No. 133, Oct. Term, 1967.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
After the convictions of petitioners had been affirmed, and while their cases were pending here, it was revealed that the United States had engaged in electronic surveillance which might have violated their Fourth Amendment rights and tainted their convictions. A remand to the District Court being necessary in each case for adjudication in the first instance, the questions now before us relate to the standards and procedures to be followed by the District Court in determining whether any of the Government's evidence supporting these convictions was the product of illegal surveillance to which any of the petitioners are entitled to object.
No. 133, O. T., 1967. Petitioners Alderman and Alderisio, along with Ruby Kolod, now deceased, were convicted of conspiring to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce, 18 U. S. C. §§ 371, 875 (c). Their convictions were affirmed on appeal, 371 F.2d 983 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1967), and this Court denied certiorari, 389 U.S. 834 (1967). In their petition for rehearing, petitioners alleged they had recently discovered that Alderisio's place of business in Chicago had been the subject of electronic surveillance by the Government. Reading the response of the Government to admit that Alderisio's conversations had been overheard by unlawful
The United States subsequently filed a motion to modify that order. Although accepting the Court's order insofar as it required judicial determination of whether any of the prosecution's evidence was the product of illegal surveillance, the United States urged that in order to protect innocent third parties participating or referred to in irrelevant conversations overheard by the Government, surveillance records should first be subjected to in camera inspection by the trial judge, who would then turn over to the petitioners and their counsel only those materials arguably relevant to their prosecution. Petitioners opposed the motion, and the matter was argued before the Court last Term. We then set the case down for reargument at the opening of the current Term, 392 U.S. 919 (1968), the attention of the parties being directed to the disclosure issue and the question of
Nos. 11 and 197. Both petitioners were convicted of conspiring to transmit to the Soviet Union information relating to the national defense of the United States, 18 U. S. C. §§ 794 (a), (c), and of conspiring to violate 18 U. S. C. § 951 by causing Butenko to act as an agent of the Soviet Union without prior notification to the Secretary of State. Butenko was also convicted of a substantive offense under 18 U. S. C. § 951. The Court of Appeals affirmed all but Ivanov's conviction on the second conspiracy count. 384 F.2d 554 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1967). Petitions for certiorari were then filed in this Court, as was a subsequent motion to amend the
I.
The exclusionary rule fashioned in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), excludes from a criminal trial any evidence seized from the defendant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Fruits of such evidence are excluded as well. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-392 (1920). Because the Amendment now affords protection against the uninvited ear, oral statements, if illegally overheard, and their fruits are also subject to suppression. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
In Mapp and Weeks, the defendant against whom the evidence was held to be inadmissible was the victim of the search. However, in the cases before us each petitioner demands retrial if any of the evidence used to convict him was the product of unauthorized surveillance, regardless of whose Fourth Amendment rights the surveillance violated. At the very least, it is urged that if evidence is inadmissible against one defendant or conspirator, because tainted by electronic surveillance illegal as to him, it is also inadmissible against his codefendant or coconspirator.
This expansive reading of the Fourth Amendment and of the exclusionary rule fashioned to enforce it is admittedly inconsistent with prior cases, and we reject it. The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated
Thus in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), testimony induced by disclosing to witnesses their own telephonic communications intercepted by the Government contrary to 47 U. S. C. § 605 was held admissible against their coconspirators. The Court equated the rule under § 605 with the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment.
The rule is stated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960):
This same principle was twice acknowledged last Term. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
What petitioners appear to assert is an independent constitutional right of their own to exclude relevant and probative evidence because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth Amendment. But we think there is a substantial difference for constitutional purposes between preventing the incrimination of a defendant through the very evidence illegally seized from him and suppressing evidence on the motion of a party who cannot claim this predicate for exclusion.
The necessity for that predicate was not eliminated by recognizing and acknowledging the deterrent aim of the rule. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Neither those cases nor any others hold that anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment. The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that
We do not deprecate Fourth Amendment rights. The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout the rules escape unscathed. In this respect we are mindful that there is now a comprehensive statute making unauthorized electronic surveillance a serious crime.
Of course, Congress or state legislatures may extend the exclusionary rule and provide that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible against anyone for any purpose.
II.
