ACE AMERICAN INS. CO. v. KEYSTONE CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC.
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
September 27, 2012.
The plaintiffs in this case are Kleen's insurers, who paid approximately $200,000,000 to Kleen following the explosion. The insurance claims were for property damage and delays resulting from the explosion. The plaintiffs bring this lawsuit as subrogees of Kleen.
II. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is designed "merely to assess the legal feasibility of a complaint, not to assay the weight of evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980)). When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, and decide whether it is plausible that plaintiffs have a valid claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). Under Twombly, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 550 U.S. at 555, 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations."). The plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal obligates the plaintiffs to "provide the grounds of [their] entitlement to relief" through more than "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks omitted). Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claims] is improbable, and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556 (quotation marks omitted).
III. Discussion
There are three categories of claims covered by the motions to dismiss: (1) motions by the sellers of natural gas, (2) motions by the transporters of natural gas, and (3) motions by the subcontractors who designed the gas blow operation. Also pending are a motion to strike an answer, and a motion to file a third-party complaint.
1. Unless otherwise noted, all background information is taken from the Third Amended Complaint.
2. Although the plaintiffs made similar allegations with regard to Algonquin, at the motion hearing the plaintiffs admitted that they had no reason to believe Algonquin was involved in developing gas blow protocols.
3. In response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs provided the court with an affidavit describing Spectra's involvement in the gas blows. I am unable to consider that additional material at the motion to dismiss stage.
4. Plaintiffs' various builder's risk insurance policies follow the form of a single lead policy issued by Ace American Insurance Company. Unless otherwise noted, the term "insurance policy" refers to Kleen's insurance agreements with the plaintiffs.
5. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cite Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Abco Refrigeration Supply Corp., 48 Conn.Sup. 301 (2003). Stop & Shop was also a subrogation action, in which the defendant claimed to be an additional insured. The contract in that case stated that "Unless otherwise provided, the Owner shall purchase and maintain . . . property insurance upon the entire Work at the site to the full insurable value thereof. This insurance shall be on an all-risk policy form and shall include interests of the Owner, the Contractor, Subcontractors, and Sub-subcontractors in the Work and shall insure against the perils of fire." Id. at 305. The Court concluded that the defendant was not an "additional insured" under that agreement because "[w]hen Stop & Shop wanted to designate others as additional insureds, it did so." Id. at 311. I believe there is more evidence in this case that the subcontractors were actual insureds under the contract, including the fact that the Contractor was considered a fiduciary for the "insureds," including the subcontractors.
6. Perhaps the least convincing of Bluewater's arguments is that the contract should be read in the subcontractors' favor because the contract is ambiguous. "`As with contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading. . . . Under those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms of an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the insured because the insurance company drafted the policy.'" Johnson v. Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 302 Conn. 639, 640 (2011) (quoting Conn. Med. Ins. Co. v. Kulikowski, 286 Conn. 1, 5-6 (2008)). The ambiguity here stems not from the insurance agreement, however, but the contract between Kleen and O&G. There is no indication that Kleen alone drafted the contract, and thus the usual rule regarding ambiguity in insurance agreements does not apply here.