MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join.
This case involves the constitutionality of a 1967 Louisiana statute, known as Act No. 2, which creates
Since the case was decided on a motion to dismiss, a rather detailed examination of the structure of the Act and of the allegations of the complaint is necessary.
The impetus for the formation of the Commission was stated in the preamble of the Act. [1967 Extra. Sess.] La. Acts 2. It cited "unprecedented conditions" in the labor relations of the construction industry, and it particularly noted certain "allegations and accusations of violations of the state and federal criminal laws which should be thoroughly investigated in the public interest. . . ." Id., at 3. The additional investigative facilities of the Commission were thought necessary to
The Commission is composed of nine members appointed by the Governor. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.1 (Supp. 1969). It is empowered to act only upon referral by the Governor when, in his opinion, there is substantial indication that there are or may be "widespread or continuing violations of existing criminal laws" affecting labor-management relations. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.5 (Supp. 1969). Upon referral by the Governor, the Commission is to proceed by public hearing to ascertain the facts pertaining to the alleged violations. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.6 (Supp. 1969). In order to carry out this function, the Commission has the power to make appropriate rules and regulations, to employ attorneys, investigators, and other staff members, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to examine them under oath, and to require the production of books, records, and other evidence. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.8 (Supp. 1969). It can enforce its orders by petition to the state courts for contempt proceedings. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.9 (Supp. 1969).
The scope of the Commission's investigative authority is explicitly limited by the Act to violations of criminal laws. "The commission shall have no power, authority or jurisdiction to investigate, hold hearings or seek to ascertain the facts or make any reports or recommendations on any of the strictly civil aspects of any labor problem . . . ." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.6 B (Supp. 1969).
The Commission is required to determine, in public findings, whether there is probable cause to believe violations of the criminal laws have occurred. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.7 A (Supp. 1969). Its power is limited to making these findings and recommendations:
The findings are to be a matter of public record, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.15 B (Supp. 1969), although they may not be used as prima facie or presumptive evidence of guilt or innocence in any court of law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.7 A (Supp. 1969). The Commission is required to report its findings to the proper state or federal authorities if it finds there is probable cause to believe that violations of the criminal laws have occurred, and it may file appropriate charges. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.7 B (Supp. 1969). Finally, the Commission may request the Governor to refer matters to the State Attorney General asking the latter to exercise his authority to cause criminal prosecutions to be instituted. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.7 D (Supp. 1969). Nothing in the Act makes any provision for preparation of findings or reports for submission to the Governor or the legislature for the explicit purpose of legislative action. Indeed, the preamble of the Act and the Act itself make it clear that the purpose of the Commission is to supplement the activities of the State's law enforcement agencies in one narrowly defined area.
As indicated above, the Commission has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. A witness is given notice of the general subject matter of the investigation before being asked to appear and testify. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.10 A (Supp. 1969). A witness has the right to the presence and advice of counsel, "subject to such reasonable limitations as the commission may impose in order to prevent obstruction of or interference with the orderly conduct of the hearing." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.10 B (Supp. 1969). Counsel may question his client as to any relevant matters, ibid., but the
With one limited exception to be discussed below, neither a witness nor any other private party has the right to call anyone to testify before the Commission.
Although the Commission must base its findings and reports only on evidence and testimony given at public hearings, the Act does provide for executive session when it appears that the testimony to be given "may tend to degrade, defame or incriminate any person." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.12 A (Supp. 1969). In executive session the Commission must allow the person who might be degraded, defamed, or incriminated an opportunity to appear and be heard, and to call a reasonable number of witnesses on his behalf. Ibid. However, the Commission may decide that the evidence or testimony shall be heard in a public hearing, regardless of its effect on any particular person. Ibid. In that case, the person affected has the right to appear as a "voluntary witness" and may submit "pertinent" statements of others. Ibid. He may submit a list of additional witnesses, but subpoenas will be issued only in the discretion of the Commission. Ibid.; see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:880.12 C (Supp. 1969).
Appellant's complaint named as defendants the Governor of Louisiana and six members of the Commission. The complaint presented, inter alia, the question of
More specifically, the complaint alleged that appellees and their agents, acting under color of law and in conspiracy, procured false statements of criminal activities and used such statements to initiate baseless criminal proceedings against appellant, that they intimidated and coerced public officials into filing and prosecuting false criminal charges against appellant, and that they knowingly, willfully, and purposefully intimidated state court judges having under consideration legal controversies involving appellant. These acts of appellees allegedly deprived appellant and all others similarly situated of "rights, privileges and immunities secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Finally, appellant alleged that the appellees intended to continue to deprive him and others of their rights and that there was no "plain, adequate or efficient remedy at law."