In these cases, therefore, any petitioner would be entitled to the suppression of government evidence originating in electronic surveillance violative of his own Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Such violation would occur if the United States unlawfully overheard conversations of a petitioner himself or conversations occurring on his premises, whether or not he was present or participated in those conversations. The United States concedes this much and agrees that for purposes of a hearing to determine whether the Government's evidence is tainted by illegal surveillance, the transcripts or recordings of the overheard conversations of any petitioner or of third persons on his premises must be duly and properly examined in the District Court.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART, who are in partial dissent on this phase of the case, object to our protecting the homeowner against the use of third-party conversations overheard on his premises by an unauthorized surveillance. Their position is that unless the conversational privacy of the homeowner himself is invaded, there is no basis in the Fourth Amendment for excluding third-party conversations overheard on his premises. We cannot agree. If the police make an unwarranted search of a house and seize tangible property belonging to third parties—even a transcript of a third-party conversation—the homeowner may object to
The Court has characteristically applied the same rule where an unauthorized electronic surveillance is carried out by physical invasion of the premises. This much the dissent frankly concedes. Like physical evidence which might be seized, overheard conversations are fruits
Because the Court has now decided that the Fourth Amendment protects a person's private conversations as well as his private premises, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the dissent would discard the concept that private conversations overheard through an illegal entry into a private place must be excluded as the fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation. Although officers without a valid warrant may not search a house for physical evidence or incriminating information, whether the owner is present or away, the dissent would permit them to enter that house without consent and without a warrant, install a listening device, and use any overheard third-party conversations against the owner in a criminal case, in spite of the obvious violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his own dwelling. Even if the owner is present on his premises during the surveillance, he would have no complaint unless his own conversations were offered or used against him. Information from a telephone tap or from the microphone in the kitchen or in the rooms of guests or children would be freely usable as long as the homeowner's own conversations are not monitored and used against him. Indeed, if the police, instead of installing a device, secreted themselves on the premises, they could neither testify about nor use against the owner anything they
These views we do not accept. We adhere to the established view in this Court that the right to be secure in one's house against unauthorized intrusion is not limited to protection against a policeman viewing or seizing tangible property—"papers" and "effects." Otherwise, the express security for the home provided by the Fourth Amendment would approach redundancy. The rights of the owner of the premises are as clearly
The Court proceeded to hold quite the contrary. We take the same course here.
III.
The remaining aspect of these cases relates to the procedures to be followed by the District Court in resolving the ultimate issue which will be before it—whether the evidence against any petitioner grew out of his illegally overheard conversations or conversations occurring on his premises.
The Government concedes that it must disclose to petitioners any surveillance records which are relevant to the decision of this ultimate issue. And it recognizes that this disclosure must be made even though attended by potential danger to the reputation or safety of third parties or to the national security—unless the United States would prefer dismissal of the case to disclosure of the information. However, the Government contends that it need not be put to this disclose-or-dismiss option in the instant cases because none of the information obtained from its surveillance is "arguably relevant" to petitioners' convictions, in the sense that none of the overheard conversations arguably underlay any of the evidence offered in these cases. Although not now insisting that its own evaluation of relevance should be accepted automatically and without judicial scrutiny, the United States urges that the records of the specified conversations be first submitted to the trial judge for an in camera examination. Any record found arguably relevant by the judge would be turned over to the petitioner whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, and that petitioner would then have the opportunity to use the disclosed information in his attempt to show that the Government has used tainted evidence to convict him. Material not arguably relevant would not be disclosed to any petitioner.
Adversary proceedings are a major aspect of our system of criminal justice. Their superiority as a means for attaining justice in a given case is nowhere more evident than in those cases, such as the ones at bar, where an issue must be decided on the basis of a large volume of
Adversary proceedings will not magically eliminate all error, but they will substantially reduce its incidence by guarding against the possibility that the trial judge, through lack of time or unfamiliarity with the information contained in and suggested by the materials, will be unable to provide the scrutiny which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule demands. It may be that the prospect of disclosure will compel the Government to dismiss some prosecutions in deference to national security or third-party interests. But this is a choice the Government concededly faces with respect to material which it has obtained illegally and which it admits, or which a judge would find, is arguably relevant to the evidence offered against the defendant.
We think this resolution will avoid an exorbitant expenditure of judicial time and energy and will not unduly prejudice others or the public interest. It must be remembered that disclosure will be limited to the transcripts of a defendant's own conversations and of those which took place on his premises. It can be safely
None of this means that any defendant will have an unlimited license to rummage in the files of the Department of Justice. Armed with the specified records of overheard conversations and with the right to cross-examine the appropriate officials in regard to the connection between those records and the case made against him, a defendant may need or be entitled to nothing else. Whether this is the case or not must be left to the informed discretion, good sense, and fairness of the trial judge. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-342 (1939).
