FOURNET, Chief Justice.
The defendant, Coleman P. Murphy, having appealed from a judgment in favor of his wife, Freda Jones Murphy, decreeing a separation from bed and board and ordering him to pay alimony pendente lite of $60 a month, filed in this Court shortly before the date set for argument of his appeal an "Exception of No Cause of Action and/or Plea in Abatement and Estoppel," based on the fact that his wife, while this case was pending here on appeal, secured a judgment of absolute divorce from him on the ground of two years separation
Counsel's argument that when the wife was granted an absolute divorce on the ground that she had been living separate and apart from her husband for more than two years, her suit against him for separation from bed and board necessarily went out of existence, is correct. Cotton v. Wright, 193 La. 520, 190 So. 665; Sampognaro v. Sampognaro, 213 La. 814, 35 So.2d 742. But counsel's conclusion that the judgment in this case in favor of the wife, ordering the husband to pay alimony pendente lite, became void and ineffective the moment the judgment for divorce was granted, finds no support in law. Cotton v. Wright, supra; Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So.2d 409. As pointed out in Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 652, 47 So.2d 32, 34, "Article 148
Counsel's argument in brief on the merits that the plaintiff failed to establish lawful grounds for separation from bed and board, and that the judgment decreeing this relief was erroneous and should be reversed, avails him nothing insofar as alimony is concerned because, as shown above, the wife's right to alimony pendente lite is not dependent upon the merits or the outcome of the suit. In any event we think the evidence supports the judgment of the trial court decreeing a separation from bed and board in favor of the wife, and that the award of $60 a month for alimony was reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
We think, however, that there is merit in defendant's claim that the trial judge erred in awarding plaintiff the amount of $250 as attorney's fees. Although she alleged that she was entitled to attorney's fees and prayed for judgment against the defendant therefor, she did not allege that she had paid counsel or obligated herself to pay in any amount, nor did she introduce any evidence to show the value of said services. Under the circumstances, the judgment granting attorney's fees was unwarranted. Scacciaferro v. Hymel, 206 La. 973, 20 So.2d 284; Arnold v. Arnold, 186 La. 323, 172 So. 172.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is amended by disallowing attorney's fees, fixed therein at the sum of $250, and, as amended, it is affirmed.