as a matter of judicial construction, it does not provide a meaningful stopping point between Standard Nut and Williams Packing. Acceptance of petitioner's irreparable injury argument would simply
C
Assuming, arguendo, the applicability of § 7421 (a) and Williams Packing, petitioner contends that forcing it to meet the standards of those authorities will deny it due process of law in light of the irreparable injury it will suffer pending resort to alternative procedures for review and of the alleged inadequacies of those remedies at law. The Court dismissed out of hand similar contentions nearly 60 years ago,
This is not a case in which an aggrieved party has no access at all to judicial review. Were that true, our conclusion might well be different. If, as alleged in its complaint, petitioner will have taxable income upon the withdrawal of its § 501 (c) (3) status, it may in accordance with prescribed procedures petition the Tax Court to review the assessment of income taxes. Alternatively, petitioner may pay income taxes, or, in their absence, an installment of FICA or FUTA taxes, exhaust the Service's internal refund procedures, and then bring suit for a refund. These review procedures offer petitioner a full, albeit delayed, opportunity to litigate the legality of the Service's revocation of tax-exempt status and withdrawal of advance assurance of deductibility. See, e. g., Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States,
We do not say that these avenues of review are the best that can be devised. They present serious problems of delay, during which the flow of donations to an organization will be impaired and in some cases perhaps even terminated. But, as the Service notes, some delay may be an inevitable consequence of the fact that disputes between the Service and a party challenging the Service's actions are not susceptible of instant resolution through litigation. And although the congressional restriction to postenforcement review may place an organization claiming tax-exempt status in a precarious financial position, the problems presented do not rise to the level of constitutional infirmities, in light of the powerful governmental interests in protecting the administration of the tax system from premature judicial interference, e. g., Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S., at 88-89; State
IV
Since we hold that Williams Packing, supra, governs this case, the remaining issue is whether petitioner has met the standards of that case. Without deciding the
In holding that § 7421 (a) blocks the present suit, we are not unaware that Congress has imposed an especially harsh regime on § 501 (c) (3) organizations threatened with loss of tax-exempt status and with withdrawal of advance assurance of deductibility of contributions. A former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service has sharply criticized the system applicable to such organizations.
The judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the result.
I concur in the Court's judgment and agree with much of the reasoning in its opinion for this case. As the Court notes, ante, at 738, the University's obtaining an injunction would directly prevent the collection of what it says are $750,000 in income taxes for 1971 and of over $500,000 for 1972. On the basis of this fact alone, the "purpose" of the suit is indeed to restrain "the
Since the anti-injunction statute is applicable, we must consider whether the University comes within the statute's exception recognized in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). As to this, I join Part IV of the Court's opinion to the effect that it has not been shown that "under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail." Id., at 7.
FootNotes
"Charitable contribution defined.—For purposes of this section, the term `charitable contribution' means a contribution or gift to or for the use of—
.....
"(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation —
"(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States;
"(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
"(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and
"(D) no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."
The organizations set forth in § 170 (c) (2) are, but for a few unimportant exceptions, the same as those described in § 501 (c) (3). Analogous deductions for contributions to § 501 (c) (3) organizations are provided for federal estate and gift tax purposes. See Code §§ 2055 (a) (2) and 2522 (a) (2), 26 U. S. C. §§ 2055 (a) (2) and 2522 (a) (2).
"Where an organization listed in [the Cumulative List] ceases to qualify as an organization contributions to which are deductible under section 170 of the Code and the Service subsequently revokes a ruling or a determination letter previously issued to it, contributions made to the organization by persons unaware of the changes in the status of the organization generally will be considered allowable if made on or before the date of publication of the Internal Revenue Bulletin announcing that contributions are no longer deductible. However, the Service is not precluded from disallowing a deduction for any contribution made after an organization ceases to qualify under section 170, where the contributor (1) had knowledge of the revocation of the ruling or determination letter, (2) was aware that such revocation was imminent, or (3) was in part responsible for, or was aware of, the activities or deficiencies on the part of the organization that gave rise to the loss of qualification."
"Except as provided in sections 6212 (a) and (c), 6213 (a), and 7426 (a) and (b) (1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." (Emphasis added.)
The italicized portion of § 7421 (a) is identical to language in § 10 of the Act of Mar. 2, 1867, but for the first "any," which the revisers added to the Revised Statutes version. See Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 192 (1883). None of the exceptions in § 7421 (a) is relevant to this case. The phrase commencing with "by any person . . ." was added by § 110 (c) of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1144. The main purpose of the addition of this language was to deal with cases where third parties who are not themselves subject to tax liability hold property liens that compete with federal tax liens. Due to the literal meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act, such persons were, prior to 1966, often unable to protect their legitimate property interests when the Service foreclosed on property on which it held a tax lien. See H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 27-28 (1966). Such persons are now given a right of action under Code § 7426, 26 U. S. C. § 7426, and the language of § 7421 (a), as amended, renders that action exclusive. The "by any person" phrase is, however, also a reaffirmation of the plain meaning of the emphasized portion of § 7421 (a). In this respect, it is declaratory, not innovative. Cf. Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 Yale L. J. 51, 57, n. 22 (1972). We are aware of the contrary reading of the "by any person" phrase in McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.Supp. 448, 453 n. 25 (DC 1972) (three-judge court), but we are of a different view.
