MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ brings here for review the action of petitioner, a foreign insurance company, to recover taxes paid to respondent, the Insurance Commissioner of Oklahoma, which were levied by § 10478, Oklahoma Statutes 1931, as amended by Chapter 1 (a), Title 36, Session Laws of Oklahoma 1941. This was an annual four per cent tax on premiums received by foreign insurance companies in Oklahoma, and it, together with certain specified fees, was in lieu of all other taxes and fees in Oklahoma. Petitioner paid the tax under protest and, alleging diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 41, brought suit against the Insurance Commissioner in the District Court of the United States. The procedure for recovery is laid down by § 12665, Oklahoma Statutes 1931.
The right of petitioner to maintain this suit in a federal court depends, first, upon whether the action is against an individual or against the State of Oklahoma. Secondly, if the action is determined to be against the state, the question arises as to whether or not the state has consented to suit against itself in the federal court.
Respondent challenged the right of petitioner to seek relief in the District Court by the defense in its answer that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. R.C.P. 12 (b) and (e).
In Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, an action was instituted in the federal trial court by railroad receivers against the defendant "as Treasurer of the State of California" to recover taxes assessed against and paid by the railroad. The proceeding was brought under § 3669 of the California Political Code, as amended by California Statutes (1891) 442, which authorized a suit against the State Treasurer for the recovery of taxes which were illegally exacted. The defendant could demand trial of the action in the Superior Court of the County of Sacramento, California. If the final judgment was against the Treasurer, the Comptroller of the state was directed to draw his warrant on state funds for its satisfaction.
As the suit was against a state official as such, through proceedings which were authorized by statute, to compel him to carry out with the state's funds the state's agreement to reimburse moneys illegally exacted under color of the tax power, this Court held, p. 439, it was a suit against the state. The state would be required to pay.
This ruling that a state could not be controlled by courts in the performance of its political duties through suits against its officials has been consistently followed. Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 529; Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 167; Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461, 468 et seq.; Ex parte State of New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 500; Worcester County Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 296, 299. Efforts to force, through suits against officials, performance of promises by a state collide directly with the necessity that a sovereign must be free from judicial compulsion in the carrying out of its policies within the limits of the Constitution. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 320; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 720. A state's freedom from litigation was established as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment. The inherent nature of sovereignty prevents actions against a state by its own citizens without its consent. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 16.
Oklahoma provides for recovery of unlawful exactions paid to its collectors under protest. § 12665 Oklahoma Statutes 1931. Note 1, supra. In our view of this case it
A suit against a state official under § 12665 to recover taxes is held to be a suit against the state by Oklahoma and the remedy exclusive of other state remedies. Antrim Lumber Co. v. Sneed, supra, 175 Okla. at 51, 52 P.2d at 1045. This interpretation of an Oklahoma statute by the Supreme Court of the state accords with our view, as set out above, of the meaning of a suit against a state. Petitioner brought this action against the collector, the Insurance Commissioner, in strict accord with the requirements of § 12665. It alleged that there was no appeal provided by Oklahoma laws from defendant's action in collecting and gave notice of protest and suit to defendant at the time of payment in the language of the section. By so doing petitioner was relieved of the necessity of establishing that the payment was not voluntary
By § 12665, Oklahoma creates a judicial procedure for the prompt recovery by the citizen of money wrongfully collected as taxes. It is the sovereign's method of tax administration. Oklahoma designates the official to be sued, orders him to hold the tax, empowers its courts to
But it is urged that if this is a suit against the state, Oklahoma has consented to this action in the federal court. Cf. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 391.
The principle of immunity from litigation assures the states and the nation from unanticipated intervention in the processes of government, while its rigors are mitigated by a sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the sovereign. The history of
The Oklahoma section in question, 12665, was enacted in 1915 as a part of a general amendment to then existing tax laws. Session Laws 1915, p. 149, Chap. 107, Art. One, subdivision B, § 7.
