HAMLIN, Justice.
In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction, we directed Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, in order that we might review its decision affirming a judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiff $3,722.50, together with legal interest, as damages for personal injuries and property loss suffered in an intersectional automobile collision. Article VII, Section 11, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, LSA.
On November 7, 1960, at approximately 7:00 A.M., plaintiff, Peter J. Theunissen, 63 years of age, was driving a 1951 Plymouth automobile north on Doyle Street in the City of Jennings, Louisiana. The defendant Patrick Victor Guidry, age 21 years, was driving a 1955 Chevrolet vehicle in an easterly direction on Howard Street. The weather was not inclement and visibility was not impeded. The streets cross each other, their intersection being described as an "uncontrolled intersection," i.e., an intersection having no semaphore lights nor stop signs; they are approximately the same width and of equal dignity, and both have blacktop surfaces. The Guidry car and the Theunissen car collided in the southeastern portion of the intersection of Howard and Doyle Streets; the left front of plaintiff's vehicle struck the right door of defendant Guidry's automobile. Immediately prior to the accident, Theunissen's car was to the right of Guidry's car, and, under the following provision of Ordinance 371, Section 9, Traffic Laws of the City of Jennings, Louisiana, Theunissen had the right-of-way to cross the intersection and was in a favored position:
Theunissen suffered personal injuries and property damage as a result of the collision, and he instituted the present proceedings. He alleged in part that the defendant Guidry was negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way in violation of Ordinance No. 371, Section 9, of the City of Jennings, Louisiana; in failing to yield the rightof-way after he, Theunissen, had preempted the intersection; and, in violating Ordinance No. 371, Section 22, of the City of Jennings, Louisiana.
Plaintiff and defendant Guidry gave depositions, and the case was submitted to the trial court on the depositions, photographs, and a photographer's affidavit.
Theunissen's deposition is to the effect that at the time of the accident he was on his way to work, and that as he approached Howard Street, "Well, I looked left and I didn't see nothing. I looked right and I didn't see nothing. I come on and first thing I know the car was right at me. I didn't see him coming." Theunissen estimated his speed at between fifteen and twenty miles per hour, because he had stopped for a stop sign on the preceding street. When asked how far he thought he could see down Howard Street when he looked left, he replied, "Well, I guess maybe a half a block." Theunissen said that when he looked down Howard Street he was about two car lengths from the intersection; that he did not look down Howard Street again and started on toward and through the intersection. Theunissen's deposition is affirmative to the effect that he did not see the Guidry car until he hit it.
Defendant Guidry stated that at the time of the accident he was on his way to work; that as he approached the intersection he was traveling at a rate of approximately fifteen miles per hour. Guidry's pertinent testimony is as follows:
"A. No, sir.
"A. No, sir, I slowed a little.
"Q. Slowed a little?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Which way did you look first?
"A. I can't recall.
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you see him prior to you entering the intersection?
* * * * * *
"A. Well, that is, the law reads, I believe he does.
* * * * * *
"A. I would say about five or five and a half car lengths away.
"A. No, sir.
* * * * * *
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And you did, in fact, see him?
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. About three or four car lengths, I imagine.
* * * * * *
"Q. Making an effort to stop?
"A. Yes, sir, he was slowing down.
"A. Yes, sir.
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The trial court and the Court of Appeal concluded that Theunissen was charged in law with seeing what he could have seen, and that if he had seen the Guidry car, he would have seen nothing that would have caused a reasonably prudent man to believe that Guidry was not going to stop and yield the right-of-way at the intersection. The Court of Appeal found that plaintiff's failure to see the Guidry car did not have a causal connection with the accident. Both courts found that the proximate cause of the accident was attributable to defendant Guidry's negligence, and that any negligence ascribed to plaintiff was not the proximate cause of the accident.
The Court of Appeal rendered its decision on November 5, 1962, the same day this Court rendered a decision in the case of Smith v. Borchers, 243 La. 746, 146 So.2d 793, Rehearing Denied, Dec. 10, 1962.
Relators contend that the holdings of the trial court and the Court of Appeal in the instant case are contrary to the holding of this Court in Smith v. Borchers; and, that the standards set forth in Smith v. Borchers require a dismissal of Theunissen's demands at his cost. They state that there are really three principal issues to be decided herein:
In Smith v. Borchers, supra, Mrs. Smith was driving in a southerly direction and Borchers was driving in a westerly direction when their automobiles collided at the intersection of Pressburg and Nighthart Streets in New Orleans, Louisiana. The two streets were of equal dignity with no traffic controls, and under the physical facts Mrs. Smith was the favored driver and had the right-of-way to cross the intersection. This Court was concerned only with the question of Mrs. Smith's contributory negligence. In adjudging Mrs. Smith guilty of contributory negligence, we recognized her obligation to operate her vehicle in a prudent manner and to have respect for other motorists. We said that "we first consider the locus in quo upon which there is generally little dispute. We then must consider the testimony of the persons who witnessed the accident, plus the physical facts at the time of and following the accident, in an endeavor to ascertain how the accident occurred. We then must apply the law to the case to determine the responsibility for the accident." Applying the above principles, we found that "the testimony of both drivers and the photographs filed in evidence by defendants are replete in showing that Mrs. Smith was guilty of contributory negligence."
The facts in Smith v. Borchers are not identical with the facts in the instant case.
Herein, the allegation of contributory negligence on the part of Theunissen is an issue for our determination.
Plaintiff's deposition, supra, reflects that he looked to his left and then to his right and did not see anything; that his speed was within fifteen and twenty miles per hour; and, that he was about two car lengths from the intersection when he looked down Howard Street. Plaintiff had the right-of-way to cross the intersection and availed himself of such; there is no evidence that he stopped at the intersection or committed any act that would have indicated that he was going to accord the rightof-way to traffic proceeding on Howard Street. It is true that he did not see the Guidry car; he should have seen it because, according to the physical and evidentiary facts of record, it was within his vision. However, there is no showing that Theunissen could have avoided and prevented the accident had he seen the Guidry car in the position it was and under the conditions it was being driven as stated in Guidry's deposition, supra.
We find no causal connection between Theunissen's omission and the injury of which he complains. The Court of Appeal correctly stated:
Guidry's deposition, supra, reflects that he saw Theunissen approaching; that he was going at a moderate speed and could have stopped before entering the intersection; that he did not stop but entered the intersection and placed his car in Theunissen's path; that he was aware of the Ordinance of the City of Jennings and that he should accord the right-of-way to Theunissen; and, that he violated said City Ordinance.
We find that Guidry was guilty of negligence and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
In Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298, we held that the essence of proximate cause in cases involving the violation of statutes is whether the risk and harm encountered fall within the scope of protection of the statute.
We have also held that to impose liability for an injury claimed to be the result of a violation of statute or ordinance, it must appear that compliance therewith would have prevented the injury. Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466; Martin v. Jonesboro Drug Co., 7 La.App. 262.
We conclude that Guidry's compliance with the Ordinance of the City of Jennings, by according to Theunissen the right-ofway in crossing the intersection, would have prevented the accident and the injuries and damage for which Theunissen seeks recovery.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, is affirmed. All costs to be paid by relators.
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