JELLENIK v. HURON COPPER MINING CO.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

Process was served upon the Huron Copper Mining Company and the other defendants residing in Michigan. Watson, Demmon and Smith, being non-residents, were proceeded against by publication, but they failed to appear. The Company appeared and pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court: 1. That Watson, Demmon and Smith were indispensable parties to the suit, but not inhabitants of the Western District of Michigan, and that no subpoena or process of any kind had been served upon them in the district, nor had they voluntarily appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. 2. That the stock of the Huron Copper Mining Company belonging to the complainants was not personal property within the district.

The plea was sustained and the bill was dismissed without prejudice to the bringing of such further suit by the complainants as they might be advised.

The Circuit Court correctly held that the defendants Watson, Demmon and Smith were necessary parties to the controversy made by the bill. 82 Fed. Rep. 778. But could they not have been brought before the court in the mode and for the limited purposes indicated in the eighth section of the act of March 3, 1875, entitled "An act to determine the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of the United States, and to regulate the removal of cause from State courts and for other purposes," which section provides:

" § 8. That when in any suit, commenced in any Circuit Court of the United States, to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon or claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to real or personal property within the district where such suit is brought, one or more of the defendants therein shall not be an inhabitant of or found within the said district, or shall not voluntarily appear thereto, it shall be lawful for the court to make an order directing such absent defendant or defendants to appear, plead, answer or demur, by a day certain to be designated, which order shall be served on such absent defendant or defendants, if practicable, wherever found, and also upon the person or persons in possession or charge of said property, if any there be; or where such personal service upon such absent defendant or defendants is not practicable, such order shall be published in such manner as the court may direct, not less than once a week for six consecutive weeks; and in case such absent defendant shall not appear, plead, answer or demur within the time so limited, or within some further time, to be allowed by the court, in its discretion, and upon proof of the service or publication of said order, and of the performance of the directions contained in the same, it shall be lawful for the court to entertain jurisdiction, and proceed to the hearing and adjudication of such suit in the same manner as if such absent defendant had been served with process within the said district; but said adjudication shall, as regards said absent defendant or defendants, without appearance, affect only the property which shall have been the subject of the suit and under the jurisdiction of the court therein, within such district. And when a part of the said real or personal property against which such proceeding shall be taken shall be within another district, but within the same State, said suit may be brought in either district in said State; Provided, however, That any defendant or defendants not actually personally notified as above provided may, at any time within one year after final judgment in any suit mentioned in this section, enter his appearance in said suit in said Circuit Court, and thereupon the said court shall make an order setting aside the judgment therein, and permitting said defendant or defendants to plead therein on payment by him or them of such costs as the court shall deem just; and thereupon said suit shall be proceeded with to final judgment according to law." 18 Stat. 470, 472, c. 137.

That section was expressly saved from repeal by the fifth section of the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, 555, c. 373, as corrected by section 5 of the act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, 436, c. 866, and is in full force. Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 131 U.S. 352.

Prior to the passage of the above act of March 3, 1875, the authority of a Circuit Court of the United States to make an order directing a defendant — who was not an inhabitant of nor found within the district and who did not voluntarily appear — to appear, plead, answer or demur, was restricted to suits in equity brought to enforce legal or equitable liens or claims against real or personal property within the district. Rev. Stat. § 738. But that act extended the authority of the court to a suit brought "to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to real or personal property within the district where such suit is brought."

One of the objects of the present suit was to remove an incumbrance or cloud upon the title to certain shares of the stock of a Michigan corporation. No question is made as to the jurisdiction of the court so far as it rests upon the diverse citizenship of the parties. The plaintiffs alleged that they were the equitable owners of that stock, although the legal title was in certain of the defendants. The relief asked was a decree establishing their rightful title and ownership; and in order that such a decree might be obtained the defendants referred to were ordered to appear, plead, answer or demur; but as they refused to do so, the Circuit Court decided that it could not proceed further. That court was of opinion that "the shares of stock in question are not personal property within the district within the purview of the statute of the United States authorizing the bringing in by publication of notice to nonresident defendants who assert some right or claim to the property which is the subject of suit." 82 Fed. Rep. 778, 779. The proper forum, the court said, for the litigation of the question involved would be in the State of which the defendants were citizens.

The question to be determined on this appeal is, whether the stock in question is personal property within the district in which the suit was brought. If it is, then the case is embraced by the act of 1875, c. 137, and the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the bill.

