ACE AMERICAN INS. CO. v. KEYSTONE CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC.
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
September 27, 2012.
A. Sprague's Motion to Dismiss
Sprague, the seller of natural gas, has filed a motion to dismiss Count Seven of the Third Amended Complaint, which alleges that Sprague is liable under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572m, Connecticut's product liability statute, and Count Eight of the Third Amended Complaint, which alleges that Sprague's conduct was reckless, wanton, and/or willful.
Under the Connecticut Product Liability Act, "[a] product seller may be subject to liability for harm caused to a claimant who proves by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the product was defective in that adequate warnings or instructions were not provided." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572q(a). Sprague argues that Kleen's product liability claim must fail because, among other things, Sprague did not sell the natural gas that was used at the time of the Kleen Plant explosion.
Sprague acknowledges that Kleen bought natural gas from it on January 26, 2010, and that that gas was delivered on January 30, 2010 through the Algonquin/Spectra pipeline. Sprague claims, however, that Kleen did not use all of the natural gas delivered on January 30, and that Kleen had to sell back to Algonquin/Spectra any gas it had not used on January 30, so that it would begin February 2010 with a zero balance. Sprague also claims that it did not nominate, deliver, or sell natural gas to Kleen for the February 7, 2010, gas blow.
According to the plaintiffs, the natural gas used in the February 7, 2010 gas blow was not sold to Kleen by any gas supplier in advance of the gas blow. Instead, the plaintiffs say that Kleen took the gas it needed out of the Algonquin/Spectra line. The plaintiffs state that Kleen then, in late February, bought gas from Sprague to replace the gas it had used out of the Algonquin/Spectra line. Consequently, the plaintiffs argue, Kleen paid Sprague, not any other supplier, for the gas used at the time of the explosion.
Under the plaintiffs' theory, then, Sprague is liable to Kleen for a failure to warn, even though, even under the plaintiffs' version of the facts, Sprague did not "sell" Kleen the gas used for the blow until late February. The plaintiffs argue that the liability arises because Sprague did know that the gas it sold Kleen in January would be used for the January 30 gas blow. Although the January 30 blow occurred without incident, the plaintiffs argue that Sprague had a continuing duty to warn of product defects even after the sale had been completed.
The plaintiffs are correct that sellers have a continuing duty to warn. Densberger v. United Tech. Corp., 125 F.Supp.2d 585 (D. Conn. 2000). Where the plaintiffs err is in treating the January and February gas sales as one continuous sale. In actuality, it is clear from even the plaintiffs' version of events that there were two separate sales. The plaintiffs acknowledged at oral argument that if any other company had provided the gas used in the February blow, that company would not be liable. That is because the gas was technically not "sold" until after the explosion occurred, and thus there can have been no duty to warn that arose prior to the explosion unless there was a continuing duty to warn. The plaintiffs also acknowledged that there is no case law that supports their argument that a continuing duty to warn can carry over to a subsequent sale. Sprague could not have warned Kleen that the February 7 gas should not be used for a gas blow, because the February 7 sale was not completed until after the explosion occurred. Therefore, Sprague's motion to dismiss the failure to warn claim is granted. Because Sprague is not liable for failure to warn, its failure to warn could not have risen to the level of wanton or reckless, and the motion to dismiss the recklessness claim is also granted.
1. Unless otherwise noted, all background information is taken from the Third Amended Complaint.
2. Although the plaintiffs made similar allegations with regard to Algonquin, at the motion hearing the plaintiffs admitted that they had no reason to believe Algonquin was involved in developing gas blow protocols.
3. In response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs provided the court with an affidavit describing Spectra's involvement in the gas blows. I am unable to consider that additional material at the motion to dismiss stage.
4. Plaintiffs' various builder's risk insurance policies follow the form of a single lead policy issued by Ace American Insurance Company. Unless otherwise noted, the term "insurance policy" refers to Kleen's insurance agreements with the plaintiffs.
5. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cite Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Abco Refrigeration Supply Corp., 48 Conn.Sup. 301 (2003). Stop & Shop was also a subrogation action, in which the defendant claimed to be an additional insured. The contract in that case stated that "Unless otherwise provided, the Owner shall purchase and maintain . . . property insurance upon the entire Work at the site to the full insurable value thereof. This insurance shall be on an all-risk policy form and shall include interests of the Owner, the Contractor, Subcontractors, and Sub-subcontractors in the Work and shall insure against the perils of fire." Id. at 305. The Court concluded that the defendant was not an "additional insured" under that agreement because "[w]hen Stop & Shop wanted to designate others as additional insureds, it did so." Id. at 311. I believe there is more evidence in this case that the subcontractors were actual insureds under the contract, including the fact that the Contractor was considered a fiduciary for the "insureds," including the subcontractors.
6. Perhaps the least convincing of Bluewater's arguments is that the contract should be read in the subcontractors' favor because the contract is ambiguous. "`As with contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading. . . . Under those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms of an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the insured because the insurance company drafted the policy.'" Johnson v. Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 302 Conn. 639, 640 (2011) (quoting Conn. Med. Ins. Co. v. Kulikowski, 286 Conn. 1, 5-6 (2008)). The ambiguity here stems not from the insurance agreement, however, but the contract between Kleen and O&G. There is no indication that Kleen alone drafted the contract, and thus the usual rule regarding ambiguity in insurance agreements does not apply here.