MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue to be decided in these cases is narrow. It is whether respondent, as Administrator, has authority under § 8 (f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, to prohibit industrial homework as a necessary means of making effective a minimum wage order for the embroideries industry. The question arises in proceedings brought to review the order pursuant to § 10. The cases were consolidated for hearing in the Circuit Court of Appeals, which sustained the Administrator's action, one judge dissenting. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608. Because of the public importance of the question and its importance for purposes of administering the statute, certiorari was granted, 323 U.S. 695, limited to the stated issue.
One of the Act's primary objectives was "a universal minimum wage of 40 cents an hour in each industry
The Act's scheme is therefore a combination of "statutory" minimum wages fixed by § 6 and what may be termed "committee" wages,
In this statutory setting stands § 8 (f), the crucial provision which in material part is as follows:
"(f) Orders issued under this section shall define the industries and classifications therein to which they are to apply, and shall contain such terms and conditions as the Administrator finds necessary to carry out the purposes of such orders, to prevent the circumvention or evasion thereof, and to safeguard the minimum wage rates established therein. No such order shall take effect until after due notice is given . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The narrow issue turns upon the scope properly to be given the emphasized portions of the section. Respondent says that this authorizes him to take whatever action he finds necessary to prevent circumvention or evasion of the order so that the wage rate it establishes may be safeguarded; and that in this case his findings, amply
In this sharply chiseled state of the issue, the accuracy of the Administrator's findings and conclusions and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain them must be taken
Furthermore, upon the findings that is true not only with reference to the employees who are themselves homeworkers. It is true also as to all other employees in the industry.
Hence, if the prohibition cannot be made, the floor for the entire industry falls and the right of the homeworkers and the employers to be free from the prohibition destroys the right of the much larger number of factory workers to receive the minimum wage. This is true not merely as a matter of inference from evidence having only prospective and predictive value. It is proved conclusively by the Administrator's experience in attempting by regulatory methods to secure compliance with the previously
The case therefore comes down squarely to whether or not minimum wages may be effectively prescribed and required in this industry. If homework can be prohibited, this is possible. If it cannot, the floor provided by the order cannot be maintained and, further, what is more important, it inevitably follows that no floor, whether of "statutory" or of "committee" wages, can be maintained.
The statute itself thus gives the answer. It does so in two ways, by necessity to avoid self-nullification and by its explicit terms. The necessity should be enough. But the Act's terms reinforce the necessity's teaching. Section 8 (d) requires the Administrator to "carry into effect" the committee's approved recommendations. Section 8 (f) commands him to include in the order "such terms and conditions" as he "finds necessary to carry out" its purposes. These duties are backed up by other provisions.
Petitioners' objections are not procedural. They have not contended that the provision of the order forbidding homework is a definition or classification of the industry
Petitioners' arguments rest chiefly on their views of the legislative history and the character of the prohibition. The latter, they say, is not a "method of enforcement" but is rather a form of "experimental social legislation" touching a matter not incidental to the order, but in the nature
This argument is closely interlaced with the contentions drawn from the legislative history and the statute's enforcement provisions, presently to be noted. In so far as it is independent of these, however, it rests on wholly untenable premises. One is that the prohibition is merely an "enforcement" measure. It is rather primarily preventive in character, intended to aid in making the order effective and to eliminate the need for enforcement. But, in accordance with their "enforcement" conception, petitioners' larger fallacy is that the Administrator can take no action toward making his order effective which, if taken as a matter of independent legislation not expressly related to the Fair Labor Standards Act's objects, would produce substantially the same social and economic effects, apart from those objects. In this view the Administrator's power is so restricted that he can do nothing if, in addition to making the rate effective and safeguarding it against circumvention, other social and economic consequences would result.
The answer is obvious. Section 8 (f), in directing the Administrator to include "such terms and conditions" as he "finds necessary to carry out the purposes of such orders," did not forbid him to take the only measures which would be effective, merely because other consequences necessarily would follow. The language neither states expressly nor implies that he is to do only what will achieve the stated ends and nothing more. The statute does not direct the Administrator to make the rate effective by all necessary means except those which may have other social or economic consequences.
