PER CURIAM.
Appeal is sought from an order of the District Court denying appellant's motion for summary judgment or for judgment on the pleadings. We hold the order is not final for the purpose of appeal-ability.
Appeal dismissed.
BAZELON, Circuit Judge (concurring).
Appellant labor union sued for a judgment declaring that appellee company had breached a collective bargaining agreement between the parties by refusing to arbitrate an issue concerning the employees' pension plan. The complaint also sought a mandatory injunction to compel the company to proceed to arbitration. The District Court denied appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
The defendant below did not seek, and the court did not order, dismissal or summary judgment in defendant's favor. Nor, of course, was there a final disposition in favor of the plaintiff. On this state of the record, I think denial of plaintiff's motion, viewed in the light of Rule 56,
In considering whether the order is appealable as a denial of injunctive relief within the meaning of § 1292(1), I note that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the equity powers of the District Court were invoked on the motion for summary judgment. Such a motion is not an application for injunctive relief, and there is no basis for inferring that the court considered it so merely because a prayer for injunction was included in the complaint. At least without a clear showing that the court considered the merits of a plea to its equitable jurisdiction, the denial of summary judgment cannot be deemed an "interlocutory order * * * refusing" an injunction within § 1292(1). Morganstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Corp., 3 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 160, 162.
DANAHER, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
Appellant sought a mandatory injunction ordering the appellee to arbitrate a pension dispute and, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment that the defendant's refusal to arbitrate constituted a breach of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. Pertinent portions of the agreements appear of record. Appellee having answered, appellant moved for summary judgment, or for judgment on the pleadings, but appellee filed no cross motion. At the close of the argument the trial judge, treating both of appellant's motions as coming within Rule 56, denied them, and orally expressed the opinion "that the action does not lie." Thereupon the following order was entered:
This case is not like Morganstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Corp., 3 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 160, where the court pointed out that the motion for summary judgment had been denied because of the presence of genuine issues of fact. Here, the trial judge clearly ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to prevail as a matter of law. I am confident that Judge Holtzoff is fully aware that before a movant may be granted a summary judgment, he must establish (1) "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and (2) that he is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." He chose to predicate his order upon the latter ground, and to me, that order looks "final." Accordingly, I would go right to the merits. Now that the appeal is being dismissed, and after considerable loss of time and effort, I suspect that some other District judge may decide that the law of the case has been established, and we will have it right back here with additional loss of time and expense.
Comment
User Comments