Smith v. Reeves, supra, p. 445, holds that an act of a state is valid which limits to its own courts suits against it to recover taxes. There California's intention to so limit was made manifest by authorizing the state officer to demand trial in the Superior Court of Sacramento County. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, considered above at p. 53, is not applicable since it was not a suit against the state.
Petitioner urges that Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 517, and Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 391, 392, are precedents which lead to a contrary conclusion on this issue of the suability of Oklahoma in the District Court of the United States. The former is clearly inapposite. That case involved proceedings to enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute providing for intrastate railroad rates. Since the state act provided a remedy, the state took the position
In the Reagan case, a proceeding for injunction to restrain the members of the Texas Railroad Commission from enforcing rates which were alleged to be unconstitutional was allowed to be maintained in equity in a federal court. This Court said it was maintainable against the defendants both under the general equity jurisdiction of the federal courts and under the provisions of the state statute which allowed review "in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County, Texas. . . ." It was thought that the United States Circuit Court, sitting in Travis County, was covered by this language. As it was concluded, however, that this was not a suit against the state, page 392, we do not feel impelled to extend the ruling of the Reagan case on this alternative basis of jurisdiction to a suit, such as this, against a state for recovery of taxes.
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U.S. 273, is also distinguishable. There the Attorney General of South Carolina appeared in a federal court to answer for the state in an injunction suit under the authority of a statute which read as follows:
"if the State be interested in the revenue in said action, the county auditor shall, immediately upon the commencement of said action, inform the Auditor of State of its commencement, of the alleged cause thereof, and the Auditor of State shall submit the same to the Attorney General, who shall defend said action for and on behalf of the State." p. 286.
This Court construed this to consent to an appearance in the federal court and held its decision res judicata against the state and added at p. 287:
The administrative construction by a state of these statutes of consent have influence in determining our conclusions. Cf. Farish v. State Banking Board, 235 U.S. 498, 512; Richardson v. Fajardo Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 44, 47; Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24.
It may be well to add that the construction given the Oklahoma statute leaves open the road to review in this Court on constitutional grounds after the issues have been passed upon by the state courts. Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 592; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, with whom the CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS concur, dissenting:
To avoid the imposition of penalties and other serious hazards, the plaintiff paid money under claim of a tax which Oklahoma, we must assume, had no power to exact. Concededly, he could sue to recover the moneys so paid to the defendant, a tax collector, in a state court in Oklahoma. But to allow the suit to be brought in a federal court sitting in Oklahoma would derogate, this Court now holds, from the sovereignty of Oklahoma. Such a result, I believe, derives from an excessive regard for formalism
To repeat, this is a simple suit to get back money from a collector who for present purposes had no right to demand it. So far as the federal fiscal system is concerned, this common law remedy has been enforced throughout our history, barring only a brief interruption.
The Eleventh Amendment has put state immunity from suit into the Constitution. Therefore, it is not in the power of individuals to bring any State into court — the State's or that of the United States — except with its consent. But consent does not depend on some ritualistic formula. Nor are any words needed to indicate submission to the law of the land. The readiness or reluctance with which courts find such consent has naturally been influenced by prevailing views regarding the moral sanction to be attributed to a State's freedom from suability. Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the monarchial privilege, or is a manifestation merely of power, or rests on abstract logical grounds, see Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, it undoubtedly runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts reflect a strong legislative momentum in their tendency to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years ago, that "it is a wholesome sight to see `the Crown' sued and answering for its torts." 3 Maitland, Collected Papers, 263.
Assuming that the proceeding in this case to recover from the individual moneys demanded by him in defiance of the Constitution is a suit against the State, compare Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155; Atchison, T. & S.F.