His power, it is true, is not one of social or economic reform, except as that power relates to maintaining authorized minimum wages and the statutory hours of labor.
Homework in this case is not an independent industry. It is conducted largely by the same employers who maintain factory establishments or by "contractors" who are
When all of these facts are taken into account, the case is clearly not an instance of effort to achieve ends beyond or independent of the statutory objects. It rather exhibits but an exercise of the necessary means to accomplish those objects. This is confirmed, further, by the evidence and the findings which show that the prohibition will not eliminate the great majority of homeworkers from the industry; but on the contrary will result only in transfer of the scene of their work from the home to the factory and will do this without undue hardship.
The argument from the legislative history undertakes, in effect, to contradict the terms of § 8 (f) by negative inferences drawn from inconclusive events occurring in the course of consideration of the various and widely differing bills which finally, by compromise and adjustment between the two Houses of Congress, emerged from the conference as the Act. The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction. This is such a case.
Petitioners' most insistent emphasis is upon two things. One is that the committee in charge of the original Senate bill reported that it was limited to two objectives, the establishment of minimum wages and maximum hours and the prohibition of industrial child labor.
The first objection merely repeats in another guise the argument that homework is an independent subject matter wholly without the statute's purview, but bolsters this with the assumption that because oppressive child labor was covered expressly, homework and all other factors affecting maintenance of minimum wages were left entirely untouched, if they produce other evils which independent legislation might reach, merely because they were not also specifically mentioned. The assumption ignores the fact that the child labor provisions are themselves independent prohibitions, not limited to operation in situations where child labor has harmful effects on maintaining the minimum wage rate but working entirely independently
This difference is in fact the difference between end and means, made such by the terms of the statute itself. Congress by stating expressly its primary ends does not deny resort to the means necessary to achieve them. Mention of child labor therefore gives no ground to infer, from failure expressly to mention homework, that the latter was not included within the general language which comprehends all necessary means to achieve the Act's primary objects. Exactly the opposite conclusion must be drawn on the record, in view of the Administrator's uncontested findings concerning the effects of homework in producing hidden child labor at substandard wages, thus circumventing the Act in two of its primary objects.
The answer to the argument microscopically made from the long course of legislative events is obvious. From the beginning the parenthetical clause was but illustrative of the general authority conferred by the provision of which it was a part.
However, as he points out, the course of events was quite different, and even more conclusive against the petitioners' view. The section containing the parenthesis began, and continued, as a feature of the Senate bill. This followed an entirely different plan from the one eventually adopted, which was a compromise of Senate and House proposals. The Senate bill placed administration of the Act in the hands of a board, which was by order to fix all minimum wages. In this form, including the parenthetical reference to homework,
When the two bills came to conference, compromise was worked out by writing around the conference table the final measure combining features of both bills.
Section 8 (f), which originated in the Senate, thus found its way back into the final form of the measure, though without the parenthesis. The Conference report (H. Rep. No. 2738, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.) contains no reference to the elision and none appears in the record of the ensuing debate. 83 Cong. Rec. 9158, 9246. The history, accordingly, does not sustain the negative inference petitioners would draw from the omission. The parenthesis
That rejection is no evidence that this single feature had special significance. Rejection of an entire bill cannot be taken to be a specific rejection of each and every feature, more especially of those later reintroduced in the final draft.
The amendment to § 6, relating to homework in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, adopted in 1940,
The idea seems to be twofold, first, that the Administrator has no enforcement functions under this Act; or, in any event, that the Act provides no means for enforcing the "terms and conditions," including restriction or prohibition of homework, which he may include in his order.
The Administrator's function under § 8 (f), though primarily preventive, obviously is related to enforcement. And further, he is expressly granted powers bearing directly to that end. Apart from his investigative authority under § 11, he has power also by express provision of that section to bring suits under § 17 to restrain violations of wage orders.