Appellant prayed that a three-judge district court be convened, that a temporary restraining order issue, that Act No. 2 be declared unconstitutional, that all civil
Temporary relief was denied by the District Court and a three-judge court was impanelled to hear the case. Appellees answered and moved to dismiss. They alleged that appellant lacked standing to question the constitutionality of Act No. 2 and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Thereafter, appellant filed a "Supplemental and Amending Petition" in which he alleged, in some detail, that appellees had continued the course of action described in the original complaint. After a hearing, the court dismissed the complaint. Jenkins v. McKeithen, supra.
The court, relying largely on the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Martone v. Morgan, 251 La. 993, 207 So.2d 770, appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 12 (1968) (petition for rehearing pending), held that this Court's decision in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), was dispositive of the issue of the constitutionality of the Act. The court further ruled that appellant had not stated any other claim for relief under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988 of Title 42, United States Code. Rather, the court held that the other matters sought to be raised in the complaint were merely potential defenses to the pending criminal charges and that appellant had not alleged any basis for restraining prosecution of those charges. Finally, the court ruled that appellant's suit was not a proper class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellant presents two questions for review in this Court: Whether Act No. 2 is constitutional and whether
We are met at the outset with appellees' assertion that appellant lacks standing to attack the constitutionality of Act No. 2. This argument is based in part upon certain allegations in the complaint that Act No. 2 is unconstitutional because it denies to "a person compelled to appear before . . . [the] Commission" the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right of confrontation, and the right to compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses. Since appellant did not allege in his complaint that he was called to appear before the Commission or that he expected to be called, appellees assert that he lacks standing to assert the denial of rights to those who do appear. See, e. g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). Further, appellees argue that appellant lacks standing because he cannot demonstrate that he has been, or will be, "injured" by the operation of the challenged statute. We cannot agree.
The present case was decided on appellees' motion to dismiss, in which appellees contested appellant's standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. As noted above, the court below made no explicit reference to the issue of standing. But since the question of standing goes to this Court's jurisdiction, see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968), we must decide the issue even though the court below passed over it without comment. Cf. Tileston v. Ullman, supra.
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted. See, e. g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174-175 (1965). And, the complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of plaintiff. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (f); Conley v.
It is true, as appellees assert, that appellant alleges deprivations of rights of those who are or will be called to testify before the Commission and that he fails to allege that he was or will be called to testify. If this were the extent of appellant's allegations, we would agree that appellant lacks standing to challenge the Act. However, appellant's allegations are not limited to those mentioned by appellees. Appellant alleged that the Commission was an "executive trial agency" whose function was to conduct public trials designed to find appellant and others guilty of violations of criminal laws, allegedly for the purpose of injuring him and destroying the labor union of which he was a member. More specifically, appellant alleged that
Finally, the complaint alleged that the appellees, acting in concert with others and in connection with the administration of the Act, have actually engaged in a course of conduct designed publicly to brand appellant and others as criminals, including, as noted above, the filing of allegedly baseless criminal charges against appellant.
Thus, although the complaint is inartfully drawn, it does allege that the Commission and those acting in concert with it have taken and will take in the future certain
The concept of standing to sue, as we noted in Flast v. Cohen, supra, "is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere in [the concept of] justiciability" in general. 392 U. S., at 98. Nevertheless, the outlines of the concept can be stated with some certainty. The indispensable requirement is, of course, that the party seeking relief allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions . . . ." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see Flast v. Cohen, supra; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951) (concurring opinion). In this sense, the concept of standing focuses on the party seeking relief, rather than on the precise nature of the relief sought. See Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 99-100. The decisions of this Court have also made it clear that something more than an "adversary interest" is necessary to confer standing. There must in addition be some connection between the official action challenged and some legally protected interest of the party challenging that action. See Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 101-106.
