WATERMAN, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition to review a decision of the Tax Court of the United States which upheld the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's determination of a deficiency of $25,784.43 in the federal income tax of petitioner, People's Educational Camp Society, Inc., for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1956. The Tax Court rejected petitioner's claim that it was exempt from the income tax under Section 501(c) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as a nonprofit civic organization operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, rejecting it on the ground that such an exemption was precluded because of the relationship which petitioner's operation of a large commercial resort bore to its totality of activities. We agree that petitioner was not entitled to the exemption.
A complete statement of the facts surrounding petitioner's operations, including a detailed breakdown of its financial activities, can be found in the opinion of the Tax Court, reported at 39 T.C. 756. Our summary thereof follows:
Petitioner is a New York membership corporation with its principal offices in New York City. It was organized in 1920 by persons associated with the Rand School of Social Science, an institution then operated by the American Socialist Society and engaged in conducting adult classes and presenting lectures and programs related to the dissemination of information on the labor movement and socialist principles. During 1920 officials and friends of the Rand School became interested in purchasing a tract of 2,196 acres of land in the Pocono Mountains of Pennsylvania, with an eye toward developing on the tract a campsite where the Rand School's faculty, students and friends might gather during the summers to carry on their studies and develop programs in which they were interested. After the school's executive secretary had acquired an option to purchase the land for about $21,000, petitioner was organized to take title to the property and develop the summer camp, which was eventually given the name "Tamiment," the name of a lake nearby.
When petitioner was organized its certificate of incorporation set forth its objects in the following terms:
As of the time of the Tax Court proceedings below, petitioner's by-laws provided that upon dissolution all its property was to revert to the American Socialist Society, although that Society, along with its Rand School of Social Science, had ceased to exist in 1956. As of this time no steps had been taken to amend the portion of the by-laws relating to the disposition of petitioner's property upon dissolution, nor had any alternative plan for dissolution been contemplated.
From the opening of Camp Tamiment for occupancy in July of 1921, it began to experience considerable growth. During its first twenty years its growth was steady though moderate. By 1941 the camp's annual gross income had increased to $281,633.87, and the value of its fixed assets had increased to $398,663.93. Except for the years 1925 and 1932, when small losses were incurred, Tamiment has each year consistently shown a profit, and, except for the period from 1921 to 1923 when petitioner received contributions, it has been entirely self-sustaining. In January of 1936, and again in January of 1939, petitioner obtained rulings from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that, on the basis of facts then available, petitioner was entitled to an exemption under the then existing provisions of the tax laws, provisions which later came to be embodied in
Tamiment's operations from 1941 through the taxable year 1956 represented a second distinct phase of its development, one marked by a growth much more rapid and substantial than that previously experienced. This was manifested by considerable increases in operating expenses and in the value of petitioner's fixed assets and accumulated surplus. An analysis of petitioner's balance sheet figures for these years shows that petitioner's assets, which stood at $398,663.93 in 1941, had increased to $1,124,229.91 by 1951. By the end of the taxable year 1956,
By the year 1956 Tamiment had become the largest and one of the most modern summer vacation resorts in Pennsylvania, with rates ranging from $12 to $19 per day per person. As already noted, the American Socialist Society and the Rand School of Social Science, the motivating forces behind the creation of Tamiment as a site for summer retreats, had both ceased to exist. The resort was open to the public and competed with other vacation resorts in the Poconos. It employed more than 400 persons during the peak season and it advertised itself through newspapers, magazines and brochures as "Tamiment in the Poconos."