We need not determine whether this includes authority to sue independently to restrain violations of "terms and conditions" properly included in such an order or to ask for this relief as incidental to enjoining violations of the rate specified. Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 461;
Finally, petitioners insist that power to prohibit homework could not have been intended because the authority to prescribe "terms and conditions" applies only to "committee," not to "statutory" wages and will expire, by the terms of § 8 (e),
The last conclusion might be accepted, if its foundations were solid. But they crumble. In the first place the
Beyond this, it is not true that the power either to prescribe "committee" wages or to include "terms and conditions" in the order expires altogether at the end of the first seven years. Section 8 (e) expressly provides for continuance or issuance of wage orders after that time, whenever the industry committee recommends and the Administrator finds "by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the continued effectiveness or the issuance of the order, as the case may be, is necessary in order to prevent substantial curtailment of employment in the industry." And § 6 (a) (3), perhaps also 6 (a) (4), expressly contemplates continuance of wage orders issued under § 8 after the initial seven years. The exact scope of these provisions need not now be determined. It is enough, for present purposes, that they leave some room, and it may be considerable, for the issuance or continued effectiveness of wage orders after October 23, 1945.
Finally, it is not necessary in this case to decide whether the power to prescribe "terms and conditions" applies only to "committee" wages and not to "statutory" wages. Strong reasons have been suggested for believing it applies to both.
Petitioners' arguments have been directed chiefly to the power to prohibit. If valid, they would apply equally to the authority to restrict or regulate. They would nullify the Administrator's power to establish or maintain minimum wages in the embroideries industry. They can have no such potency.
The judgments are
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring.
The Fair Labor Standards Act gives the Administrator charged with its enforcement power to fix wages so that they attain a basic minimum rate. In view of the vast and varied range of situations thus placed under his wage-fixing authority, the Administrator naturally enough was given by Congress the power to issue these wage orders on "such terms and conditions as the Administrator finds necessary to carry out the purposes of such orders, to prevent the circumvention or evasion thereof, and to safeguard the minimum wage rates established therein." § 8 (f), 52 Stat. 1060, 1065, 29 U.S.C. § 208 (f). It would disregard the authority thus given by Congress to deny that the power to fix minimum wages carries with it the subsidiary power to forbid and to prevent evasion of
And so I join in the Court's opinion.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS.
With deference I venture to think that the Court here essays to read into the law what its words, fairly construed, do not import. The Court arrives at that result by forming a judgment as to what Congress probably should have said, and would have said, if it had considered the matter, in order to make the statute what the Court deems a more perfect instrument for attaining the general objective which Congress sought to attain, and then makes the necessary additions to the language Congress has used. The principal, if not the only argument I find in the opinion for reading something into the statute, is that otherwise it cannot be most effectively applied to certain industries unless the industries themselves are made over.
Section 8 (f) provides that the Administrator's orders issued under the section "shall define the industries . . . to which they are to apply." It is not suggested that the order in question is of this description. That with which the industry committee's investigation dealt was a single industry in which two methods of work were pursued. Obviously it is not a definition of the industry to exclude from it some of those who labor in it.
The section also provides that the Administrator's orders "shall contain such terms and conditions as the Administrator finds necessary to carry out the purposes of
The language of § 8 (f) has a reasonable and proper office in the context of the Act. The provisions permitted by that section to be inserted in an order are obviously such as are incidental to administration, such as pertain to keeping records or filing reports; not exorbitant or excessive so as to amount to a regulation or suppression of an existing and recognized industry.
In my view, one need not go outside the provisions of the Act to be convinced that Congress never intended to grant the Administrator the power he has assumed. If it be thought, however, that the phraseology of § 8 (f) is of doubtful import, the legislative history seems to me to demonstrate that Congress purposely, and not by inadvertence, denied the asserted power to the Administrator.
The statute aimed at three things — the limitation of the hours of work, the fixing of minimum compensation per hour, and the prohibition of child labor. We may eliminate
Provision is made to raise wages above the prescribed minima during the seven year period after the effective date of the Act, without curtailing employment or disrupting the economy of an industry. Section 6 refers the reader to § 8 creating machinery to accomplish this. The latter section provides for the convening of industry committees to which the Administrator shall refer the question what minimum wage rate shall be set for the industry. The committee is to investigate conditions in the industry, hold hearings, and recommend the highest minimum wage rates which it determines, having regard to economic and competitive conditions, will not substantially curtail employment.
