From a judgment of dismissal entered after the sustaining of defendant's general demurrer without leave to amend in an action to impose a trust and for an accounting, plaintiff appeals.
(1) On or about April 8, 1928, plaintiff married Frank G. Flores.
(2) November 25, 1953, plaintiff and Mr. Flores separated.
(3) October 25, 1956, plaintiff filed an action for divorce against Mr. Flores, being case No. D-511182. The parties entered into a property settlement agreement on or about October 12, 1956, and a supplement thereto November 1, 1956. The real property which is the subject of this action, allegedly purchased by Mr. Flores in 1955 in the name of defendant with community property funds belonging to him and plaintiff, was not covered by said property settlement agreement or supplement. At the trial of the divorce action the property settlement agreement and the supplement thereto were received in evidence, and they are a part of the clerk's transcript on this appeal.
(4) March 21, 1958, a final decree of divorce was entered in the divorce action filed by plaintiff against Frank G. Flores.
(5) Thereafter Frank G. Flores married defendant, Esther G. Arroyo, also known as Esther Arroyo Flores. Subsequent to such marriage defendant filed an action for divorce against Frank G. Flores, being action No. D-544500, and an interlocutory judgment of divorce, which has since become final, was entered therein in favor of defendant. Said judgment quieted the title of defendant, as against Mr. Flores, to the real property which is the subject of this action.
(6) March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed the present action against defendant, entitled an "Action to Declare Trust in Real Property, and an Accounting." Mr. Flores is not a party to the litigation.
Defendant demurred to the first amended complaint on three grounds: (a) Failure to state a cause of action; (b) res judicata arising from plaintiff's divorce action from Mr. Flores; and (c) res judicata arising from defendant's divorce action from Mr. Flores.
The trial court, taking judicial notice of the judgments in both of the prior divorce actions, sustained the demurrer, in general terms, without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal of the action.
These questions are presented for determination:
First. Did the complaint, as amended, state a cause of action against defendant?
Plaintiff prayed for a judgment declaring that defendant holds the property in question subject to plaintiff's community property rights, and to that extent in trust for plaintiff, and requiring defendant to convey to plaintiff "that which is found to be plaintiff's interest therein," and to render an accounting.
No reference was made in the first amended complaint to the divorce action by defendant against Mr. Flores.
Applying the above-stated rule of law to the facts alleged in the first amended complaint as set forth above, it is clear that a cause of action for extrinsic fraud was alleged by plaintiff against defendant and that the action was not barred by plaintiff's judgment of divorce from Frank G. Flores.
 Second. In ruling on a demurrer essentially founded on res judicata, may a court take judicial notice of a prior judgment in a different case even though such judgment or its content is not pleaded in the complaint, provided (a) the judgment is appropriately drawn to the court's attention and (b) the plaintiff has adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the question of the effect of such judgment?
Yes. Courts take judicial notice of the public and private official acts of the judicial departments of this state and of the United States and the laws of the several states of the United States and the interpretation thereof by the highest courts of appellate jurisdiction of such states. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1875, subd. 3; Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal.2d 72, 75  [119 P.2d 333]; Stafford v. Ware, 187 Cal.App.2d 227, 228  et seq. [9 Cal.Rptr. 706]; Christiana v. Rose, 100 Cal.App.2d 46, 52  [222 P.2d 891]; Estate of Monks, 48 Cal.App.2d 603,
Any statements in prior cases decided by this court contrary to the rule we now approve are overruled, e.g., Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal.2d 632 [198 P.2d 1]; Sewell v. Price, 164 Cal. 265 [128 P. 407]; Ralphs v. Hensler, 97 Cal. 296 [32 P. 243].
Any statements in decisions of the District Courts of Appeal contrary to the rule announced in this decision are disapproved, e.g., Cherry v. Hayden, 100 Cal.App.2d 416 [223 P.2d 878]; Popcorn Equipment Co. v. Page, 92 Cal.App.2d 448 [207 P.2d 647]; Olds v. Peebler, 66 Cal.App.2d 76 [151 P.2d 901]; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.2d 601 [145 P.2d 344]; Johnston v. Ota, 43 Cal.App.2d 94 [110 P.2d 507]; Estate of Fulton, 8 Cal.App.2d 423 [48 P.2d 120]; Plum v. Indian Valley Bank, 118 Cal.App. 13 [4 P.2d 543].
In the present case the prior judgment which was not pleaded in the complaint, but of which the trial court took judicial notice, was appropriately drawn to the attention of that court, and plaintiff had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the question of the effect of such judgment. It was therefore proper for the court to give it judicial notice.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C.J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.