KNUDSON, Justice.
Appellants (plaintiffs) seek to quiet title to a strip of land 16 ft. wide and 400 feet long at what is known as Michaud Siding in Power Company described as:
The property in controversy borders the northwesterly right of way line of the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company.
Appellants R. V. Swanson and wife allege that Bessie Hubbard is the owner in fee of the area involved subject to an agreement to purchase (Ex. A.) executed by appellants bearing date of September 1, 1951, which agreement does not describe the property here involved. Under date of March 24, 1959, (being the date of commencement of trial of this action) appellant R. V. Swanson and the said Bessie Hubbard entered into a supplemental agreement (Ex. B.) wherein it is stated that the property in controversy was inadvertently omitted from said purchase agreement and that the terms and conditions of said purchase agreement shall be applicable to and include the property here involved.
In support of appellants' claim of ownership they allege that they are now in possession of said property by virtue of said purchase agreement; that the vendors under said purchase agreement and their predecessors in interest have been in long continued possession of said property since 1926, coupled with complete dominion over same and open and visible acts of ownership, in that there is, and since 1926 has been located thereon, the northwesterly 16 ft. of a warehouse; that their predecessors in interest were during said period since 1926, in open, notorious and adverse possession of said property and during said period paid all taxes and assessments which were levied against said property.
During the trial appellants sought to introduce the testimony of two witnesses tending to prove an oral agreement on the part of L. L. Evans (now deceased) a former owner of the land in controversy to the effect that if the warehouse company would build the warehouse in the place where it is located such former owner would give them whatever land was needed for the warehouse site. Appellants' attempt to prove such oral agreement was by appellant Mrs. Hubbard who testified:
The witness (Mrs. Hubbard) did not testify that she heard L. L. Evans make any such statement nor did any other witness testify or offer to testify that such a statement was made in his presence.
The other witness (F. M. Bistline) testified:
The rulings of the trial court in striking the testimony of Mrs. Hubbard and sustaining objections to the testimony of Mr. Bistline relative to statements of L. L. Evans (deceased) are assigned as error. Such assignments are without merit.
In an attempt to establish an oral agreement on the part of J. Paul Evans and the Evans Investment Company (successors in interest to L. L. Evans) said witness
J. Paul Evans (in referring to the same meeting of the board of directors as the witness Bistline referred to in the foregoing excerpt) testified as follows:
The evidence offered in support of appellants' said contention is wholly insufficient. The burden is upon appellants to prove by clear, satisfactory, convincing and certain evidence that an oral agreement to convey the real property involved was made and entered into. Johnson v. Albert, 67 Idaho 44, 170 P.2d 403; Prairie Development Co., Ltd. v. Leiberg, 15 Idaho 379, 98 P. 616; Wormward v. Taylor, 70 Idaho 450, 221 P.2d 686.
Appellants assign as error the action of the trial court in setting aside the default judgment entered on February 13, 1956. The affidavit filed in support of respondent's motion to set aside said default judgment discloses that the original appearance on behalf of respondent was made by attorneys who were employed by an interested title insurance company. Thereafter the defense of the action was turned over to the State of Idaho and referred to an attorney employed by the Department of Highways who at that time was familiar with the action but left the employ of the Department of Highways about the time the defense of the action was turned over to the State. The attorney to whom the action was thereafter referred was not informed of the filing of any motion of withdrawal on the part of the attorneys who originally appeared as counsel for respondent and assumed that the action was still in a demurrer status.
The statutory authority for relief from defaults is contained in I.C. § 5-905 under which it is provided that a court may, in its discretion, relieve a party from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
An application to set aside a default is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court and the order of the court will not be reversed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the court abused its discretion; and in determining the question of discretion the power of the court should be freely and liberally exercised under the statute to mold and direct its pleadings so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits. Holzeman & Co. v. Henneberry, 11 Idaho 428, 83 P. 497; Pittock v. Buck, 15 Idaho 47, 96 P. 212; Crane v. City of Harrison, 34 Idaho 167, 200 P. 892; Johnson v. Noland, 78 Idaho 642, 308 P.2d 588.
