YOUNG v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
PEGGY YOUNG
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
Civil Action No. DKC 08-2586.
United States District Court, D. Maryland.
August 9, 2011.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONDeBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination matter is a motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 101) filed by Plaintiff Peggy Young. Because the issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary, the court now rules. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the motion for reconsideration will be denied.1 Plaintiff Peggy Young first filed this suit on October 3, 2008. Later that month, Young amended her complaint to assert claims against only Defendants United Parcel Service of America, Inc.3 and United Parcel Service, Inc. ("UPS"). (ECF No. 4). The amended complaint alleged violations of Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and Section 1981. The claims largely concerned the treatment she allegedly received from UPS during the course of her pregnancy in late 2006 and early 2007.4 On July 31, 2010, UPS moved for summary judgment on all counts of the amended complaint. (ECF No. 60). After full briefing from the parties, including briefing that exceeded the standard page limits, UPS's motion was granted on February 14, 2011. (ECF Nos. 99, 100). Young moved on February 23, 2011 for partial reconsideration of that summary judgment order, contending that the earlier decision did not address one aspect of her ADA claim. (ECF No. 101). UPS opposed shortly thereafter; Young has also filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 104, 109).
II. Analysis
1. Young has also moved for leave to file a surreply to UPS's bill of costs. (ECF No. 111). The motion will be granted.
2. The background of this case is discussed at greater length in the court's earlier memorandum opinion on summary judgment. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *1-7 (D.Md. Feb. 14, 2011), ECF No. 99.
3. By stipulation of the parties, Defendant UPS of America, Inc. was dismissed on December 17, 2008. (ECF No. 14).
4. Young attempted to file a second amended complaint in June 2009 that, among other things, tried to add a new disparate impact claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Young contended that claim had already been pled in the first amended complaint. (ECF No. 30, at 6). The court disagreed and refused to allow her to add the new claim. (ECF No. 43, at 15).
5. The complaint is little help, as Young does not separate out the various claims therein. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2010 WL 1346423, at *6 (D.Md. Mar. 30, 2010) ("Plaintiff's complaint is not a model of clarity. . . . Plaintiff's first amended complaint . . . is not divided into separate counts or claims.").
6. Although Young argues that this is direct evidence, this argument is more appropriately considered a pretext argument that goes to the alleged falsity of UPS's proffered non-discriminatory reasons.
7. It seems legitimate for UPS to read the letter from Young's midwife as a "restriction," notwithstanding Young's hyper-semantic distinction between "recommendation" and "restriction."
8. E441 presented a doctor's note stating she was unable to work from September 27, 2004 to October 4, 2004, but there is no indication — and Young does not argue — that UPS disregarded that note and allowed the employee to work during that period.