JACKSON, Special Commissioner.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of robbery with a firearm, and the jury assessed the punishment at ninety-nine (99) years.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged, and no summary of the facts is necessary.
The appellant seeks reversal on two grounds: (1) prosecutor's jury argument at the punishment stage, and (2) admission in evidence of a pistol found in appellant's apartment upon a search without warrant but with written consent claimed to be invalid.
Jury argument: At the punishment phase appellant's counsel argued for a low penalty by reciting the number of days in each number of years that might be assessed. On this subject, in reply, the prosecutor said to the jury:
To this argument appellant's counsel objected: "That's a comment on the time served and that is a contradit ion of the court's charge."
The Court: "The Court has told the jury in the charge not to consider the execution of the sentence."
Motion for mistrial was overruled. The court charged the jury on this subject as follows:
Even if the foregoing argument could be construed as implying that the number of years assessed is not necessarily the number of years served, it does not require reversal in view of the verbal and written instruction given by the judge that the jury should not consider how long the appellant would be required to serve the sentence imposed. Lenzi v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 456 S.W.2d 99; Gray v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 477 S.W.2d 635; Alexander v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 44. No reversible error is shown.
Search: Appellant's second contention is that the court erred in admitting evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure.
A written instrument signed by appellant in the presence of two witnesses was in evidence, as follows:
Officer Adamcik, testifying in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, related that he had advised appellant of all his rights before getting consent to search. He also testified, on cross-examination, that
Appellant testified that the consent form introduced was signed by him, that "he knew what he was doing" and was aware of the effect of his consent. He further stated that he felt he had no choice because someone told him they could get a warrant and that giving consent would thus "save us both some time." The trial court found that consent had been freely and voluntarily given.
The foregoing is sufficient to support the finding that the consent to search was properly obtained. Further, although good police practice, written consent is not required. See DeVoyle v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 471 S.W.2d 77; Weatherly v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 477 S.W.2d 572; Darnell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 477 S.W.2d 281. Nothing remains for review.
Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
Opinion approved by the Court.
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