The motion in the instant case was filed within the time provided by statute. There is no showing that appellants were prejudiced or that they were deprived of any advantage to which they were properly entitled. It is our opinion that the showing made was sufficient to establish inadvertence and excusable neglect and we are not prepared to say that there has been such abuse of discretion by the trial court as would justify us in reversing the order complained of.
Having heretofore concluded that the evidence offered by appellants is insufficient to establish their contention that an oral agreement to transfer title to the property in issue was entered into by either of the parties, the remaining question to be resolved is "Does the evidence establish ownership in appellants by adverse possession?"
One asserting adverse possession as against the owner of real estate must prove each and every element of adverse possession by clear and satisfactory evidence and the burden of proof in this case is upon appellants. Pleasants v. Henry, 36 Idaho 728, 213 P. 565; Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740; Hogan v. Blakney, 73 Idaho 274, 251 P.2d 209; Salvis v. Lawyer, 73 Idaho 469, 253 P.2d 589.
Under the statutory definition (I.C. § 5-210) of possession or occupation by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, the only portion of the area in controversy actually occupied by appellants or their predecessors in interest is that occupied by the warehouse building. The evidence does not show that the remainder of the area involved has been protected by substantial inclosure or has been usually cultivated or improved by appellants or their predecessors in interest as contemplated by the statute. For this reason appellants' claim of title by adverse possession to the area not occupied by the warehouse building must fail.
Two statutes are pertinent and controlling in this case. They are I.C. § 5-209, which provides:
and I.C. § 5-210, which provides:
Although the trial court made no specific finding as to the use and occupancy of the warehouse by appellants and their predecessors in interest, we shall, for the purpose of considering the issue here involved, assume that the warehouse was continuously used and occupied by appellants and their predecessors in interest for warehouse purposes.
The important question is "Did they occupy the area under a claim of title?" The trial court found that prior to June 2, 1953 (being the date of the quit claim
The trial court had before it to consider in this case the allegation contained in appellants' original complaint which was verified by appellant R. V. Swanson (admitted in evidence as Def's. Ex. 7) which allegation is as follows:
The same allegation was contained in appellants' amended complaint which was verified by appellants' attorney and the foregoing underscored portion was thereafter stricken upon motion of appellants. When a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded portion disappears from the record as a judicial admission, but it nevertheless exists as an utterance once seriously made by a party, and when admitted in evidence may be properly considered by the court or jury as an item of evidence in the case. Shurtliff v. Extension Ditch Co., 14 Idaho 416, 94 P. 574; Anderson v. Hoops, 52 Idaho 757, 19 P.2d 908; C. I. T. Corp. v. Elliott, 66 Idaho 384, 159 P.2d 891; Stout v. McNary, 75 Idaho 99, 267 P.2d 625.
If at the time the warehouse was located upon the area in question those who caused it to be so located believed that it was standing on leased property of the Railroad Company, the act of appellants' predecessors in interest in entering and occupying the land involved was not an assertion of title in themselves. The allegation in appellants' complaint to which we have referred is of compelling force against the contention of appellants.
Appellants, Swanson and wife, at the time this action was commenced, claimed some interest in the area in dispute under and by virtue of an agreement (Ex. A) entered into by appellant Hubbard and her now deceased husband as vendors and appellants, Swanson and wife, as purchasers dated September 1, 1951. The only property described in said (Ex. A) which is in any respect related to the property in issue is described in the following excerpt from said agreement.
The following is an excerpt of the testimony of appellant Hubbard while being interrogated relative to said instruments (Ex. A and Ex. B):
The trial court was entitled to weigh such evidence and if the court believed that the only property owned by the Hubbards (which is in any manner related to this case) was in fact described in the agreement of December 1, 1951, and consisted of only a lease hold and the warehouse building, we are not at liberty to re-evaluate such evidence.