Tamiment's principal guest quarters in 1956 consisted of more than 160 furnished cottages, capable of accommodating about 900 persons, and located adjacent to a dining hall with a seating capacity of 1000. Set apart from the main complex of cottages was a group of bungalows known as Sandyville, designed for use by families with children, and which adjoined a play school and a small store. The other physical facilities which dotted Tamiment's grounds were of the type not uncommon to luxury vacation
Also, Tamiment's activities included organized programs in the fields of drama, music and art, all available to guests of the resort free of charge. On Saturday evenings and Sunday afternoons the theater building was the scene of a dramatic or musical production staged by a theater group employed by petitioner for that purpose, and throughout the rest of the week the building was used for the exhibition of motion pictures. Orchestras hired on theater evenings to play for musical comedies and revues were customarily used after the performances to provide music at dances. Each week during the summer season vocalists and musicians performed concerts or gave recitals, and a lecture dealing with a topic connected with the arts or with public affairs was also weekly fare for those staying at the resort. Throughout each summer season an art director employed by petitioner gave free art instruction to interested guests, and professional artists were invited to display their works there and offer them for sale.
The most outstanding single cultural attraction at Tamiment was presented each year early in the summer vacation season, a chamber music festival featuring an orchestra and string quartet. The festival was open to members of the general public as well as Tamiment's paying guests, but a moderate fee was charged those attending who were not staying at the resort.
Though the operation of Tamiment constituted the great bulk of petitioner's activities during the period under review, petitioner also carried on other activities at the time, chiefly in New York City. In 1951 it acquired from the American Socialist Society a building in the city which housed the Rand School of Social Science, the school's library, the offices of an independent publication called the New Leader, and the principal corporate office of petitioner. When the American Socialist Society was dissolved in March of 1956, and the operations of the Rand School accordingly ceased, petitioner acquired all of the assets of the school's library and, after renovating it and hiring personnel to staff it, began itself to maintain and operate the library. Containing one of the largest and most complete collections of material dealing with the labor movement, Socialism, and Communism, the library was made freely available to all persons engaged in research in those fields.
Acting under the name of "Tamiment Institute," petitioner also undertook to sponsor and promote various other programs of public interest, mostly in New York City. In order to stimulate interest in American string quartet composition, petitioner promoted annual composition contests in this field of music, awarding prizes to original works adjudged the best. An annual book award luncheon was conducted, at which a prize was awarded by petitioner for the best biographical book of the year. Petitioner launched several programs to foster thought and discussion about important public issues. It discussed such issues from time to time in public service advertisements which it sponsored, and in pamphlets which it published and circulated itself. It also conducted numerous essay contests for college and university students. An annual public forum was held at which prominent citizens aired their views on matters of public concern, and, along these same lines, annual seminars were sponsored at Tamiment before the opening of the resort's summer season at which scholarly papers were read and discussed.
On March 3, 1956, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue wrote to petitioner, ruling that, inasmuch as petitioner was primarily engaged in operating a commercial enterprise, it was no
Petitioner, of course, seeks to take advantage of that part of the subsection exempting "[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare."
Conditions (1) and (2) do not require extensive treatment. While at least one court has given the subsection a rather limited construction by defining the initial word "civic" narrowly and then regarding it as modifying both "leagues" and "organizations," Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151, 156 (3 Cir. 1963), neither party to these proceedings has raised any question as to the emphasis to be placed upon the word "civic" or the interpretation to be accorded it in construing Section 501(c) (4). Rather, they have both tacitly assumed that, even if the term does connote a limited genre of exempt organizations characterized by something other than social welfare operations, petitioner may be so classified, and they have confined themselves to an analysis of whether petitioner's operations in 1956 were exclusively of a social welfare nature.
This emphasis on the broader term "social welfare" is in line with the current regulations covering the subsection, which do not appear to give the word "civic" any real independent limiting effect but which only deal with organizations "operated primarily for the purpose of bringing about civic betterment and social improvements," Reg. § 1.501(c) (4)-(1) (a) (2), and is also in line with revenue rulings interpreting this and predecessor subsections,
Certain of petitioner's activities, not involving the commercial operation of the Tamiment resort, were found by the Tax Court to constitute the promotion of social welfare. These activities, which we have already outlined in some detail, were largely conducted in the New York City area and included such things as the maintenance of a free library on Socialism, Communism and the labor movement, the sponsorship of public forums and symposia, the promotion of musical composition and essay contests, and the circulation of pamphlets discussing important matters of public interest. We agree that these activities involved the promotion of social welfare as that term is used in Section 501(c) (4) of the Code. This court has characterized the promotion of social welfare as involving the serving of "purposes beneficial to the community as a whole," or the promotion of the "welfare of mankind" in the manner generally of the charitable, educational and religious organizations exempted by like provisions of the Code. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 148 F.2d at 951. These activities of petitioner, designed in the main to stimulate increased interest in the arts and public affairs and to provide the general citizenry with means for becoming better informed as to matters of public concern, amounted, we think, to the furthering of the beneficial interests of the community as a whole and therefore served to promote social welfare.