In the present case, it is clear that appellant possesses sufficient adversary interest to insure proper presentation of issues facing the court. His allegations, if taken as true, indicate that the Commission and those acting in concert with it have carried out a series of public acts designed to injure him in various ways. Appellant's interest in his own reputation and in his economic well-being
We also think that appellant has alleged that the Act's administration was the direct cause of sufficient injury to his own legally protected interests to accord him standing to challenge the validity of the Act. We are not presented with a case in which any injury to appellant is merely a collateral consequence of the actions of an investigative body. See Hannah v. Larche, supra, at 443; cf. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 179-180 (1927). Rather, it is alleged that the very purpose of the Commission is to find persons guilty of violating criminal laws without trial or procedural safeguards, and to publicize those findings. Moreover, we think that the personal and economic consequences alleged to flow from such actions are sufficient to meet the requirement that appellant prove a legally redressable injury. Those consequences would certainly be actionable if caused by a private party and thus should be sufficient to accord appellant standing. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 493, n. 22 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 140-141 (opinion of Burton, J.); id., at 151-160 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It is no answer that the Commission has not itself tried to impose any direct sanctions on appellant; it is enough that the Commission's alleged actions will have a substantial impact on him. See, e. g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-463 (1958). Finally, in the circumstances of the present case, we do not regard appellant's opportunity to defend any criminal prosecutions as sufficient to deprive him of standing to challenge the Act. Cf. United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 (1927). Appellant's allegations go beyond the normal publicity attending
We hold that appellant's complaint contains sufficient allegations of direct and substantial injury to his own legally protected interests to accord him standing to challenge the constitutionality of Act No. 2.
We thus reach the merits of appellant's contention that Act No. 2 is unconstitutional. Appellant's complaint is long and inartfully drawn; it contains many allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the Commission and other state officials. But the only issue presented by this aspect of the case is whether the Act creating the Commission is constitutional, either on its face or as applied. Many of appellant's allegations are relevant to this latter contention, but many involve issues that the court below ruled were properly matters to be raised in defense of any criminal prosecutions which might take place. We will deal with those allegations in the final section of this opinion.
Appellees, like the court below, rely heavily on this Court's decision in Hannah v. Larche, supra. In Hannah, this Court upheld the Civil Rights Commission against challenges similar to those involved in the present case. Indeed, Act No. 2 was drafted with Hannah in mind and the structure and powers of the Commission here are similar to those of the Civil Rights Commission. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 286 F. Supp., at 540; Martone v. Morgan, supra. We cannot agree, however, that Hannah controls the present case, for we think that there are crucial differences between the issues presented by this complaint and the issues in Hannah.
In rejecting appellants' challenge to the Civil Rights Commission's procedures, the Court placed great emphasis on the investigatory function of the Commission:
We reaffirm the decision in Hannah. In our view, however, the Commission in the present case differs in a substantial respect from the Civil Rights Commission and the other examples cited by the Court in Hannah. It is true, as the Supreme Court of Louisiana has held, Martone v. Morgan, supra, that the Commission does not adjudicate in the sense that a court does, nor does the Commission conduct, strictly speaking, a criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, the Act, when analyzed in light of the allegations of the complaint, makes it clear that the Commission exercises a function very much akin to making an official adjudication of criminal culpability. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, supra.
The Commission is limited to criminal law violations; the Act explicitly provides that the Commission shall have no jurisdiction over civil matters in the labor-management relations field. Indeed, the Commission is even limited to certain types of criminal activities.
Given this view of the purpose of the Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry, we agree with Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the result in Hannah v. Larche:
When viewed from this perspective, it is clear the procedures of the Commission do not meet the minimal requirements made obligatory on the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Act severely limits the right of a person being investigated to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Only a person appearing as a witness may cross-examine other witnesses. Cross-examination is further limited to those questions which the Commission "deems to be appropriate to its inquiry," and those questions must be submitted, presumably beforehand, in writing to the Commission. We have frequently emphasized that the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental aspect of procedural due process. See, e. g., Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-104 (1963); Greene
The Commission's procedures also drastically limit the right of a person investigated to present evidence on his own behalf. It is true that he may appear and call a "reasonable number of witnesses" in executive session, but should the Commission decide to hold a public hearing, he is limited to presentation of his own testimony and the "pertinent" written statements of others. The right to present oral testimony from other witnesses and the power to compel attendance of those witnesses may be denied in the discretion of the Commission. The right to present evidence is, of course, essential to the fair hearing required by the Due Process Clause. See, e. g., Morgan v. United States, supra, at 18; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 368-369 (1936). And, as we have noted above, this right becomes particularly fundamental when the proceeding allegedly results in a finding that a particular individual was guilty of a crime. Cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). We do not mean to say that the Commission may not impose reasonable restrictions on the number of witnesses and on the substance of their testimony; we only hold that a person's right to present his case should not be left to the unfettered discretion of the Commission.
