|
|
WILKINS v. GADDY
130 S.Ct. 1175 (2010)
Jamey L. WILKINS, Petitioner,
v.
Officer GADDY.
No. 08-10914.
Supreme Court of United States.
February 22, 2010.
In Hudson v. McMillian,503 U.S. 1, 4, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992), this Court held that "the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury." In this case, the District
Court dismissed a prisoner's excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his injuries were "de minimis." Because the District Court's approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds with Hudson's direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed. IIn March 2008, petitioner Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilkins' pro se complaint alleged that, on June 13, 2007, he was "maliciously and sadistically" assaulted "[w]ithout any provocation" by a corrections officer, respondent Gaddy.1 App. to Pet. for Cert. C-4. According to the complaint, Gaddy, apparently angered by Wilkins' request for a grievance form, "snatched [Wilkins] off the ground and slammed him onto the concrete floor." Ibid. Gaddy "then proceeded to punch, kick, knee and choke [Wilkins] until another officer had to physically remove him from [Wilkins]." Ibid. Wilkins further alleged that, "[a]s a result of the excessive force used by [Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical injuries including a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness" and "psychological trauma and mental anguish including depression, panic attacks and nightmares of the assault." Ibid. The District Court, on its own motion and without a response from Gaddy, dismissed Wilkins' complaint for failure to state a claim. Citing Circuit precedent, the court stated that, "[i]n order to state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that he received more than a de minimus [sic] injury." No. 3:08-cv-00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), pp. 1, 2 (citing Taylor v. McDuffie,155 F.3d 479, 483 (C.A.4 1998); Riley v. Dorton,115 F.3d 1159, 1166 (C.A.4 1997) (en banc); footnote omitted). According to the court, Wilkins' alleged injuries were no more severe than those deemed de minimis in the Circuit's Taylor and Riley decisions. Indeed, the court noted, Wilkins nowhere asserted that his injuries had required medical attention. In a motion for reconsideration, Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prejudice his claim. He asserted that he had been prescribed, and continued to take, medication for his headaches and back pain, as well as for depression. And he attached medical records purporting to corroborate his injuries and course of treatment. Describing reconsideration as "an extraordinary remedy," the court declined to revisit its previous ruling. No. 3:08-cv-00138 (WD NC, Aug. 25, 2008), p. 1. The medical records, the court observed, indicated that some of Wilkins' alleged injuries "were pre-existing conditions." Id., at 3. Wilkins had sought treatment for high blood pressure and mental health issues even before the assault. The court acknowledged that Wilkins received an X ray after the incident "to examine his `bruised heel,'" but it "note[d] that bruising is generally considered a de minimus [sic] injury." Id., at 4. The court similarly characterized as de minimis Wilkins' complaints of back pain and headaches. The court denied Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. In a summary disposition, the Court of Appeals affirmed "for the reasons
stated by the district court." No. 08-7881 (CA4, Jan. 23, 2009).
1. The materials in the record do not disclose Gaddy's full name. 2. Most Circuits to consider the issue have rejected the Fourth Circuit's de minimis injury requirement. See, e.g., Wright v. Goord,554 F.3d 255, 269-270 (C.A.2 2009) ("[O]ur Court has reversed summary dismissals of Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force even where the plaintiff's evidence of injury was slight. . . . [T]he absence of any significant injury to [the plaintiff] does not end the Eighth Amendment inquiry, for our standards of decency are violated even in the absence of such injury if the defendant's use of force was malicious or sadistic"); Smith v. Mensinger,293 F.3d 641, 648-649 (3d Cir.2002) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries. . . . [D]e minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force"); Oliver v. Keller,289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir.2002) (rejecting the view "that to support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis physical injury" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. LaVallee,439 F.3d 670, 687 (10th Cir.2006) (same).
The Fifth Circuit has sometimes used language indicating agreement with the Fourth Circuit's approach. See, e.g., Gomez v. Chandler,163 F.3d 921, 924 (1999) ("[T]o support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis injury"). But see Brown v. Lippard,472 F.3d 384, 386 (2006) ("This Court has never directly held that injuries must reach beyond some arbitrary threshold to satisfy an excessive force claim"). Even in the Fifth Circuit, however, Wilkins likely would have survived dismissal for failure to state a claim because that court's precedents have classified the sort of injuries alleged here as non-de minimis. See, e.g., ibid. (permitting a prisoner's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to proceed to trial where evidence indicated that the prisoner suffered "one-centimeter abrasions on both his left knee and left shoulder, pain in his right knee, and tenderness around his left thumb," as well as "back problems"); Gomez, 163 F.3d, at 922 (refusing to grant summary judgment on de minimis injury grounds where the prisoner alleged "physical pain [and] bodily injuries in the form of cuts, scrapes, [and] contusions to the face, head, and body").
|
|