McQUADE, Justice.
On October 31, 1956, the plaintiff and respondent filed his complaint for divorce. On December 3, the clerk of the district court received the answer of the defendant and appellant, who appeared in proper person. Defendant is a resident of Bethesda, Maryland. The clerk promptly notified the defendant that her answer would be filed upon payment of a $5.00 filing fee. Upon receiving the fee, the answer was filed on December 14, 1956. At that time, no default or other pleading had been filed. The answer of the defendant, among other things, denied material allegations of the complaint relative to residence and as to the grounds for the divorce. No attorney appeared of record as representing the defendant.
After December 14, 1956, the attorney for the plaintiff engaged in correspondence with Mr. Arthur J. Hilland, an attorney in Washington, D. C. Upon failure to reach satisfactory conditions for a settlement of various rights, the attorney for the plaintiff on March 22, 1957, mailed a letter to Hilland containing the following information:
On April 16, 1957, the plaintiff caused the clerk of the court to enter a default of defendant for failure to appear, answer or plead to the plaintiff's complaint. On the same date, proof was submitted in support of the allegations contained in the complaint and a decree entered, which in part recited:
The decree further granted a divorce to the plaintiff and against the defendant.
The appellant thereafter moved to set aside the decree based upon her default, which motion was denied by the court. Thereafter the defendant applied for attorney fees and costs on appeal, representing that she had insufficient funds with which to perfect the appeal, and the plaintiff resisted the motion upon the ground that he had insufficient funds with which to pay attorney fees and costs upon appeal. The trial court entered an order denying the motion for attorney fees and court costs for this appeal.
The defendant has appealed from the orders of the court refusing to set aside the decree entered and denying the motion to allow attorney fees and court costs on appeal.
This Court has said, in Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Bandel, 57 Idaho 101, at page 112, 63 P.2d 159, at page 163:
By the filing of the answer, denying the residence of the plaintiff and controverting the grounds for the divorce, issues of fact were raised. I.C. sec. 10-103:
Where issues of fact have been raised by the pleadings, the trial court is obliged to hear the evidence before entering a judgment. I.C. sec. 10-105.
The plaintiff relies upon I.C. sec. 10-108 as the authority for entering the default of the defendant, which statute is as follows:
The plaintiff urges that the letter of his attorney to the Washington, D. C., attorney, Arthur Hilland, was sufficient notice of the trial date. In response thereto, the defendant contends that Mr. Hilland was not an attorney of record and that she had not received notice of the trial date.
This Court has said, in Peters v. Walker, 37 Idaho 195, 215 P. 845, 846:
This statement envisions notice by the court to the parties or their attorneys of record that the case has been set for trial by transmitting thereto a copy of the court's setting.
This Court, in Storer v. Heitfeld, 17 Idaho 113, at page 127, 105 P. 55, at page 60, announced the rule to be:
From an examination of the letter, it is apparent that no notice of the particular date upon which the trial of the issues would be had was set forth therein. The setting of the trial date is the prerogative and the responsibility of the trial court, not to be usurped by counsel for the parties. It was error for the trial court upon the state of the record to conclude that the defendant failed to make an appearance for the trial.
The trial court is hereby directed to set aside the decree and the clerk's default.
It was also error for the trial court to disallow attorney fees and costs to the defendant, despite the fact that neither party had ample funds with which to prosecute the appeal. This question has been settled conclusively in Finnell v. Finnell, 59 Idaho 148, 81 P.2d 401, 403:
The order of the trial court denying attorney fees is hereby reversed, and it is directed that a reasonable fee be allowed the defendant-appellant.
Costs to appellant.
PORTER, TAYLOR, and SMITH, JJ., concur.
KEETON, Chief Justice (dissenting).
In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed. Defendant was regularly served with process, apparently employed a foreign attorney. Plaintiff gave such attorney notice of the setting of the case for trial. It was no fault of plaintiff that defendant did not appear, as it is apparent defendant was sufficiently notified of the proceedings about to be taken.
A party to an action is not entitled to relief for his or her own neglect or that of a foreign attorney.
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