Appellant argues that the procedures contemplated by the Act are deficient in other respects. In particular, he alleges that the Act provides no meaningful rules of
We do not mean to say that this same analysis applies to every body which has an accusatory function. The grand jury, for example, need not provide all the procedural guarantees alleged by appellant to be applicable to the Commission. As this Court noted in Hannah, "the grand jury merely investigates and reports. It does not try." 363 U. S., at 449. Moreover, "[t]he functions of that institution and its constitutional prerogatives are rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history." Id., at 489-490 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). Finally the grand jury is designed to interpose an independent body of citizens between the accused and the prosecuting attorney and the court. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11 (1887); Hannah v. Larche, supra, at 497-499 (dissenting opinion). Investigative bodies such as the Commission have no claim to specific
We also wish to emphasize that we do not hold that appellant is now entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief. We only hold that he has alleged a cause of action which may make such relief appropriate. It still remains for him to prove at trial that the Commission is designed to and does indeed act in the manner alleged in his complaint, and that its procedures fail to meet the requirements of due process.
As noted above, appellant also alleges in his complaint that appellees, and those acting in concert with them, have engaged in a course of conduct, both pursuant to the Act and otherwise, that has resulted in the filing of false criminal charges against appellant. He alleges numerous other related actions allegedly depriving him of his rights secured by the Constitution. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief with regard to these acts; in particular, appellant prays that the District Court enjoin all civil and criminal actions pending or to be instituted against him. To the extent that these allegations involve actions taken under the direct authority of Act No. 2, we think that they may properly be considered by the District Court in determining the constitutionality of the Act. However, the District Court characterized many of appellant's allegations as
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 493-508 (1960).
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.
I concur in the Court's judgment and in much of what is said in the prevailing opinion. I cannot agree, however, to reaffirming Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420. I joined the dissent of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in the Hannah case and still adhere to that dissent. The Louisiana law here, like the federal law considered in the Hannah case, is, in my judgment, nothing more nor less than a scheme for a nonjudicial tribunal to charge, try, convict, and punish people without courts, without juries, without lawyers, without witnesses—in short, without
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting.
Swept up in a constitutional revolution of its own making, the Court has a tendency to lose sight of the principles that have traditionally defined and limited its role in our political system. Constitutional adjudication is a responsibility we cannot shirk. But it is a grave and extraordinary process, one of last resort. And when it cannot legitimately be avoided, it is a function that must be performed with the utmost circumspection and precision, lest the Court's opinions emanate radiations which unintentionally, and spuriously, indicate views on matters we have not fully considered.
Over the years, the Court has evolved a number of principles designed to assure that we act within our proper confines. Perhaps the most fundamental of these is that we adjudicate only when, and to the extent that, we are presented with an actual and concrete controversy. Today, in its haste to make new constitutional doctrine, the Court turns this principle on its head, as it attempts to create a controversy out of a complaint which alleges none. With respect, I must dissent.
Only last Term, in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court reaffirmed the proposition that "when standing [to sue] is placed in issue in a case, the question is
Appellant in the case at bar attacks the constitutional validity of certain specific statutory procedures of the Louisiana Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry. Applying the principle stated above, it is not sufficient that he may be injured by the Commission or its members in some way. The injury must be alleged to arise out of, or relate to, the application of the procedures in question. The most generous reading of appellant's complaint cannot mask the simple truth that it falls short of this minimal requirement.
At the risk of wearying the reader, I must deal with appellant's pleadings in some detail. The relevant portion of the complaint, and that relied upon by the Court, is part IV ("Facts"), which contains 17 operative paragraphs.
Paragraphs 1-3 identify the plaintiff and defendants.
Paragraphs 4-6 characterize the Commission as an "executive trial agency," and outline its investigative functions. Paragraph 7 avers that the Commission's procedures for performing these functions are constitutionally
Paragraph 8 should be quoted in full:
In paragraph 9, appellant avers, "as more specifically applies to him," that appellees conspired to file false criminal charges against him. Paragraphs 10-14 describe in detail the chronology and conduct of the resulting criminal proceedings.
Paragraph 15 alleges that appellees intimidated certain persons (not including appellant) in order to elicit false statements to bring about the prosecution of other persons (not including appellant).