Upon receiving the committee's recommendation, the Administrator, after an opportunity for hearing, may approve or disapprove the committee's recommendation. If he approves, he shall do so by an order the effect of which is to put into force the recommended wage scale. Such orders are not to continue in force after seven years from the effective date of the statute unless the committee
Now it is only in enforcement of a committee's report that the Administrator has power to issue an order with respect to wages, and it is in this context that § 8 (f) permits him to include in his order "such terms and conditions" as he "finds necessary to carry out the purposes" of the order, to prevent circumvention or evasion, and to safeguard the wage rates thereby established.
With respect to the minima fixed by § 6, which apply universally (except where the special procedure authorized by § 8 is invoked), the Administrator has no authority to issue orders such as that issued in this case. He cannot, because he finds it difficult to enforce the Act in an industry, either remake or suppress the industry. The result of the decision is that, in the exceptional case where a special rate of wages is set in advance of the prescribed rate, the Administrator may do what, in the generality of cases, he may not do. This circumstance gave one of the judges below so much trouble that he was willing to hold, in the teeth of § 6, that the Administrator might in all cases make such orders as that here in question. Thus, instead of writing in additional provisions in § 8 (f), as does this court, he was prepared to write in a new provision in § 6 to make the Act a complete and logical statute.
We have, then, this situation: With respect to any industry which has not been taken out of the provisions of § 6 by an industry committee's report and an Administrator's order, the Administrator cannot forbid home work. As respects an industry in which wages have been fixed by a committee, the Administrator has these sweeping
Surely, if any such sweeping construction is to be given words having a narrower import, inquiry into the legislative history is of capital importance. That history, instead of being "wholly ambiguous" and furnishing a "dubious basis" for conflicting inferences, seems to me to be letter-clear.
The Presidential message urging enactment of this legislation states two objects: "To reduce the lag in the purchasing power of industrial workers" and to put an end to "the existence of child labor." Both purposes were to be accomplished "without creating economic dislocation."
In order to expedite the adoption of the legislation, the House Committee limited its consideration to the bill passed by the Senate and reported it favorably with amendments. Without detailing the House proceedings, it is enough to say that ultimately a bill was presented largely embodying the provisions of Senate Bill No. 2475 but creating an administrator in lieu of a board. Section 9 (6), which related to wage orders, contained the same provisions respecting prohibition of home work as the Senate bill.
The objections to the Senate bill in the House were such that a new measure was reported establishing fixed minimum wages and maximum hours and granting the Secretary of Labor only the power to declare that a particular industry was "an industry affecting commerce" and so subject to the Act. It contained no provision for administrative orders. During debate on this proposed
It is clear that in redrafting § 8 (f), which was § 9 (6) of the Senate bill, the conferees consciously and deliberately rejected the clause "including the restriction or prohibition of industrial home work or of such other acts or practices." The Conference Report was accepted, the bill passed both houses, and was signed by the President.
The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor recognized that it had no power to abolish home work. In its First Annual Report, that Division stated (p. 14) that it was treating home workers as employes and not as independent contractors. In the same report (p. 31) the Division went into detail with respect to regulations for record keeping in respect of home work. At page 46, the Division said: "A difficult problem which has required the use of special inspectors and special techniques is that of industrial homework. It has been necessary to make elaborate and time-consuming investigations at the
"I am sure that business would be less jittery about this law if the Administrator had the right to define the application of the law. Without this amendment he may not do so and some business has suffered as a result. I believe that he further needs the power to define technical and trade terms used in the act and the power to make special provisions with respect to industrial home work and make special provision for constant-wage plans consistent with section 7 relating to hours of work. Home work has long been a blot on the economic picture of this country, and I regret to say that in some cases employers have resorted to this means of employment to escape the provisions of this law."
Again she stated to the House:
". . . we are proposing in section 4 of H.R. 5435 to authorize the Administrator to make rules and regulations to carry out any of the provisions of the act. This section
"As the act is now written it is extremely doubtful whether the wage and hour standards which it establishes can be enforced as to industrial home workers. Under present practice in industrial home work industries, the Administrator is unable to secure proper records on wages and hours of home workers. Business concerns relying on home work for their labor do not ordinarily deal directly with the home workers but turn over the goods or articles on which the work is to be done to contractors who employ the home workers. If time permitted, I could give you concrete examples of cruelty in this field. Section 4 of the amendments would give the Administrator the necessary authority to cope with this situation."