The record does not disclose that appellants or their predecessors in interest made any declaration or averment of ownership of said property between 1926 (when the warehouse was located thereon) and 1953 (when the State of Idaho made inquiry to ownership); nor does it disclose any manifestation on the part of those who located the warehouse, at the time of its location on the property in issue, that they claimed any title to the property upon which it was located.
Appellants cite a number of cases, nearly all of which involve fence or boundary line issues, which they contend support their position. They rely most heavily upon the case of Beneficial Life Insurance Company v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232, 270 P.2d 830, 835, wherein this Court said:
Not only had the property in issue been inclosed, occupied, cultivated and farmed by the defendants and their predecessors in interest, for forty years, but defendant's predecessors in interest had claimed title to the fence. In this connection the Court said:
The other cases cited by appellants are likewise distinguishable.
Where there is no proof showing that actual occupation was accompanied by a claim, or an intention, inconsistent with the title of the owner, an adverse claim based upon such occupation cannot be allowed. Bower v. Kollmeyer, 31 Idaho 712, 175 P. 964.
In this respect the following language has been repeatedly approved by this Court [36 Idaho 728, 213 P. 567]:
Pleasants v. Henry, supra; Hogan v. Blakney, supra; Salvis v. Lawyer, supra.
Some contention is made that taxes relative to the area in controversy were not paid by appellants. The trial court made no specific finding on that question and we do not consider it controlling.
We also do not find merit to appellants' contention that the rule of estoppel is in any manner applicable in this case.
It is our view that the record does not contain competent or satisfactory evidence supporting a contention that the occupation of the land in issue was initiated or continued under a claim of title such as is required by our statutes. Since the findings of the trier of facts are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting evidence, such findings may not be disturbed on appeal. I.C. § 13-219; Larson v. Lindsay, 80 Idaho 242, 327 P.2d 775; Shellhorn v. Shellhorn, 80 Idaho 79, 326 P.2d 64; Summers v. Martin, 77 Idaho 469, 295 P.2d 265.
The determination of which way the evidence preponderated was for the trial court and we cannot say that he erred in finding and concluding in favor of respondent.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.
TAYLOR, C. J., SMITH and McFADDEN, JJ., and MARTIN, District Judge, concur.
KNUDSON, Justice.
A petition for rehearing has been filed in this case in which it is contended that the opinion filed is erroneous in two particulars:
First, in holding that the trial court properly excluded the offered testimony of witness F. M. Bistline relative to some
Appellants' second contention is that the court erred in not holding that respondents were estopped to question appellants' rights to the property occupied by the warehouse. This Court has repeatedly stated the essential elements of an equitable estoppel. See Cahoon v. Seger, 31 Idaho 101, 168 P. 441; Sullivan v. Mabey, 45 Idaho 595, 246 P. 233; Loomis v. Gray, 60 Idaho 193, 90 P.2d 529; Little v. Bergdahl Oil Co., 60 Idaho 662, 95 P.2d 833; Edwards v. Belknap, 66 Idaho 639, 166 P.2d 451. In Charpentier v. Welch, 74 Idaho 242, 259 P.2d 814, 817, this Court, while discussing estoppel, quoted with approval as follows:
In the instant case there is no competent evidence to support a contention that appellants' position was changed or that they were in any manner influenced by any deception in the conduct or declarations of any party, nor that appellants were without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts. Norwithstanding the fact that the warehouse (now belonging to appellants) stood upon a portion of the area in controversy for approximately 27 years prior to the date it was conveyed to respondent, State of Idaho, the record does not disclose that appellants or their predecessors in interest at any time during said period claimed title to or occupied any portion of said area with hostile intent. In our judgment the record is wholly wanting in the essential elements of estoppel.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
TAYLOR, C. J., and SMITH and McFADDEN, JJ., and MARTIN, District Judge, concur.
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