Petitioner further urges us to characterize, as promoting social welfare, the various cultural activities which were conducted at Tamiment, and which were connected with that area's operation as a commercial vacation resort. Our attention is directed to the lectures, concerts, plays, and art exhibits which were regularly held during the resort's summer season, and to Tamiment's annual four-day chamber music festival. We agree with the Tax Court, however, that these activities, considered in their relation to the total operation of Tamiment, did not involve the promotion of social
We come now to the important question of whether petitioner's operation of the resort Tamiment, not in itself an activity involving the promotion of social welfare, prevents the petitioner from obtaining a Section 501(c) (4) exemption as an organization operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. The word "exclusively" as used in the statute has not been given a strict interpretation, so as to foreclose every operation for a non-exempt purpose no matter how insubstantial, but rather has been interpreted to mean "primarily." Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 148 F.2d at 952; see Sugarman & Pomeroy, Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 46 Va.L.Rev. 424, 425 (1960). Stated another way, "the presence of a single * * * [non-exempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly * * * [exempt] purposes." Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283, 66 S.Ct. 112, 114, 90 L.Ed. 67 (1945).
It was the nature of petitioner's operation of Tamiment as a commercial resort in active competition with other such businesses in the Poconos area, coupled with the relationship which the running of Tamiment bore to the total aggregation of petitioner's activities, that caused the Tax Court to conclude that petitioner was not operating exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. That court laid particular stress upon the fact that petitioner's expenditures for genuine social welfare activities constituted but a small fraction of its total revenues and paled in comparison with the total accumulated surplus which petitioner carried and which it had consistently increased over the years. The following table, drawn up by the Tax Court on the basis of its findings as to petitioner's financial activities, excellently demonstrates this point:
Fiscal year Expenditures for Accumulated ended Total social welfare earned
Sept. 30 Revenues activities surplus1953 $968,004.85 $13,378.44 $1,913,550.32 1954 956,911.51 28,550.86 2,036,911.38 1955 918,558.59 47,636.86 2,124,602.33 1956 942,612.55 44,684.76 2,226,080.50 1957 979,579.07 70,718.27 2,307,097.89
We agree with the Tax Court that, under these circumstances, petitioner's operations at Tamiment foreclosed a determination that it is an organization operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. See Scripture Press Foundation v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct.Cl.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985, 82 S.Ct. 597, 7 L.Ed.2d 523 (1962). True, none of petitioner's revenues from Tamiment have ever been turned over as profits to any private person,
Petitioner argues, however, that despite the relationship existing between its Tamiment expenditures and the amount of its revenues devoted to the promotion of social welfare, its Tamiment resort is no more than an income producing operation designed to finance its social welfare activities, and hence it is entitled to an exemption under the "destination of income" test. According to that test, first developed by this Circuit in 1938 largely on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, etc., supra, the fact that an otherwise exempt organization conducts a commercial operation should not prevent the organization from qualifying for an exemption if the net income thereby realized is destined to be used for exempt purposes. Consumer-Farmer Milk Coop. v. Commissioner, supra; Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra; Bohemian Gymnastic Ass'n Sokol v. Higgins, 147 F.2d 774 (2 Cir. 1945); Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2 Cir. 1938).
