McDONALD, PARKER LEE, Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment in favor of the Defendant, Southern Maid Syrup Company, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and against the Plaintiff, Robert T. Quinnelly, entered after the Court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The only assignment of error directed to this Court is the dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint and entry of final judgment as a consequence thereof.
The pertinent portions of the Second Amended Complaint were as follows:
Our Courts have consistently held that where the plaintiff was an employee-invitee or a business visitor-invitee it was the duty of the defendant to use reasonable care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to have given the plaintiff timely notice and warning of latent and concealed perils, known to the defendant or which by the exercise of due care should have been known to him, and which were not known by plaintiff or which, by the exercise of due care, could not have been known to him. Hall v. Holland, Fla., 47 So.2d 889; Hickory House v. Brown, Fla., 77 So.2d 249. An ever underlying principle in all of these cases, before a defendant is held liable, is a showing by proper allegations of superior knowledge of the danger on the defendant's part.
The plaintiff contends that the case of Ahearn v. Florida Power & Light Company, Fla.App., 129 So.2d 457, supports and substantiates his claim against this defendant. The cases are easily distinguishable, however. The Ahearn case was an action against a distributor of electricity. A higher degree of care is required of persons engaged in the distribution of electricity than that of an ordinary land owner. Florida Power & Light Company v. Robinson, Fla., 68 So.2d 406, Price v. Florida Power & Light Company, Fla.App., 159 So.2d 654. In addition thereto, the Ahearn case clearly showed from the evidence superior knowledge on the part of Florida Power & Light Company of a dangerous condition. In the past, the company had warned workers (and Ahearn was an experienced worker) of the danger when a line was energized. A custom had been established at the time of the unfortunate accident. There were no warnings at the time of the accident and the company knew the lines were energized. Because of the past practices it was reasonable for the deceased to assume that the lines were de-energized. In the case at bar, there was no reason for the injured party or the operator of the boom-truck which came in contact with the wire to assume that the wire was de-energized. There is an allegation that the line dead-ended at a pole; but in the absence of a showing of some practice or standard of conduct which would authorize a person to believe that under those circumstances the wires were de-energized, any reasonable man should expect and anticipate the potential hazard. His duty is at least as great as that of the land owner.
There is no superior knowledge of danger on the defendant's part existing in this case. There is no allegation showing a breach of a duty owed the plaintiff. The allegations do not show any injuries as a proximate result of any conduct of the defendant. The instrumentality actually causing the injury was under the exclusive control of third persons. It was not the duty of the land owner to furnish the plaintiff a safe place to work, but to use due care in maintaining his premises. Notice or warning is not required where the dangerous
WHITE, Acting C.J., and KANNER (Retired), J., concur.