IV.
Accordingly, in No. 133, O. T. 1967, the motion of the United States is denied to the extent that it requests an initial in camera inspection of the fruits of any unlawful
Vacated and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, while joining the opinion of the Court, concurs in Part II of the opinion of MR. JUSTICE FORTAS and would hold that the protection of the Fourth Amendment includes also those against whom the investigation is directed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART. I join MR. JUSTICE HARLAN'S separate opinion, except insofar as it would authorize in camera proceedings in the Ivanov and Butenko cases. I would apply the same standards to all three cases now before us, agreeing to that extent with the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents, adhering to his dissent in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-374 (1967).
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Court's careful opinion is, I think, constructed on a faulty premise, which substantially undermines the validity of its ultimate conclusions. The majority confronts
I.
STANDING.
I am in substantial agreement with the reasons the Court has given for refusing to expand the traditional standing doctrine to permit a Fourth Amendment challenge to be raised by either a codefendant or a co-conspirator.
A.
There is a very simple reason why the traditional law of standing permits the owner of the premises to exclude a tangible object illegally seized on his property, despite the fact that he does not own the particular object taken by the police. Even though he does not have title to the object, the owner of the premises is in possession of it—and we have held that a property interest of even less substance is a sufficient predicate for standing under the Fourth Amendment. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
Consequently, in order to justify the traditional rule, one must argue, as does the majority, that the owner of the premises should be granted standing because the bugged third-party conversations are "fruits" of the police's infringement of the owner's property rights. The "fruits" theory, however, does not necessarily fit when the police overhear private conversations in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-353 (1967), squarely holds, the right to the privacy of one's conversation does not
It is true, of course, that the "fruits" theory would require a different result if the police used a listening device which did physically trespass upon the accused's premises. But the fact that this theory depends completely on the presence or absence of a technical trespass only serves to show that the entire theoretical basis of standing law must be reconsidered in the area of conversational privacy. For we have not buried Olmstead, so far as it dealt with the substance of Fourth Amendment rights, only to give it new life in the law of standing. Instead, we should reject traditional property concepts entirely, and reinterpret standing law in the light of the substantive principles developed in Katz. Standing should be granted to every person who participates in a conversation he legitimately expects will remain private—for it is such persons that Katz protects.
The following hypothetical suggests the paradoxical quality of the Court's rule. Imagine that I own an office building and permit a friend of mine, Smith, to use one of the vacant offices without charge. Smith uses the office to have a private talk with a third person, Jones. The next day, I ask my friend to tell me what Jones had said in the office I had given him. Smith replies that the conversation was private, and that what was said was "none of your business." Can it be that I could properly feel aggrieved because the conversation occurred on my property? It would make no sense if I were to reply to Smith: "My privacy has been infringed if you do not tell me what was said, for I own the property!" It is precisely the other way around—Smith is telling me that when he and Jones had talked together, they had a legitimate expectation that their conversation would remain secret, even from me as the property owner.
Now suppose that I had placed a listening device in the office I had given to Smith, without telling him. Could anyone doubt that I would be guilty of an outrageous violation of the privacy of Smith and Jones if I then listened to what they had said? It would be ludicrous to defend my conduct on the ground that I, after all, was the owner of the office building. The case does not stand differently if I am accused of a crime and demand the right to hear the Smith-Jones conversation which the police had monitored. The Government doubtless has violated the privacy of Smith and Jones,
In the field of conversational privacy, the Fourth Amendment protects persons, not places. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). And a man can only be in one place at one time. If the privacy of his conversation is respected at that place, he may engage in all those activities for which that privacy is an essential prerequisite. His privacy is not at all disturbed by the fact that other people in other places cannot speak without the fear of being overheard. That fact may be profoundly disturbing to the man whose privacy remains intact. But it remains a fact about other people's privacy. To permit a criminal defendant to complain about such intrusions is to permit the vicarious assertion of Fourth Amendment rights—a step which I decline to take in relation to property owners for much the same reasons as those which have impelled the Court to deny standing to coconspirators.
In rejecting the "property" rule advanced by the Court, I do not mean to suggest that standing may never properly be granted to permit the vicarious assertion of Fourth Amendment rights. While it is arguable that an individual should be permitted to raise a constitutional claim when the privacy of members of his family has been violated, I need not reach this question on the facts of the cases before us. It must be noted, however, that even if this Court recognized a man's right to protest whenever the privacy of his family was infringed, the lines the majority draws today would still seem extremely arbitrary. Under the prevailing "property" rule, for example, a husband generally cannot complain
B.