While petitioner's argument is not completely unpersuasive, we think that to use the destination test to exempt this petitioner from the income tax would
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, etc., supra, the Supreme Court decision relied upon by this court as the original basis for the development of the destination test, provides no support for using that test in order to exempt an organization such as petitioner. In fact, a careful analysis of the facts before the Court in that case demonstrates that to use the destination test here would be to carry the rule developed from Sagrada Orden very far afield from the principles which were there set forth. The Court in Sagrada Orden interpreted an exemption which shielded from tax liability any corporation "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual." The Government conceded that the entity, a Philippine corporation, was organized and operated for religious, charitable and educational purposes and that no part of its net income inured to the benefit of any private individual, but claimed that it was not operated exclusively for those purposes because of some income producing operations which it carried on. The great bulk of the income which was commercially derived consisted of rents, interest and dividends on properties which the corporation owned and held. The rest of it, consisting of only about 2.8% of the total income realized by the corporation during the taxable year involved, represented profits from the sale of wine, chocolate, and other articles used by the corporation's churches and various subordinate agencies. The Court held that the corporation was exempt from taxation, noting that the statute "says nothing about the source of the income, but makes the destination the ultimate test of exemption." 263 U.S. at 581, 44 S.Ct. at 205, 68 L.Ed. 458.
What petitioner's argument fails to recognize is that the Court in Sagrada Orden when discussing the corporation's income producing operations took care to distinguish between its mere holding of property for the production of income and its merchandising or trading activities, a distinction which has also been recognized in certain current Code provisions which were in effect in 1956. Compare § 501(c) (2) and § 512(b) (1)-(3) with § 502; see H.R.Rep.No.2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1950). Thus, the Court in discussing the Government's position in that case, characterized it as one which put aside as immaterial both the fact that "the income from the properties" was devoted exclusively to religious, charitable and educational purposes, "and also the fact that the limited trading, if it can be called such, is purely incidental to the pursuit of those purposes, and is in no sense a distinct or external venture," 263 U.S. at 581, 44 S.Ct. at 205, 68 L.Ed. 458; and, after explaining how the corporation in using its properties to produce income was actually adhering to and furthering its exempt purposes, the Court turned to a discussion of the corporation's trading activities.
The Court emphasized the fact that the corporation's sales operations were quite small, did not involve any selling to the public or competition with others, and could not really be called "engaging in trade":
"As respects the transactions in wine, chocolate and other articles, we think they do not amount to engaging in trade in any proper sense of the term. It is not claimed that there is any selling to the public or in competition with others. The articles are merely bought and supplied for use within the plaintiff's own organization and agencies — some of them for
In the case at bar, of course, petitioner's Poconos resort operation is anything but small, and it competes actively for the public's business with other commercial resorts in the Poconos area. More importantly, unlike the corporation in the Sagrada Orden case, petitioner has, over the years, applied substantial portions of its income to expanding its business operations and to the building up of large accumulations of surplus.
Moreover, we find no substantial support for petitioner's position in any of the cases in which this court has, through an application of the destination test, held certain organizations exempt despite their conducting of commercial operations. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; Bohemian Gymnastic Ass'n Sokol v. Higgins, supra; Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra.
Section 502 of the Code, which denies exempt status to an entity primarily engaged in business, even though all its net income is ultimately channeled to truly exempt organizations, does so without regard to whether any of the particular feeder's gross income is first used to expand and improve its own capacity as a business. All feeder organizations, even those not interested in using any part of their gross revenues to expand their own operations, are declared taxable. In view of this we think it would be somewhat inconsistent, in dealing with the problem of the taxability of other organizations, to permit an entity like petitioner to attain exempt status while devoting considerable energy to improving and expanding an already large business operation. Moreover, the Congressional purpose behind the 1950 enactment of both the feeder provision now in Section 502 and the unrelated business income amendment now in Section 511 was to prevent organizations with tax exempt status from competing unfairly with ordinary, taxed business entities. See S.Rep.No.2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 26-31, 35-36 (1950), U.S.Code Congressional Service 1950, p. 3053; H. R.Rep.No.2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-38, 41-42 (1950); H.R.Doc.No.451, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950). And, while it appears that the Section 511 amendment was not supposed to change the existing rule for determining tax exempt status, we think that the Congressional purpose behind both it and the feeder provision
Not only is the majority unable to cite a single authority in support of its conclusion, it is, as I see it, departing from a line of controlling authority firmly established for many years in our own circuit. Nothing in the case before us justifies this break with the past. In fact the equities of the case cry out for the continued application of that construction of the relevant statute which this court has so long followed.
