So much of the New York statute, as imposes an inheritance tax, was sustained in Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115, and in several decisions of the Court of Appeals of that State. But the plaintiffs insist that there is a radical difference between an inheritance tax and one on transfers inter vivos. The first, they say, is an excise, imposed on a privilege; while that complained of here is really on property, though called a tax on a transfer. They argue that inheritance taxes have been sustained on the ground (United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625), that no one has the natural right to acquire property by will or descent, and if the State permits such acquisition, it may require the payment of a tax as a condition precedent to the right of using that privilege. On the other hand, they contend that the right to convey, or come into possession, does not depend upon a statutory or taxable privilege, but is a right incident to the ownership of property, and that the tax imposed by the statute on that right is in effect a tax on the property itself, and void because lacking in the elements of uniformity and equality required in the assessment of property taxes.
But, if any such distinction could be made between taxing a right and taxing a privilege, it would not avail plaintiffs in the present case. There is no natural right to create artificial and technical estates with limitations over, nor has the remainderman any more right to succeed to the possession of property under such deeds than legatees and devisees under a will. The privilege of acquiring property by such an instrument is as much dependent upon the law as that of acquiring property by
This was true under the Internal Revenue Act of 1864 (June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 223, c. 173). It imposed a succession tax on "all dispositions of real estate, taking effect upon the death of any person." It was not apportioned, and would have been void if a tax on property. But it was held that "it was not a tax on land," since "the succession or devolution of the real estate is the subject matter of the tax . . . whether . . . effected by will, deed or law of descent." Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331, 347, cited and followed, Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 78-81.
Wherever the amount of a tax is, as here, to be measured by the value of property, it has been earnestly argued that it was to tax the property itself, and that to ignore that feature is to put the name above the fact. But when the State decides to impose such a tax the amount must be determined by some standard. To require the same amount to be paid on all transfers is not so fair as to impose the burden in proportion to the value of the property. An excise on transfers therefore does not lose that character because the amount to be paid is determined by the values conveyed. In view of the decisions in Magoun v. Illinois Trust Bank, 170 U.S. 283, and other cases already cited, it is unnecessary to review the arguments pro and con, and again point out the distinction which has been made and sustained between excises and ad valorem taxes. We therefore accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeals of New York that the statute of
The validity of the tax must be determined by the laws of New York. The Fourteenth Amendment does not diminish the taxing power of the State, but only requires that in its exercise the citizen must be afforded an opportunity to be heard on all questions of liability and value, and shall not, by arbitrary and discriminatory provisions, be denied equal protection. It does not deprive the State of the power to select the subjects of taxation. But it does not follow that because it can tax any transfer (Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 159), that it must tax all transfers, or that all must be treated alike.
It is true that in New York it is as lawful to create an estate for life, with remainder after the death of grantor, as it is to convey in fee, or with remainder after the death of a third person, or on the happening of a particular event. But there is a difference in law as well as in practical effect between these various estates. Every encouragement is given to making conveyances in fee. But, from an early date, public policy has been opposed to the private interest which impelled men to withdraw property from the channels of trade and tie it up with limitations intended, among other things, to secure to the beneficiary the use of the property, while at the same time removing it, to some extent, from liability for his debts. The favored transfers in fee need not be taxed with the latter, even though the law permits their creation. These latter estates also differ among themselves. Where the grantor makes a transfer of property to take effect on the death of a third person, it might, under the ruling in Scholey v. Rew, supra, be taxed as a devolution or succession. But under such an instrument the grantor does not retain the use and power during
The New York statute recognizes this difference. It imposes a tax on transfers by descent, or will, which take effect at the death of the testator; and then a tax upon transfers made in contemplation of death. It was but logical to take the next step, and tax transfers intended to take effect at or after the death of the grantor — even though that event was not actually impending when the deed was signed.
There can be no arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination. But when there is a difference it need not be great or conspicuous in order to warrant classification. In the present instance, and so far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the State could put transfers intended to take effect at the death of the grantor in a class with transfers by descent, will or gifts in contemplation of the death of the donor, without, at the same time, taxing transfers intended to take effect on the death of some person other than the grantor, or on the happening of a certain or contingent event.
As to the other discriminatory features which, it is alleged, operate to deny the equal protection of the law, it is sufficient to say that it is now well settled that the State may impose a graduated tax in this class of cases. Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 298. The plaintiffs in error being children of the grantor were assessed at the lowest rate. They are, therefore, not in a position to take advantage of the fact that transfers to collaterals and strangers in blood are, by this act, taxed at a higher rate. The entire statute would not be invalidated
The real estate and tangible property in Texas were not within the taxing jurisdiction of the State of New York, and there was no effort to tax the transfer of that property. St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423, 430; Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 301, 319. It is urged that on the same principle the stocks and bonds could not be taxed because they were in New Jersey in the hands of a trustee holding title and possession, by virtue of a deed made three years before the grantor died.
But the statute does not impose a tax on the property, but on the transfer. The validity of that burden must be determined by the situation as it existed in 1903, when the deed was made. At that time the grantor was a resident of the State of New York. This personal property there had its situs. She there made a transfer, which was taxable, regardless of the residence of the trustee or beneficiary. The fact that the assessment and payment were postponed until the death of the grantor would be a benefit to the remainderman in the many instances in which values decreased. But where the power to tax exists, it is for the State to fix the rate and to say when and how the amount shall be ascertained and paid. The fact that the liability was imposed when the transfer was made in 1903, and that payment was not required until the death of grantor in 1907, does not present any Federal question.