GRISSOM, Chief Justice.
Ernest Wright, allen Wright and J. d. Wright, doing business in Abilene, Texas, and the surrounding trade territory as Abilene Linen Supply, sued Martin Linen Supply Company of San Antonio and George Harrelson, its manager in Abilene, for an injunction prohibiting them from doing business in that territory under the name of Abilene Linen Service Company. Upon a hearing, the court granted the Wrights a temporary injunction and Martin Linen Supply Company and its manager, Harrelson, have appealed.
There was evidence to the effect that the Wrights had been doing business in Abilene and its adjoining trade territory under the name of Abilene Linen Supply since 1947; that appellants and appellees were engaged in the same business in the same territory; that the Wrights commenced
Appellants contend the court erred in granting a temporary injunction because the name "Abilene" is a geographical term which cannot be appropriated to the use of one individual or group, and because the words "Linen" and "Supply" are descriptive terms and, likewise, cannot be so appropriated. Appellants further contend that there is no evidence, or it is insufficient, to show that a secondary meaning has been acquired by appellees in the use of their trade name or that there has been any confusion, or deception, by Martin's use of its new trade name. Although "Abilene" is a geographical name and "Linen" may be a descriptive word, we think the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the use of same in the Wrights' trade name had acquired a secondary meaning and that the Wrights were entitled to a temporary injunction preserving the status quo.
Appellants and appellees are in the same business in the same trade territory and appellees' trade name identifies its business based upon the combination of the words "Abilene" and "Linen". Geographical names and descriptive words may be used in such a manner and for such a length of time that they acquire a secondary meaning by becoming associated in the public mind with the business of some one person, or group. 41-A Tex.Jur. 444, 87 C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition § 90, p. 319. The burden, of course, was upon the Wrights to establish that their use of said words had acquired a secondary meaning in the locality and that Martin's new name would probably be mistaken by customers in the exercise of such reasonable care and observation as they may be expected to exercise. However, it was not necessary to prove that anyone was actually deceived into trading with Martin Linen Supply Company in the
It was a question of fact as to whether Martin's use of a trade name similar to the Wrights' previously adopted trade name was reasonably calculated to deceive the public. 41-A Tex.Jur. 451; Dilworth v. Hake, Tex.Civ.App., 64 S.W.2d 829, (Writ Dis.); 87 C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition § 100, p. 346.
The following authorities support our conclusion that the judgment preserving the status quo by a temporary injunction was authorized and that it must be affirmed. Burge v. Dallas Retail Merchants Association, Tex.Civ.App., 257 S.W.2d 733, 735; Aultz v. Zucht, Tex.Civ.App., 209 S.W. 475; Russ v. Duff, Tex.Civ.App., 49 S.W.2d 905; Suniland Furniture Company v. Sunnyland Wholesale Furniture Company, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 674, (Writ ref.); Ravel v. Couravallos, Tex.Civ.App., 245 S.W.2d 731; Walters v. Building Maintenance Service, Tex.Civ.App., 291 S.W.2d 377.
The judgment is affirmed.