In the Annual Report of the Wage and Hour Division for 1940 industrial home work was discussed at page 89 and statements made as to the requirements of record keeping in respect of it.
After the Wage and Hour Act had become law it developed that if the prescribed minimum hourly wages were enforced in Puerto Rico certain industries there, which consisted almost entirely of home work, would be destroyed. It was believed that the only relief which would correct the situation would be to amend the statute to abrogate the fixed minima named in § 6 to provide for an industry committee to fix lower standard wages for industries consisting largely of home workers in the island. Such minima would be recommended by an industry committee and implemented by orders of the Administrator.
A section of the Wage and Hour Division's Report for 1940 contained a discussion of enforcement of the Act with respect to home work, without any suggestion that the Administrator could deal with it by abolishing it. (p. 89)
In the Report for 1941 the Division, for the first time, suggested that the Administrator had been considering, in connection with wage orders, the question: "Must homework be abolished as one of the terms and conditions of a wage order in order to safeguard and effectuate enforcement of the order." (p. 64)
Thus it appears that the Administrator, having failed to obtain explicit authority from Congress, began contemplating the effort to persuade the courts that he had implied authority in the premises.
In the Report for 1942 (p. 19) all that appears is the following:
"The problem of industrial homework has been one of the most important administrative questions since the inception of the Fair Labor Standards Act. For the guidance of the Administrator, the data were presented for the jewelry and knitted outerwear industries, showing conditions of industrial homework, the average earnings of homeworkers, the difficulties of enforcement of minimum wage provisions for homeworkers, and the methods of evasion of minimum wage regulations by workers and employers."
In the Report for 1943, for the first time, Congress was apprised of action being taken (p. 19) thus:
"Enforcement measures established to protect the standards of the Act for factory employees have not been effective in controlling hours and wages of homeworkers. This failure prompted regulation of industrial homework under wage orders in industries in which homework is prevalent. These regulations are designed to protect factory employees against unfair wage competition.
"Industrial homework in these industries is restricted to persons who are unable to adjust to factory work because of age or physical or mental disability or who are home-bound because of an invalid in the home and who have been engaged in the particular industry prior to a specified date. This latter requirement may be waived in unusual hardship cases. These restrictions were adopted after searching examination of the subject which included the opinions and convictions of representatives of management and labor. A total of 4,451 applications for industrial homework certificates have been received and 3,701 certificates have been granted."
But, by that time, this case had been taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals to test the validity of the order here under review.
I would reverse the judgment.
The CHIEF JUSTICE joins in this opinion.
Industry representatives, who appeared, were unanimous, with one exception, in supporting the committee's recommendation, but divided on restricting or prohibiting industrial homework. Labor representatives supported both proposals, as did representatives of federal and state agencies, including the Departments of Labor of the United States and of the States of New York and Rhode Island.
Extensive testimony was taken and many exhibits were received in evidence. In many of its aspects the Administrator found the evidence repetitious of that upon which previous findings were based approving the recommendations of an earlier industry committee (No. 15), which resulted in establishing the 37 1/2-cent rate by order effective January 27, 1941. Oral argument was restricted to the question of homework, to which the greater part of the record of 1,691 pages relates. The procedure was substantially that which had been followed, upon the same question, in the cases of six other industries. See the Administrator's Findings and Opinion on the minimum wage recommendation of Industry Committee No. 26 for, and industrial homework in, the Jewelry Manufacturing Industry, dated October 16, 1941, and in relation to the Knitted Outerwear Industry (March 30, 1942), Women's Apparel Industry (July 8, 1942), Gloves and Mittens Industry (August 22, 1942), Button and Buckle Manufacturing Industry (September 19, 1942), and Handkerchief Manufacturing Industry (January 22, 1943).
