MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
This case rests on the findings and conclusion of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for while on the trial in the Circuit Court testimony in addition to that which was produced before the commission was received, yet the finding of the court was that "from all the evidence heard and adduced on the trial of this cause in this court, the court finds that the said findings of fact by the said Interstate Commerce Commission are supported and justified by the said evidence, and it is ordered that the said findings of fact as above recited and set out be and the same are adopted as the special findings of fact of the court and that the same be set out in the records of this court accordingly."
Nothing was of course added in the Circuit Court of Appeals which merely affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. We
"While the question is perplexing, and while we may not have apprehended all the material points involved, we are strongly of the opinion and find that, taking everything into account, the average additional expense to southern lines in case of reconsigned hay will not exceed that of direct through shipments by more than from $2.00 to $2.50 per car, which is equivalent upon the average loading of hay to about one cent per hundred pounds."
The conclusions so far as material to this controversy are thus stated:
"The stopping of a commodity in transit for the purpose of treatment or reconsignment is in the nature of special privilege which the carrier may concede, but which the shipper cannot, in the present state of the law, demand as a matter of lawful right. Diamond Mills v. Boston & M.R.R. Co., 9 I.C.C. Rep. 311. Carriers may not, however, discriminate between markets nor between individuals in the granting of such privileges. If this right is given to the markets which compete with East St. Louis in this business by these defendants, it should, prima facie, also be granted to that market. If these defendants allow this privilege to the competitors of the complainant at East St. Louis, they should accord it the same privilege.
"The case shows, although not very clearly, that the defendants concede this privilege at other competing markets, and that a track buyer in East St. Louis itself can send along a carload, which he purchases but does not unload, without the payment of this charge. It further shows, however, that the right to unload this hay and handle it at its warehouse is of value to the complainant, and that it costs these defendants something to accord that privilege.
"Under these circumstances, we think it is not an undue preference against this complainant if the railroads charge for the privilege what it actually costs them, but we do not think
It thus appears that the commission was of the opinion that the shipper could not demand as a matter of right the stopping of the hay for the purposes of treatment or reconsignment unless the same privilege was given to other shippers, and that, in granting this privilege, the railway company could only charge the shipper the actual cost. But this privilege involved to the railway company the cost of hauling to and from the warehouses and the use of the car for some hours, perhaps days. The commission found that $2 or $2.50 per car, or approximately one cent per hundred pounds, was the actual cost to the railway company.
We are unable to concur with the commission. If the stopping for inspection and reloading is of some benefit to the shipper and involves some service by and expense to the railway company, we do not think that the latter is limited to the actual cost of that privilege. It is justified in receiving some compensation in addition thereto. A carrier may be under no obligations to furnish sleeping or other accommodations to its passengers, but if it does so it is not limited in its charges to the mere cost, but may rightfully make a reasonable profit out of that which it does furnish. Especially is this true when, as here, the privilege is in no sense a part of the transportation, but outside thereof. Whether the conclusion of the commission that the carrier is under no obligations to permit the interruption of the transit is right, and whether it is or is not under such obligation, it is entitled to receive some compensation beyond the mere cost for that which it does.
The testimony taken before the commission is not preserved in the record, hence it would be impossible, even if proper with all the testimony before us, to fix the amount which would be a fair and reasonable charge. All we can do is to reverse the judgments of the Circuit Court and Circuit Court of Appeals and remand the case to the former court with instructions to send the matter back to the Commerce Commission for further investigation and report.