MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
For the first time since the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914 the Court is called upon to consider § 8's prohibitions against interlocking corporate directorates.
Appellees suggest, without arguing the point in extenso, that the judgment should be affirmed because § 11 of the Clayton Act vests exclusive § 8 enforcement powers in the Federal Trade Commission.
Both sides agree to the abstract proposition that voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i. e., does not make the case moot. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). A controversy may remain to be settled in such circumstances, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (1945), e. g., a dispute over the legality of the challenged practices. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., supra; Carpenters Union v. Labor Board, 341 U.S. 707, 715 (1951). The defendant is free to return to his old ways.
Along with its power to hear the case, the court's power to grant injunctive relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra; Goshen Mfg. Co. v. Myers Mfg. Co., 242 U.S. 202 (1916). The purpose of an injunction is to prevent future violations, Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928), and, of course, it can be utilized even without a showing of past wrongs. But the moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed. The necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive. The chancellor's decision is based on all the circumstances; his discretion is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to reverse it. To be considered are the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of the past violations.
The facts relied on by the Government to show an abuse of discretion in this case are these: Hancock's three interlocking directorates viewed as three distinct violations, his failure to terminate them until after suit was
Were we sitting as a trial court, this showing might be persuasive. But the Government must demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for the District Judge's decision.
Assuming with the Government that the corporations were properly joined as defendants,
Essentially, the Government's claim is that it was deprived of a trial on the relief issue. But at no time was objection raised to the procedure by which the case was handled. Of course summary judgment procedure could not have been employed were there a "genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 56. However, after the defendants had moved to dismiss, the Government elected not to file any countervailing affidavits or amend its complaint and stated on oral argument that the truth of the defendants' affidavits was not questioned. To frame a factual dispute, that left the complaint, the only relevant paragraph of which reads: "16. The defendants have threatened to continue and will continue the aforesaid violation of Section 8 of the Clayton Act unless the relief prayed for herein is granted." (Emphasis added.) "The aforesaid violation[s]," the specific interlocks, had been voluntarily terminated and intention to resume them had been negatived under oath. As to the prayer that the defendants be enjoined from any future violations of § 8, the complaint alleged no threatened violations other than those specifically charged. In these circumstances, the District Judge could decide that there was no significant threat of future violation and that there was no factual dispute about the existence of such a threat.
We conclude that, although the actions were not moot, no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated in the trial
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs, dissenting.
Monopoly and restraints of trade are sometimes the products of practices and devices as ingenious as the minds of men. Sometimes they follow a blunt and direct course as is involved in the acquisition of the assets of a competitor—a way of growth of monopoly power to which the decisions of the Court have given a powerful impetus and encouragement. See especially United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495. More subtle are interlocking arrangements between directorates. This can accomplish disastrous consequences, as Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out forty years ago. Interlocking directorates between companies which compete stifle the competition. Or to use the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, the practice substitutes "the pull of privilege for the push of manhood."
The web that is woven may tie many industries, insurance companies, and financial houses together into a vast and friendly alliance that takes the edge off competition.
That condition is aggravated here. The interlocking control in the present case is not indirect. Mr. Hancock served as a director for each of three sets of companies which, on the state of the pleadings before us, we must assume to have been competitive. The fact that he resigned under the pressure of these proceedings should not dispose of the case. We are dealing here with professionals whose technique for controlling enterprises and building empires was fully developed and well known long before Mr. Justice Brandeis was crying out against the evils of "the money trust." Mr. Hancock is and has been for some years a partner in the investment banking firm of Lehman Bros. In 1940 he testified that when Lehman Bros. did financing for a company it was their "traditional practice" to ask for representation on the board of directors.
It therefore seems to me that a District Judge, faced with violations such as were involved here, would want
The fact that the Lehman partner resigned to avoid a decision on the merits has little, if any, relevancy to the issue in the case, for we are here concerned with the proclivity of the house to indulge in the practice.
The relevant issues have never been weighed in this case. The District Court's ruling would be entitled to a presumption of validity if those various factors had been considered. But the District Court made no such considered judgment. It disposed of the case on the basis of mootness, a ruling now conceded to be erroneous. The case should go back for a consideration of the nature and extent of the web which this investment banking house has woven over industry and its effect on the "elimination of competition" within the meaning of § 8 of the Clayton Act.
FootNotes
"No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce, . . . if such corporations are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws. . . ." 38 Stat. 730, 15 U. S. C. § 19.
"Whenever the Commission . . . shall have reason to believe that any person is violating or has violated any of the provisions of sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of this Act, it shall issue and serve upon such person and the Attorney General a complaint stating its charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing . . . . If upon such hearing the Commission . . . shall be of the opinion that any of the provisions of said sections have been or are being violated, it shall make a report in writing, in which it shall state its findings as to the facts, and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such violations, and divest itself of the stock, or other share capital, or assets, held or rid itself of the directors chosen contrary to the provisions of sections 7 and 8 of this Act, if any there be, in the manner and within the time fixed by said order. . . ." 64 Stat. 1126, 15 U. S. C., Supp. V, § 21.
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