The Administrator found that "the estimated direct increase in the wage bill resulting from the establishment of a minimum wage rate of 40 cents an hour would be 1.2 per cent in the three main areas and 2.6 per cent in the other areas." These findings are related to others to the effect that "almost 90 percent of the embroidery establishments are located in the New York City (including northern New Jersey), Chicago, and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. . . ." The Administrator concluded that "the insignificant rise in operating costs which will result from the recommended minimum will not cause substantial curtailment of employment." Cf. § 8 (b), (d).
His conclusions, upon the evidence, were in general that both state and federal efforts at regulation had been ineffective; that violations were widespread, of great variety and in great part concealed; and that these were due to factors inherent in the conditions under which industrial homework is performed and impossible to correct by the regulatory measures applied.
The Administrator's review of efforts at regulation, by both state, cf. note 17 infra, and federal authorities prior to the Fair Labor Standards Act, led him to conclude "that labor conditions in industrial home work are not susceptible to regulation," and that, according to "the nearly unanimous viewpoint of Federal and State officials having experience in the administration of labor laws, . . . regulation, restriction or prohibition of industrial home work must be on a Nation-wide basis if minimum wage standards are to be preserved and upheld."
Likewise, "experience under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [to November, 1942] has also indicated that labor conditions in industrial homework in this Industry are not susceptible to regulation that will guarantee that the home worker will be paid the established minimum rate. . . . Compliance with the Act has been the exception rather than the rule." Cf. note 16 infra. Such homework, it is further concluded, "furnishes a ready means of circumventing or evading the minimum wage order for this Industry" and "mere regulation . . . including regulation of the record-keeping practices of employers or governmental establishment of piece rates will not be adequate to secure enforcement of the minimum wage order for the Embroideries Industry."
The Administrator's opinion states the most common practice in setting piece rates for home operations is by the timing of a sample worker in the factory and the evidence showed this worker may be a very skilled and experienced one. Of the firms inspected by the Wage and Hour Division June 1, 1939, to July 1, 1942, "a review of 211 showed that 80, or 37.9 percent, fixed piece rates for home workers upon the basis of arbitrary estimates; 73, or 34.6 percent, based the rates for home workers on time tests of plant sample workers; and only 40, or 19 percent, based the rates for home workers on time tests of some of the home workers themselves." Cf. also note 16 infra.
Much other evidence, including testimony of individual homeworkers and of the Director of the Women's Division, New York Department of Labor, relating to inspections made in 1941 and 1942 involving 1,582 homeworkers, sustained the Administrator's statement, "The evidence in the record, including the report of the Economics Branch, which showed low subminimum earnings for the bulk of the homeworkers in this industry, was not seriously contested at the hearing," and his further conclusions that, in view of competitive relationships, mere regulation of homework would not be adequate to secure effective enforcement of the order and, likewise, that this could not be had by applying the prohibition to only part of the industry.
Noting that twelve states had legislated, before 1900, to regulate tenement workshops, the Administrator found that "effective enforcement was impossible, however, and home work remained a serious problem." The subsequent period of legislation by a few states "achieved little effective control prior to 1930." New state laws, enacted during the 1930's, providing for abolition of homework by administrative order, "became the only effective statutory approach to a problem generally considered beyond regulation." Under the National Industrial Recovery Administration, 118 of the 556 codes included homework provisions; and 86 percent of the 118 prohibited homework. Homework in consequence was greatly reduced, but its volume turned sharply upward when the National Industrial Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Petitioners presented contrary evidence, largely statements of individual homeworkers in embroidery that they could not or would not make the transfer, for various reasons, if the prohibition were adopted. The Administrator found some of this evidence unacceptable "as furnishing a sound basis for predicating their actual conduct when faced with actual prohibition" and concluded that reasonable adjustment could be made to the prohibition both by employees and by the employers.
The House Committee on Labor approved and reported the Senate bill with this version of the parenthesis, which was retained through many revisions of the bill after it was recommitted. Eventually the clause was expanded in the House Committee to read, "(including the restriction or prohibition of industrial home work or such other acts or practices and such requirements as the keeping of records, labeling, periodic reporting and posting of orders and schedules)." House Confidential Subcommittee Print "A" of February 18, 1938. The clause disappeared entirely from the House bill when, shortly before passage, that body changed the entire scheme by substituting "statutory" for "committee" wages. Cf. H. Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.; cf. also text infra at notes 32, 33.