MR. JUSTICE MORAN delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff, Raymond Ziegler, brought this action against the defendants, Houghton-Mifflin Co. and Henry Hodges, for invasion of his right of privacy and for certain monies due under an assignment from the defendant, Henry Hodges, to the plaintiff and accepted by the defendant, Houghton-Mifflin. The defendant, Henry Hodges, was personally served with summons and complaint at his residence in Florida. The defendant, Henry Hodges, moved to quash the service of summons stating that he was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court. His motion was granted and an order was entered dismissing the suit as against him, and from this order the plaintiff appeals.
The defendant, Henry Hodges', motion was accompanied by an affidavit and the plaintiff filed an affidavit and a supplemental affidavit. By his affidavit the defendant, Henry Hodges merely avers that he has never submitted to the jurisdiction of the court in said action, that he has never committed any of the acts set forth in chapter 110, section 17 of the Civil Practice Act (c 110, § 17,
The plaintiff by his affidavit and supplemental affidavit avers that in 1961 Henry Hodges made a written offer in a letter which was sent from Hodges to the plaintiff in Urbana, Illinois; that said offer was for plaintiff to participate with Hodges in writing a certain textbook; that the consideration for plaintiff's participation in writing said textbook would be a percentage of the royalties received by Hodges from Houghton-Mifflin Co. upon publication of said textbook; that thereafter there were certain long-distance telephone conversations between the plaintiff in Illinois and Hodges in Florida by which the plaintiff accepted the offer of Hodges; that said telephone conversations specifically concerned the agreement to write a portion of the aforesaid textbook; that thereafter certain materials were sent to the plaintiff in Illinois by Hodges to aid the plaintiff in the preparation of his portion of the textbook; that pursuant to the agreement that portion of the textbook to be written by the plaintiff was written by him in Illinois and all labor concerning his writing was performed in Illinois; that the plaintiff sent the fruits of his labor to Hodges in Florida; that that portion of the manuscript prepared by Hodges was sent to the plaintiff in Illinois for the express purpose that the plaintiff edit and comment upon the same; that the plaintiff did edit and comment as requested and that all such labor performed by the plaintiff in this respect was performed within Illinois; that thereafter the plaintiff returned the same to Henry Hodges in Florida and that Hodges knew or should have known that the plaintiff would perform the agreements solicited by Hodges
Although Hodges suggests in his argument that no consideration should be given to the supplemental affidavit, we find no merit to this argument and we are considering the facts as presented by the affidavit of the defendant, Hodges, and the affidavit and supplemental affidavit of the plaintiff as set forth above.
The applicable part of section 17 is as follows:
Ill Rev Stats, 1965, c 110, § 17-1a, 2 and 3.
The sole question to be answered in this case is whether the defendant, Hodges, submitted his person to the
It does not appear nor was it contended by the counsel for the defendant in his oral argument that the personal presence of the nonresident defendant in this State is required in order for the courts of this State to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra. Also see, Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 34 Ill.2d 164, 214 N.E.2d 755 (1966).
Rather it appears that the issue in this case rests upon the question as to what are the minimum contacts required for the exercise of the in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
In Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., supra, a section 12a Use Tax case, the nonresident mail order corporation neither maintained a local office nor sent salesmen into Illinois, but availed itself of the mail for local solicitation of mail orders and the goods were mailed or shipped by common carrier. Under section 12a (c 120, par 439, § 12a, Ill Rev Stats 1965), any nonresident of Illinois subject to the provisions of said section appoints the Secretary of State his agent for the service of process and such service shall have the same force and validity as personal service in Illinois upon the taxpayer. The Court held at page 176 that solicitation was of prime importance in satisfying the "minimal connections" requirement of the Use Tax Act; and that the defendant's continuous local solicitation for mail orders followed by delivery of ordered goods to the customers
In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra, at page 438, the Court said:
Defendant Hodges has cited the case of Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., Inc., 16 Ill.2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959), and Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., 249 F.2d 198 (1957) and Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (1959). However, the Gray case was decided after these cases and even the Grobark case represented an extension of the restricted concept of jurisdiction, for the Court there implied that service on the defendant outside the forum State would be proper if the defendant had performed substantial acts within the forum State.
We hold that under the expanded concept of due process as delineated by the Gray case this continuous contact between the plaintiff and the defendant Hodges satisfied the "minimal contacts" prerequisite to in personam jurisdiction of the defendant Hodges.
The order quashing the service of process upon the defendant is reversed.
DAVIS, P.J. and ABRAHAMSON, J., concur.