The Court's lengthy discussion of my position loses sight of the basic justification for the narrower standing rule I have advanced. To recapitulate, it is my central aim to show that the right to conversational privacy is a personal right, not a property right. It follows from this that the Court's rule permits property owners to assert vicariously the personal rights of others. Indeed, granting standing to property owners compromises the personal privacy of others.
The Court's response seems to be that the Fourth Amendment protects "houses" as well as "persons." But this is simply to treat private conversations as if they were pieces of tangible property. Since an individual
I entirely agree, however, that if the police see a person's tangible property while committing their trespass, they may not constitutionally use this knowledge either to obtain a search warrant or to gain a conviction. Since a man has no choice but to leave the bulk of his physical possessions in his "house," the Fourth Amendment must protect his "house" in this way or else the immunity of his personal possessions from arbitrary search could not be assured. Thus if an individual's personal possessions are to be protected at all, they must be protected in his house; but a person's private conversations are protected as much as is possible when he can complain as to any conversation in which he personally participated. To go further and protect other conversations occurring on his property is simply to give the householder the right to complain as to the Government's treatment of others.
C.
While the Court grants special standing rights to property owners, it refuses to reach the question whether employees, business visitors, social guests, and other
II.
IN CAMERA PROCEEDINGS.
While I would hold that property owners have no right as such to hear conversations in which they were not participants, it appears to me that at a minimum the Court should adopt the Government's suggested judicial screening procedure with regard to third-party conversations. Property owners should not be permitted to intrude into the private lives of others unless a trial judge determines that the conversation at issue is at least arguably relevant to the pending prosecution.
On the other hand, I would agree that in the typical case, the prosecution should be required to hand over the records of all conversations in which the accused played a part. Since the other parties to these conversations knew they were talking to the accused, they can hardly have an important interest in concealing from him what they said to him. Whatever risk of unauthorized disclosure is involved may generally be minimized even further by the issuance of appropriate protective orders. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16 (e).
There is, however, at least one class of cases in which the standard considerations do not apply. I refer to the situations exemplified by Ivanov and Butenko, in which the defendant is charged, under one statute or another,
Even more important, there is much less reason to believe that a protective court order will effectively deter the defendant in an espionage case from turning over the new information he has received to those who are not entitled to it. For in an espionage case, the defendant is someone the grand jury has found is likely to have passed secrets to a foreign power. It is one thing to believe that the normal criminal defendant will refuse to pass on information if threatened with severe penalties for unauthorized disclosure. It is quite a different thing to believe that a defendant who is probably a spy will not pass on to the foreign power any additional information he has received.
Moreover, apart from the sense of fair play of most judges, additional safeguards could be devised which would assure that an in camera procedure would be used only when an unauthorized disclosure presents a substantial risk to the national security. As in the somewhat analogous situation in which the Government attempts to invoke a national security privilege in a
The Court's failure to consider the special characteristics of the Ivanov and Butenko cases is particularly surprising in the light of the reasons it gives for creating an absolute rule in favor of an automatic turnover. For the majority properly recognizes that its preference for a full adversary hearing cannot be justified by an easy reference to an absolute principle condemning in camera judicial decisions in all situations. Indeed, this Court has expressly authorized the use of such procedures in closely related areas involving the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309-313 (1967). If, as the Court rightly states, the propriety of an in camera screening procedure is a "matter of judgment," ante, at 182, depending on an informed consideration of all the competing factors, I do not understand why the trial judge should not be authorized to consider whether the accused simply cannot be trusted to keep the Government's records confidential. Nor do I understand why the Government must be confronted with the choice of dismissing the indictment or disclosing the information because the accused cannot be counted on to keep faith with the Court.
In sum, I would require the Government to turn over to Alderman and Alderisio only the records of those conversations in which each defendant participated, and I would leave the way open for a preliminary in camera screening procedure in the Ivanov and Butenko cases.
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I.
In the present cases, the Court holds (1) that the Government may use evidence it obtains by unlawful electronic surveillance against any defendant who does not have "standing" to complain; (2) that a defendant has standing only if he was a party to the overheard conversation
I find it necessary to file this separate opinion because I believe (1) that a person concerning whom an investigation involving illegal electronic surveillance has been conducted, as well as the persons given "standing" in the majority opinion, has the right to suppression of the illegally obtained material and its fruits; and (2) that it is permissible for the trial judge, subject to suitable specifications, to order that information vital to the national security shall be examined only in camera to determine its relevance or materiality, although I agree that all other information that may be the subject of a motion to suppress must be shown to the defendant or his counsel so that its materiality can be determined in an adversary hearing.