"§ 2201. Creation of Remedy.
"In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such." (Emphasis added.)
"§ 2202. Further relief.
"Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment."
Some have noted that the federal tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act may be more sweeping than the Anti-Injunction Act. E. g., E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 855 (2d ed. 1941); Bittker & Kaufman, supra, n. 6, at 58. See S. Rep. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1935). The Service takes that position in this case, arguing that any suit for an injunction is also an action for a declaratory judgment and thus is barred by the literal terms of the Declaratory Judgment Act, without regard to the independent force of § 7421 (a). A number of courts, on the other hand, have held that the federal tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act have coterminous application. E. g., "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 284, 291, 477 F.2d 1169, 1176 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., post, p. 752; Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d 808 (CA7 1942); McGlotten v. Connally, supra; Jules Hairstylists of Maryland, Inc. v. United States, 268 F.Supp. 511 (Md. 1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d 389 (CA4), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 934 (1968). Petitioner cites these cases in response to the Service's reliance on the Declaratory Judgment Act. There is no dispute, however, that the federal tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act is at least as broad as the Anti-Injunction Act. Because we hold that the instant case is barred by the latter provision, there is no occasion to resolve whether the former is even more preclusive. Nor need we decide whether any action for an injunction is of necessity a request for a declaration of rights that triggers the terms of the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The argument is too speculative to be persuasive. It presumes that all donors who take § 170 (c) (2) deductions will desert petitioner if the ruling letter is withdrawn and that all such donors will make gifts in equivalent amounts to other tax-exempt organizations. We deem it unlikely that either premise is wholly true. To the extent that either premise is inaccurate, an injunction preserving petitioner's § 501 (c) (3) ruling letter will interrupt the assessment and collection of taxes.
"[The delay inherent in pursuing remedies at law], it is urged, is a special circumstance which justifies resort to a suit for an injunction in order that the question of liability may be promptly determined. If the delay incident to such proceedings justified refusal to pay a tax, the federal rule that a suit in equity will not lie to restrain collection on the sole ground that the tax is illegal, could have little application. For possible delay of that character is the common incident of practically every contest over the validity of a federal tax." (Footnote omitted.)
Since equitable principles militating against the issuance of federal injunctions in tax cases existed independently of the Anti-Injunction Act, it is most unlikely that Congress would have chosen the stringent language of the Act if its purpose was merely to restate existing law and not to compel litigants to make use solely of the avenues of review opened by Congress. For this reason, it is not surprising that the early cases interpreting the Act read it at face value.
"In effect [Standard Nut] says that if special circumstances exist which bring the case within some acknowledged head of equity jurisdiction, [the Anti-Injunction Act] does not apply, and the Court may issue an injunction. But in the absence of such circumstances the Court will lack equity jurisdiction because there will be no basis for such jurisdiction. To say that [the Act] applies only in such cases seems a little absurd. It is tantamount to saying that [the Act] forbids the courts to issue injunctions only when they would not have the authority to issue them anyway! It denies any force whatever to [the Act] except as declaratory of an equitable rule previously followed by the courts."
"There is a contention that the provisions requiring an appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue after payment of the taxes and giving a right to sue in case of his refusal to refund are wanting in due process and therefore there is jurisdiction [to issue injunctive relief prior to the assessment or collection of any tax]. But we think it suffices to state that contention to demonstrate its entire want of merit."
The Service indicates that "its normal practice is to issue a favorable ruling upon the application of an organization which has prevailed in a court suit." Brief for Respondents 35 n. 31, When the Service adheres to that position following a refund suit decided in favor of the plaintiff, there is of course little likelihood that injunctive relief would be necessary or appropriate. But our decision today that § 7421 (a) bars pre-enforcement injunctive suits by organizations claiming § 501 (c) (3) status unless the standards of Williams Packing are met should not be interpreted as deciding whether injunctive relief is possible in a refund suit in a district court.
"There is no practical possibility of quick judicial appeal at the present. If we deny tax exemption or the benefit to the organization of its donors having the assurance of deductibility of contributions, the organization must either create net taxable income or other tax liability for itself as a litigable issue, or find a donor who as a guinea pig is willing to make a contribution, have it disallowed, and litigate the disallowance. Assuming the readiness of the organization or donor to litigate, the issue under the best of circumstances could hardly come before a court until at least a year after the tax year in which the issue arises. Ordinarily, it would take much longer for the case of the organization's status to be tried. . . . While all of this time is passing, the organization is dormant for lack of contributions and those otherwise interested in its program lose their interest and move on to other organizations blessed with the Internal Revenue Service imprimatur; and the right to judicial review is not pursued.
"This is an extremely unfortunate situation for several reasons. First, it offends my sense of justice for undue delay to be imposed on one who needs a prompt decision. Second, in practical effect it gives a greater finality to IRS decisions than we would want or Congress intended. Third, it inhibits the growth of a body of case law interpretative of the exempt organization provisions that could guide the IRS in its further deliberations."
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