Legislation giving consent to sue is not to be treated in the spirit in which seventeenth century criminal pleading was construed. Only by such overstrained rendering of the Oklahoma statute does the Court finally achieve exclusion of the right of the plaintiff to go to a federal court. To the language of that statute I now turn. By § 12665 Oklahoma Statutes, 1931, the State authorized an action to recover moneys illegally exacted as a tax, in a situation like the present, where the exaction is one "from which the laws provide no appeal." The relevant jurisdictional
The situation thus presented by the Oklahoma legislation is very different from that which was here in Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590. There a suit was brought against state officials to remove a cloud on title to lands claimed by the State. The relief that was sought and the procedure for pursuing it plainly indicated "that the legislature had in mind only proceedings in the courts of the State. A copy of the complaint is to be served upon the prosecuting attorney, who is to send a copy thereof within five days to the Auditor General, and this is to be in lieu of service of process. It then is left to the discretion of the Auditor General to cause the Attorney General to represent him, and it is provided that in such suits no costs shall be taxed. These provisions with regard to procedure and costs show that the statute is dealing with a matter supposed to remain under state control. . . . [The] statute does not warrant the beginning of a suit in the federal court to set aside the title of the State." 194 U.S. at 591-592. The marked difference between the Michigan statute and this Oklahoma statute is further evidenced by the fact that § 12665 gives an action to recover not merely illegal state taxes but also taxes of the "county or sub-division of the county" that have been illegally collected. But counties or their subdivisions do not enjoy immunity from suit. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529; Seattle v. Oregon & Washington R. Co., 255 U.S. 56, 71. If the other jurisdictional requirements are present, they can be sued in a federal court without the leave of Oklahoma. It is not, I submit, a rational way to construe the Oklahoma statute, dealing with a particular type of illegal exaction raising the same kind of issue and involving the same procedure,
I have proceeded on the assumption that the action below was under § 12665, and as such an action against the State. But the suit was not brought under § 12665. It was brought as an ordinary common law action for the recovery of money against an officer acting under an unconstitutional statute. The defendant answered the suit, but did not claim the State's immunity from suit and the court's resulting lack of jurisdiction. What is even more significant is that he did allege lack of jurisdiction on another ground not now relevant. In a word, the defendant did not claim, on behalf of the State, the immunity which this Court now affords him. He did not even make this claim at the pre-trial conference and the claim did not emerge as one of the issues defined by the pre-trial conference under Rule 16. In disposing of the case, the Judge interpreted the action as having been brought under § 12665, although the pleadings gave no warrant for such conclusion, and on such interpretation, he found that the defendant could claim and had not waived Oklahoma's immunity. Evidently, however, the District Court was not content with its own finding of want of "jurisdiction" for it proceeded to dispose of the constitutional issues on their merits. I think that the claim of the State's immunity was not in the case under Illinois Central R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 28, which held that in a suit nominally against an individual sovereign immunity is a defense that must be raised by appropriate pleading. Doubtless for this reason, the jurisdictional question on which the case is now made to turn was not even discussed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
That court, I believe, properly passed on the constitutional merits, but since the case here goes off on jurisdiction, I intimate no views upon them.
FootNotes
"In all cases where the illegality of the tax is alleged to arise by reason of some action from which the laws provide no appeal, the aggrieved person shall pay the full amount of the taxes at the time and in the manner provided by law, and shall give notice to the officer collecting the taxes showing the grounds of complaint and that suit will be brought against the officer for recovery of them. It shall be the duty of such collecting officer to hold such taxes separate and apart from all other taxes collected by him, for a period of thirty days and if within such time summons shall be served upon such officer in a suit for recovery of such taxes, the officer shall further hold such taxes until the final determination of such suit. All such suits shall be brought in the court having jurisdiction thereof, and they shall have precedence therein; if, upon final determination of any such suit, the court shall determine that the taxes were illegally collected, as not being due the state, county or subdivision of the county, the court shall render judgment showing the correct and legal amount of taxes due by such person, and shall issue such order in accordance with the court's findings, and if such order shows that the taxes so paid are in excess of the legal and correct amount due, the collecting officer shall pay to such person the excess and shall take his receipt therefor."
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