The majority opinion dismisses as hardly worth serious consideration the contention that such activities at Camp Tamiment as the following are social welfare activities:
Weekly lectures on art, music, literature, current affairs, anthropology, psychology and human relations;
Weekly concerts by vocalists and instrumentalists of international reputation;
Daily concerts and lectures on music by a resident professional pianist;
An annual four day music festival featuring outstanding chamber music orchestras and string quartets;
A subsidized experimental theatrical group composed of a professional director, writers, composers, lyricists, arrangers, designers of scenery and costumes, actors, actresses, dancers and others, which produced new and original plays;
A professional orchestra for productions in the theatre;
A resident professional artist and art teacher giving instruction without charge in painting and drawing;
Exhibitions of painting and sculpture with an annual prize for painting.
The question which the majority opinion fails to answer is:
If these and the other activities of the camp were not for social welfare purposes, what was their purpose?
It is conceded that the camp is not operated for the purpose of earning a profit for any objective except an admittedly social welfare objective. The camp has no such "commercial purpose" as the Supreme Court found in Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 66 S.Ct. 112, 90 L.Ed. 67 (1945). Its operation is not designed to benefit any group "economically." See Consumer-Farmer Milk Coop. v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 931, 71 S.Ct. 803, 95 L.Ed. 1360 (1951); American Institute for Economic Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934 (Ct.Cl.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976, 83 S.Ct. 1109, 10 L.Ed.2d 141 (1963).
To the extent that the camp was operated for "cultural" purposes, i. e. education in art, music, literature, politics, etc., the encouragement of experiment in the theater, and of excellence in music, sculpture and painting, then surely its purposes were social welfare purposes. To what other purpose is to be ascribed its provision of rest and recreation for young people interested in these cultural purposes? It seems to me to be impossible to find any rational formulation of the purposes of the camp which can be phrased in any terms other than social welfare. It is significant, I believe, that the majority does not even attempt to formulate any alternative.
There is some suggestion in the majority opinion that the activities of the camp cannot be social welfare activities if a charge is made to the participants. This position proves on reflection to be absurd, since it would eliminate from tax exemption universities which charge tuition, hospitals which charge for medical services, art galleries and historical museums which charge admission fees, churches which charge pew rentals, and some examples of almost every other imaginable type of social welfare organization. In fact to concede that the activities of the camp would be social welfare activities if provided free of charge is practically to concede the correctness of petitioner's position.
But assuming arguendo that the cultural and recreational aspects of the operation of the camp do not have a social
But, says the majority:
Not only is there no authority whatsoever for any such exception to the destination test, but the majority's analysis of the situation cannot survive scrutiny. What the majority is saying, in effect, is that no organization can properly be classified as a social welfare organization if it devotes a certain proportion of its income to expanding its facilities, whatever may be the purpose of such expansion. (Repeated use by the majority of the word "commercial" to describe the operations of the camp should not be permitted to prejudice consideration of the real character of those operations. They are, of course, not "commercial" operations in the ordinary or usual sense of that word since they are not designed for private profit.)
The majority's analysis is deficient in another material respect. It refers to the proportion of the petitioner's "revenue" which is devoted to "expanding its * * facilities and increasing its surpluses." Both here and in the table reproduced on page 931, the argument is presented as if "facilities" and "surpluses" were two separate and distinct items, as if the camp had, in addition to its "facilities" some two million three hundred thousand dollars salted away somewhere in cash. Of course the largest part of petitioner's "surpluses" is represented by its "facilities." "Accumulated earned surplus" is merely the bookkeeping item of liability which balances assets.
Moreover, the "revenue" to which the majority refers is the gross revenue before deduction of any expenses. Using gross revenue in this way suggests that the majority would hold that any organization which has a large operation in money terms cannot be a social welfare operation. (The attempt to distinguish the destination cases is largely based on the argument that the operations in those cases resulted in smaller revenues than in the present case.) There is, of course, no justification whatsoever to support such a position. Nothing in the statute or in any of the cases suggests that the size of an operation has any bearing on whether it is a social welfare organization.