II.
The effect of the Court's decision, bluntly acknowledged, is to add another to the long list of cases in which the courts have tolerated governmental conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. The courts have done this by resort to the legalism of "standing." See, e. g., Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Cf., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
The Fourth Amendment to our Constitution prohibits "unreasonable" governmental interference with the fundamental facet of individual liberty: "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." Mr. Justice Jackson recognized the central importance of the Fourth Amendment in his dissenting opinion in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-181 (1949):
It is disquieting when an individual policeman, through carelessness or ignorance or in response to the pressure of events, seizes a person or conducts a search without compliance with the standards prescribed by law. It is even more disturbing when law enforcement officers engage in unconstitutional conduct not because of their individual error but pursuant to a calculated institutional policy and directive.
Surreptitious electronic surveillance—the "uninvited ear" as my Brother WHITE calls it—is a "search and seizure" within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). It is usually the product of calculated, official decision rather than the error of an individual agent of the state. And because by nature it is hidden, unlawful electronic surveillance is even more offensive to a free society than the unlawful search and seizure of tangible material.
In recognition of the principle that lawlessness on the part of the Government must be stoutly condemned, this Court has ruled that when such lawless conduct occurs, the Government may not profit from its fruits. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), held that in a federal prosecution the Government may not use evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure. In Mapp v. Ohio, supra, the exclusionary rule was applied to the
But for reasons which many commentators charge are related more to convenience and judicial prudence than to constitutional principles, courts of all States except California
I find these arguments cogent and appealing. The Fourth Amendment is not merely a privilege accorded to him whose domain has been lawlessly invaded. It grants the individual a personal right, not to privacy, but to insist that the state utilize only lawful means of proceeding against him. And it is an assurance to all that the Government will exercise its formidable powers to arrest and to investigate only subject to the rule of law. See Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 181 (dissenting opinion).
To allow anyone, regardless of "standing," to prevent the use against him of evidence that the Government has lawlessly obtained would, however, be contrary to a number of decisions stemming from Jones v. United States, supra. E. g., Wong Sun v. United States, supra; Parman v. United States, 130 U. S. App. D. C. 188, 399 F.2d 559 (1968). It is the mandate of Jones that something more than the generalized interest of any citizen in governmental
Jones represented a substantial step towards full implementation of the Fourth Amendment. The case involved a charge of illegal possession of narcotics, and it held that mere lawful presence on the premises searched gave "standing" to challenge the legality of the search.
The Court said in Jones, in a passage the majority quotes but the full scope of which it does not incorporate in its opinion:
It is my position that this quotation, read in light of the Court's rejection of property concepts, requires that we include within the category of those who may object to the introduction of illegal evidence "one against whom the search was directed." Such a person is surely "the victim of an invasion of privacy"
III.
I do not agree with the Court's decision that sensitive national security material that may not be relevant to a defendant's prosecution must be turned over to the defendant or his counsel for their scrutiny. By the term "national security material," I mean to refer to a rigid and limited category. It would not include material relating to any activities except those specifically directed to acts of sabotage, espionage, or aggression by or on behalf of foreign states.
Because the Court believes that no distinction can be made with respect to the defendant's right to suppress relevant evidence on the basis of the sensitivity of the material, it has concluded that no distinction can be made as to the method of determining whether the material is relevant. I agree that an in camera inspection of the records of unlawful surveillance should not be the usual method of determining relevance. I agree with all that the Court says about the inadequacy of an inspection in which the defendant cannot participate and the burden that it places upon the trial judge. But in cases where the trial court explicitly determines, in written findings, sealed and available for examination by
Let me emphasize that the defendant's right to suppress is the same whether the charge is espionage, sabotage, or another kind of crime: Relevant material that has been illegally seized may be suppressed if the defendant has standing, but the existence of nonrelevant illegal evidence will not prevent a prosecution. Only the method of determining the relevance of the lawlessly obtained material to the prosecution would vary according to whether the national security is involved.
