We acknowledge receipt of your communication of May 22, 1963, which is as follows:
"Act No. 92, adopted at the Second Special Session of the Legislature of Alabama of 1963 and approved at 4:10 P.M. on May 3, 1963, levies a tax on persons engaged in the sale of malt or brewed beverages, provides that the residue of the proceeds therefrom, after certain prior charges, shall be paid into the State Treasury to the credit of the Alabama special educational trust fund, and appropriates so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the principal
"Act No. 93, adopted at the Second Special Session of the Legislature of Alabama of 1963 and approved at 4:11 P.M. on May 3, 1963, provides that the Governor, the Director of Finance and the State Superintendent of Education may, by taking certain actions prescribed thereby, proceed to form a public corporation to be known as the Alabama Trade School and Junior College Authority. The act goes on to provide that the corporation may issue and sell bonds, not exceeding $15,000,000 in aggregate principal amount, secured by a pledge and appropriation of that portion of the proceeds of the tax levied by said Act No. 92 that is required to be paid into the Alabama special educational trust fund. I am required by Act No. 93 to approve the terms and conditions of the issuance of the bonds authorized thereby as a prerequisite to the validity of the said bonds. The proceeds of the said bonds are to be used for building and equipping educational institutions.
"Pursuant to the provisions of Title 13, Section 34 of the Code of Alabama of 1940, I respectfully request your written opinion on the following important constitutional questions with respect to the said Acts No. 92 and No. 93:
Section 45 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901, in parts pertinent to the present question reads:
Section 71 of our Constitution provides:
Act No. 92 is obviously a separate bill, and is obviously not a general appropriation bill. It can therefore be influenced by Section 71, supra, only as to that portion of Section 71, supra, requiring that such separate bill embrace but one subject. Such constitutional requirement is identical in purport with that part of Section 45, supra, providing that each law shall contain but one subject. Section 45, supra, contains the additional requirement that the subject of each law "shall be clearly expressed in its title."
It is clear therefore that if a separate bill meets the broader requirements of Section 45, supra, it, of necessity, will satisfy the requirements of Section 71, supra.
The title to Act No. 92 is phrased as follows:
One of the purposes of the requirement of Section 45, supra, that the subject of a law shall be clearly expressed in the title, is to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by incorporating in bills provisions not reasonably disclosed by its title, and which might be overlooked, and unintentionally approved in enacting the bill. Opinion of the Justices, 247 Ala. 195, 23 So.2d 505. Another purpose is to fairly apprise the public of the import of the legislature so they may be heard. Grayson v. Stone, 259 Ala. 320, 66 So.2d 438.
However, this court is committed to the principle that this requirement as to clear expression of the subject of a bill in the title is not to be exactingly enforced in such manner as to cripple legislation, or is it to be enforced with hypercritical exactness, but is to be accorded a liberal interpretation. Kendrick v. Boyd, 255 Ala. 53, 51 So.2d 694; Taylor v. Johnson, 265 Ala. 541, 93 So.2d 143.
When the subject of a bill is expressed in general terms in the title everything which is necessary to make a complete enactment in regard to it, or which results as a complement of the thought contained in the general expression, is included in and authorized by it. Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84, 173 So. 864.
Under the above principles, it is our conclusion that the declaration in the title of Act No. 92 setting out, among other things, that it is "to provide for the collection and distribution of the proceeds of said tax" is sufficiently comprehensive and informative to reasonably permit an appropriation of such proceeds.
Nor does Act No. 92 offend Section 45, supra, by containing more than one subject.
The inhibitions of Sections 45 and 71, supra, that an act shall have but one subject are met if the act has but one general subject which is contained in its title. Norton v. Lusk, 248 Ala. 110, 26 So.2d 849. And in Yielding v. State ex rel. Wilkinson, 232 Ala. 292, 167 So. 580, this court stated:
A reading of the title of Act No. 92, and of the Act itself discloses that the grand and comprehensive pattern of the Act relates to but a single matter, and that all its provisions are germane and cognate, or complementary to the idea expressed in the title.
As stated in Nachman v. State Tax Commission, 233 Ala. 628, 173 So. 25:
That is, merely because an act appropriates funds, it is not thereby a general appropriation bill.
It is our conclusion therefore that Act No. 92 does not offend Section 45, supra, nor Section 71, supra, by containing more than one subject.
Question 1 is answered in the negative.
Question 2 is answered in the negative.
In view of the negative answers to questions 1 and 2, no need arises to answer question 3.
Question 4, relating to Act No. 93 is answered in the negative. Act No. 93 specifically provides that the bonds issued by the Alabama Trade School and Junior College Authority authorized by Act No. 93 shall not constitute or create an obligation or debt of the State of Alabama. The provisions in Act No. 93 in this regard are in all material aspects similar to the provisions of Act No. 126, Second Special Session of the Legislature of 1959. (1959 Acts, Vol. 1, page 369.) In an advisory opinion five of the Justices of this Court answered that Act No. 126, supra, was not violative of Section 213 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, as creating or incurring a new debt against the State. Opinion of the Justices, 270 Ala. 147, 116 So.2d 588. The undersigned are in accord with that view.