By the statutes of Michigan providing for the incorporation of companies for mining, smelting and manufacturing iron, copper, silver, coal and other ores or minerals, it is provided: "The stock of every such corporation shall be deemed personal property, and shall be transferred only on the books of the company in such form as the by-laws direct or as the directors shall prescribe; and such corporation shall at all times have a lien upon the stock of its members for all the debts due from them to such corporation." By the same statutes it is provided: "It shall be lawful for any corporation formed under the provisions of this act to conduct its mining and manufacturing business in whole or in part at any place or places in the United States (or any foreign country); and any such corporation shall be subject to the laws of this State in regard to corporations, so far as the same shall be applicable to corporations formed under this act." "It shall be lawful for any company associating under this act to provide in the articles of association for having the business office of such company out of this State, and to hold any meeting of the stockholders or board of directors of such company at such office so provided for; but every such Company having its business office out of this State shall have an office for the transaction of business within this State, to be also designated in such articles of association." c. 266. "Any share or interest of a stockholder in any bank, insurance company, or any other joint stock company that is or may be incorporated under the authority of, or authorized to be created by any law of this State, may be taken in execution and sold in the following manner: The officer shall leave a copy of the execution certified by him with the clerk, treasurer or cashier of the company, if there be any such officer, and if not, then with any officer or person who has, at the time, the custody of the books and papers of the corporation; and the property shall be considered seized on execution when such copy is left." "If the shares or interest of the judgment debtor shall have been attached in the suit in which the execution issued, the purchaser shall be entitled to all the dividends which shall have accrued after the levying of the attachment." c. 275. "In attaching real estate or any right or interest in land, it shall not be necessary that the officer should enter upon the land or be within view of it; and in attaching shares of stock, or the interest of a stockholder in any corporation organized under the laws of this State, the levy shall be made in the manner provided by law for the seizure of such property on execution." 1 and 2 Howells' Anno. Stat. Michigan, (1882) §§ 4094, 4097, 4105, 7697, 7698, 7701, 7993; 2 Compiled Laws, Mich. 1897, pp. 2197, 2200; 3 Ib. 3131-2, 3187.

These provisions make it clear that by the law of Michigan the shares of stock in the defendant Company are to be deemed personal property, transferable on the books of the Company; and that the share or interest of a stockholder may be taken in execution or reached by attachment, a copy of the execution or attachment being left by the officer with the clerk, treasurer or cashier of the Company. The authority of the State to establish such regulations in reference to the stock of a corporation organized and existing under its laws cannot be doubted. We need not discuss, in the light of the authorities, whether the shares of stock in the defendant Company may not be accurately described as chattels or choses in action, or property in the nature of choses in action. Chief Justice Shaw, in Hutchins v. State Bank, 12 Met. 421, 426, said: "If a share in a bank is not a chose in action, it is in the nature of a chose in action, and what is more to the purpose, it is personal property." The Court of Appeals of New York, speaking by Judge Comstock, held certificates of stock to be simply muniments and evidence of the holder's title to a certain number of shares in the property and franchises of the corporation of which he is a member. Mechanics Bank v. New York & New Haven Railroad, 3 Kernan, 627; Angell & Ames on Corp. § 560. It is sufficient for this case to say that the State under whose laws the Company came into existence has declared, as it lawfully might, that such stock is to be deemed personal property. That is a rule which the Circuit Court of the United States sitting in Michigan should enforce as part of the law of the State in respect of corporations created by it. The stock held by the defendants residing outside of Michigan who refused to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court being regarded as personal property, the act of 1875 must be held to embrace the present case, if the stock in question is "within the district" in which the suit was brought. Whether the stock is in Michigan so as to authorize that State to subject it to taxation as against individual shareholders domiciled in another State, is a question not presented in this case, and we express no opinion upon it. But we are of opinion that it is within Michigan for the purposes of a suit brought there against the Company — such shareholders being made parties to the suit — to determine whether the stock is rightfully held by them. The certificates are only evidence of the ownership of the shares, and the interest represented by the shares is held by the Company for the benefit of the true owner. As the habitation or domicil of the Company is and must be in the State that created it, the property represented by its certificates of stock may be deemed to be held by the Company within the State whose creature it is, whenever it is sought by suit to determine who is its real owner. This principle is not affected by the fact that the defendant is authorized by the laws of Michigan to have an office in another State, at which a book showing the transfers of stock may be kept.

It is suggested that the requirement in the act of 1875 that a copy of the order of publication "shall be served on such absent defendant or defendants, if practicable, wherever found, and also upon the person or persons in possession or charge of said property, if any there be," is inapplicable here, because no one in Michigan is alleged in the bill to have possession of the shares in question. But the bill does show that the property represented by the certificates of shares is held by a Michigan corporation which being subject personally to the jurisdiction of the court may be required by a final decree in a suit brought under the act of March 3, 1875 to cancel such certificates held by persons outside of the State and regard the plaintiffs as the real owners of the property interest represented by them.

It is also contended that the words in the act of 1875, "when a part of said property shall be within another district but within the same State, said suit may be brought in either district in said State," indicate that the act had reference only to tangible personal property capable of being located in more than one district. This would be too narrow an interpretation of the statute. No reason can be suggested why suits involving the title to shares of the stock of a corporation or company should have been excluded from the operation of the statute. On the contrary, the statute contemplated that there might be cases involving the title to personal property not in the actual manual possession of some person; for the direction is that the order of the court be served upon the person or persons in possession or charge of the property, "if any there be." The corporation being brought into court by personal service of process in Michigan, and a copy of the order of court being served upon the defendants charged with wrongfully holding certificates of the stock in question, every interest involved in the issue as to the real ownership of the stock will be represented before the court. We think the Circuit Court may rightfully proceed under the act of 1875, for the purpose of determining such ownership, and that in dismissing the bill error was committed.

The decree is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions for such further proceedings as are consistent with this opinion and with law.

MR. JUSTICE BROWN and MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS did not participate in the decision of this case.