If we use the much more significant figure of net operating revenue, that is, gross revenue less expenses of operation, we find that, even excluding cultural programs and activities, the proportion of concededly social welfare expenditures ranges in the years 1956 to 1960 from 53% to 89% (and that it was 53% in 1956, the tax year in question). The following table also shows that if the expenditures for cultural activities are added to the expenditures which are admittedly for social welfare, a very large proportion of operating revenue went for the total of the two purposes.
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960Contributions to League for Industrial Democracy *$ 4,000.00 $ 4,000.00 $ 4,000.00 $ 3,000.00 $ 3,000.00 Brandeis University -- -- 2,000.00 -- 2,500.00 University of Scranton -- -- -- -- 100.00 Physical recreation expenditures 28,147.33 22,981.39 27,146.67 31,578.95 24,228.13 _________ _________ _________ _________ _________ Total — "Costs of other activities" 32,147.33 26,981.39 33,146.67 34,578.95 29,828.13 "Cultural programs and activities" per Judge Pierce 82,746.41 87,178.45 97,792.47 91,164.60 108,071.51 _________ _________ _________ _________ __________ (1) Total excluded by Judge Pierce from "social welfare" expenditures 114,893.74 114,159.84 130,939.14 125,743.55 137,899.64 (2) Operating revenue 119,147.03 232,487.58 276,082.70 258,311.51 219,619.38 __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ (3) Adjusted operating revenue (item (2) less item (1) above) 84,253.29 118,327.74 145,143.56 132,567.96 81,719.74 (4) "Social welfare" expenditures per Judge Pierce $ 44.684.76 $ 70.718.27 $ 78,194.54 $ 83,751.40 $ 72,610.13 =========== =========== =========== =========== =========== (5) Per cent which item (4) is of item (3) above 53 60 54 64 89
Additions to reserves ranged in the years 1956 to 1960 from 4% to 24% of operating revenue. The addition to reserves was 20% of operating revenue in 1956.
The majority seek to find support for their conclusion in the adoption of two statutes by Congress in 1950. The first, now Section 502 of the Code, withdrew exemption from "feeder" organizations. The other, now Section 511 of the Code, imposed a tax on the unrelated business income of certain organizations otherwise exempt from taxation. Admittedly neither of these statutes is applicable to petitioner. Far from lending support to the conclusion reached by the majority, the fact that Congress adopted these statutes to remedy the particular situations with which they dealt, excluding from their application the social welfare organizations described in Section 501(c)
If we are to look to other statutes for support for one position or the other, the majority's view that the accumulation of surplus is a ground for withdrawing exemption is dealt a powerful blow by consideration of Section 504 of the Code which expressly provides that exemption shall be denied charitable and educational organizations "if the amounts accumulated out of income during the taxable year or any prior taxable year and not actually paid out by the end of the taxable year — (1) are unreasonable in amount or duration in order to carry out the charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for [their] exemption * * *." Social welfare organizations are not subject to the provisions of Section 504. The majority is, then, clearly in error in reading the limitations of Section 504 into the section on social welfare organizations. See Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151, 156 n. 21 (3d Cir. 1963).
It seems to me quite clear on the basis of logic and authority, as well as because of the equities of the case with which we are presented, that the decision of the Tax Court must be reversed.
In Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, a radio station originally organized for only public service broadcasting, finding itself in financial distress, undertook to use a portion of its broadcasting time for commercial programming to finance its operations. Though no precise figures were included in the case as to the distribution of broadcasting time between public service and commercial programs during the taxable year, it appears that the majority of the total time, and all of the prime evening time, was devoted to public service broadcasts. Improvements in the station's facilities were made largely through advances from charitable foundations, but of course those improved facilities directly served public service purposes as well as helped to produce income. No sizable surpluses were accumulated; in fact, the court noted that up to the end of the period under review the station's operating expenses had exceeded its operating receipts by some $37,000.