I agree with the majority that the possibility of error in determining relevance is much greater if there is only in camera examination. But I also agree with my Brother HARLAN that disclosure of some of the material may pose a serious danger to the national interest. I therefore reach the conclusion that a differentiation may properly be made between the method of handling materials the disclosure of which would endanger the national security and other illegally obtained materials. Skepticism as to the court's ability to detect and turn over to the defendant all relevant material may be well founded, but in camera inspection does not so clearly threaten to deprive defendants of their constitutional rights that it justifies endangering the national security. Accordingly, I would
FootNotes
"(1) Should the records of the electronic surveillance of petitioner Alderisio's place of business be subjected to in camera inspection by the trial judge to determine the necessity of compelling the Government to make disclosure of such records to petitioners, and if so to what extent?
"(2) If in camera inspection is authorized or ordered, by what standards (for example, relevance and considerations of injury to persons or to reputations) should the trial judge determine whether the records are to be turned over to petitioners?
"(3) What standards are to be applied in determining whether each petitioner has standing to object to the use against him of the information obtained from the electronic surveillance of petitioner Alderisio's place of business? More specifically, does petitioner Alderisio have standing to object to the use of any or all information obtained from such electronic surveillance whether or not he was present on the premises or party to a particular overheard conversation? Also, does petitioner Alderman have standing to object to the use against him of any or all information obtained from the electronic surveillance of petitioner Alderisio's business establishment?"
"In some of the instances the installation had been specifically approved by the then Attorney General. In others the equipment was installed under a broader grant of authority to the F. B. I., in effect at that time, which did not require specific authorization. . . . [P]resent Department of Justice policy would call for specific authorization from the Attorney General for any use of electronic equipment in such cases."
In all three cases, the District Court must develop the relevant facts and decide if the Government's electronic surveillance was unlawful. Our assumption, for present purposes, is that the surveillance was illegal.
"On the assumption that there was electronic surveillance of petitioner or a codefendant which violated the Fourth Amendment,
"(1) Should the records of such electronic surveillance be subjected to in camera inspection by the trial judge to determine the necessity of compelling the Government to make disclosure of such records to petitioner, and if so to what extent?
"(2) If in camera inspection is to be authorized or ordered, by what standards (for example, relevance, and considerations of national security or injury to persons or reputations) should the trial judge determine whether the records are to be turned over to the defendant?
"(3) What standards are to be applied in determining whether petitioner has standing to object to the use against him of information obtained from such illegal surveillance? More specifically, if illegal surveillance took place at the premises of a particular defendant,
"(a) Does that defendant have standing to object to the use against him of any or all information obtained from the illegal surveillance, whether or not he was present on the premises or party to the overheard conversation?
"(b) Does a codefendant have standing to object to the use against him of any or all information obtained from the illegal surveillance, whether or not he was present on the premises or party to the overheard conversation?"
"The question now to be decided is whether we shall extend the sanction for violation of the Communications Act so as to make available to one not a party to the intercepted communication the objection that its use outside the courtroom, and prior to the trial, induced evidence which, except for that use, would be admissible.
"No court has ever gone so far in applying the implied sanction for violation of the Fourth Amendment. While this court has never been called upon to decide the point, the federal courts in numerous cases, and with unanimity, have denied standing to one not the victim of an unconstitutional search and seizure to object to the introduction in evidence of that which was seized. A fortiori the same rule should apply to the introduction of evidence induced by the use or disclosure thereof to a witness other than the victim of the seizure. We think no broader sanction should be imposed upon the Government in respect of violations of the Communications Act." 316 U. S., at 121.
The Court noted that the principle had been applied "in at least fifty cases by the Circuit Courts of Appeals . . . not to mention many decisions by District Courts." Id., at 121, n. 12.
So also we do not distinguish between electronic surveillance which is carried out by means of a physical entry and surveillance which penetrates a private area without a technical trespass. This much, we think, Katz makes quite clear. In either case, officialdom invades an area in which the homeowner has the right to expect privacy for himself, his family, and his invitees, and the right to object to the use against him of the fruits of that invasion, not because the rights of others have been violated, but because his own were. Those who converse and are overheard when the owner is not present also have a valid objection unless the owner of the premises has consented to the surveillance. Cf. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367-370 (1968). The Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy and does not protect persons engaged in crime from the risk that those with whom they associate or converse will cooperate with the Government. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).
"In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal —would bring terrible retribution. . . ." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 128 (1942) (dissenting opinion); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 149 (1954) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); Comment, The Benanti Case: State Wiretap Evidence and the Federal Exclusionary Rule, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1159, 1167-1168 (1957).
Although I have referred to relevant provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, I note that I have not considered the constitutionality of the Act, as that issue is not involved in this case. I express neither agreement nor disagreement with the majority's statements concerning the Act.
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