Broadway Avenue is a through street running north and south in the City of Boise. It is protected by stop signs at street intersections. It is intersected at right angles by Rossi Street and Beacon Street. The block between Rossi Street on the south and Beacon Street on the north is the location in question in this action. Broadway Avenue in this block is 70 feet wide. Down the middle the street has a strip of hard surface 30 feet wide and on each side of such hard surface is a strip of gravel 20 feet wide. On the east side of the street in this block is a service station and on the west side there are retail stores, including a super market and a drug center, constituting a business district.
On September 25, 1953, at about 9:00 o'clock p. m., appellant was driving his automobile in a northerly direction on Broadway Avenue. He parked his car on the east side of the street approximately in the middle of the block in question and
Appellant brought this action to recover damages for his injuries. By his complaint he alleged that respondent was negligent in that he failed to keep a proper lookout; was driving without his headlights being turned on; and was driving at a speed in excess of 30 miles per hour. Respondent, by his answer, alleged that appellant was guilty of contributory negligence in that he crossed the street in the middle of the block and that he failed to keep a proper lookout for and to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic. At the close of the evidence produced at the trial a motion was made by respondent for a directed verdict. The motion was granted, a directed verdict was rendered by the jury and a judgment for respondent entered thereon. Appellant has appealed from such judgment.
By his assignments of error, appellant mainly challenges the granting of the motion for a directed verdict. Appellant contends that the question of the negligence of respondent and the question of contributory negligence on the part of appellant were questions which should have been submitted to the jury under the evidence.
The question raised in the case as to whether the speed limit on Broadway at the place in question was 15 miles per hour through a business district, or 30 miles per hour on a through and arterial street is unnecessary for decision herein because the evidence on behalf of appellant, although contradicted by the evidence on behalf of respondent, was that respondent was traveling in excess of 30 miles per hour. The evidence on behalf of appellant that respondent was driving without his headlights being turned on is not persuasive. However, as we view this case the question
We recognize that where the evidence is such that reasonable minds might differ as to the facts, or where reasonable minds might draw different conclusions from the facts, the questions of negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause are for the jury. However, where there is no other reasonable interpretation of the evidence except that plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately caused or contributed to his injury, then the question of contributory negligence becomes one of law for the court. Bennett v. Deaton, 57 Idaho 752, 68 P.2d 895; Adkins v. Zalasky, 59 Idaho 292, 81 P.2d 1090; Ford v. Connell, 69 Idaho 183, 204 P.2d 1019; McKee v. Chase, 73 Idaho 491, 253 P.2d 787.
Section 49-520, subdivision c, I.C., provides as follows:
It was admitted that Section 18 of Ordinance No. 1856 of the City of Boise reads as follows: "No pedestrian shall cross any street except upon the crosswalk thereof." The validity of such ordinance was not challenged.
It is admitted by appellant that he was crossing the street in the middle of the block and at a place where there was no pedestrian crossing or crosswalk in violation of the city ordinance. His action constituted negligence per se. Ineas v. Union Pac. R. Co., 72 Idaho 390, 241 P.2d 1178; Turner v. Purdom, Idaho, 289 P.2d 608, filed October 31, 1955; Linde v. Emmick, 16 Cal.App.2d 676, 61 P.2d 338; Furuta v. Randall, 17 Cal.App.2d 384, 62 P.2d 157; Shimizu v. Kurtz, 43 Cal.App.2d 471, 111 P.2d 1.
The controlling question then is, did the negligence of appellant proximately cause or contribute to his injury? In Senkirik v. Royce, 192 Or. 583, 235 P.2d 886, the court considered the question of contributory negligence of a pedestrian plaintiff under a yield the right-of-way statute similar to ours and an ordinance of the City of Portland prohibiting the crossing of a street except at an intersection or on a crosswalk. The court, 235 P.2d on page 894, said:
In Howard v. Thompson-White Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W.2d 242, the Texas Court considered the question of contributory negligence of pedestrian under a yield the right-of-way statute and a city ordinance forbidding the crossing of streets except at intersections or on crosswalks. The Texas Court held that the pedestrian was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Under yield the right-of-way statutes but without the presence of prohibitory city ordinances, some courts appear to have
In some cases the courts have held that under yield the right-of-way statutes a plaintiff violating the same was not conclusively barred from recovery where the facts were such that different conclusions might be reasonably drawn on the questions of whether the plaintiff was negligent and whether his negligence proximately caused or contributed to his injury. See Casalegno v. Leonard, 40 Cal.App.2d 575, 105 P.2d 125; Shipway v. Monise, Cal.App., 139 P.2d 60; Martin v. Harrison, Or., 186 P.2d 534; Jacoby v. Johnson, Cal.App., 190 P.2d 243.
In the case at bar the negligence of appellant is not an open question as his actions constituted negligence per se. As to the proximate cause of the accident, there is no evidence to invoke the doctrine of last clear chance or to indicate that the accident would have occurred regardless of whether appellant was on a crosswalk or in the middle of the block. There can be no other reasonable interpretation of the evidence than that the negligence of appellant proximately caused or contributed to his injury. Hill v. Wilson, 124 Cal.App.2d 472, 268 P.2d 748.
The other questions raised by the assignments of error concern the matter of negligence on the part of respondent and are not material under the theory upon which this case is decided. The trial court did not err in granting the motion for a directed verdict and in entering judgment upon such verdict. Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.
TAYLOR, C. J., and KEETON, ANDERSON and SMITH, JJ., concur.