Finally, paragraph 16 contains the usual averments requisite to equitable and declaratory relief, and paragraph 17 requests a temporary restraining order.
Reading and re-reading these many paragraphs of legal and factual averments, one cannot help but be struck by the conspicuous absence of any claim that appellant has been or will be investigated by the Commission, or called as a witness before it, or identified in its findings, or, indeed, subjected to any of its processes.
Only paragraphs 9-14 relate specifically to appellant, and they contain no hint that the filing of the criminal informations against him was the result of the Commission's use of any of the procedures which the Court today indicates are constitutionally suspect. And assuming, contrary to fact, see n. 1, supra, that appellant represents
The complaint's utter failure to allege any connection between the injuries asserted to have been suffered by appellant and the procedures complained of is not, on any objective reading of the complaint, an accidental omission or the result of counsel's "inartfulness"—as my Brother MARSHALL would put it. In my view, the only plausible inference—especially when it is remembered that appellant was represented by counsel throughout this litigation—is that such allegations were omitted because appellant had no facts to support them.
The prevailing opinion's strained construction of the complaint goes well beyond the principle, with which I have no quarrel, that federal pleadings should be most liberally construed. It entirely undermines an important function of the federal system of procedure—that of disposing of unmeritorious and unjusticiable claims at the outset, before the parties and courts must undergo the expense and time consumed by evidentiary hearings.
Accordingly, I would sustain the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that appellant has not shown himself to have standing to challenge the Commission's procedures.
Because the complaint is barren of any indication of the manner in which appellant is affected by the Commission's formal procedures, the prevailing opinion is required to make its own assumptions. It places appellant in the vague position of "a person being investigated" by the Commission, ante, at 428, 429, and thence proceeds to discuss the rights of such a person to confront witnesses and to offer evidence in his own behalf. The prevailing opinion appears understandably reluctant to commit itself to very much. As I read the opinion, it does not state that any of the Commission's procedures are actually unconstitutional, but holds only that there is enough latent in the complaint that the case should proceed to trial.
Of necessity, however, my Brother MARSHALL has to examine some of the constitutional issues sought to be raised by appellant in order to justify a remand, and his discussion leaves radiations which are, at least, unclear. Reluctant as I am, under the circumstances of this case, to discuss the merits, I therefore feel compelled to outline my own views. I am not certain to what extent they comport with those of the majority.
The prevailing opinion fails to articulate what I deem to be a constitutionally significant distinction between two kinds of governmental bodies. The first is an agency whose sole or predominant function, without serving any other public interest, is to expose and publicize the names of persons it finds guilty of wrongdoing. To the extent that such a determination—whether called a "finding" or an "adjudication"—finally and directly affects the substantial personal interests, I do not doubt that the Due Process Clause may require that it be accompanied by many of the traditional adjudicatory procedural safeguards. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
The Commission thus bears close resemblance to certain federal administrative agencies, infra, this page and 440, and to the offices of prosecuting attorneys. These agencies have one salient feature in common, which distinguishes them from those designed simply to "expose." None of them is the final arbiter of anyone's guilt or innocence. Each, rather, plays only a preliminary role, designed, in the usual course of events, to initiate a subsequent formal proceeding in which the accused will enjoy the full panoply of procedural safeguards. For this reason, and because such agencies could not otherwise practicably pursue their investigative functions, they have not been required to follow "adjudicatory" procedures.
I see no constitutionally relevant distinction between this State Commission and the federal administrative agencies that perform investigative functions designed to discover violations which may result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. In Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 445-448, 454-485 (1960), the Court expressly
And the Court said of the Securities and Exchange Commission:
The statutory safeguards afforded persons being investigated by the Louisiana Commission are at least equal to those provided by most of these federal agencies. See id., at 454-485.
The Commission's functions also find close analogies in the investigations and determinations that take place
For obvious reasons, it has not been seriously suggested that a "person under investigation" by a district attorney has any of the "adjudicative" constitutional rights at the investigative stage.
As I noted above, the very insubstantiality of appellant's complaint leaves it unclear what the Court holds today. It may be that some of my Brethren understand the complaint to allege that in fact the Commission acts primarily as an agency of "exposure," rather than one which serves the ends required by the state statutes. If so—although I do not believe that the complaint can be reasonably thus construed—the area of disagreement between us may be small or nonexistent.
Before the Court holds that a purely investigatory agency must adopt the full roster of adjudicative safeguards