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HAZLETON v. TRINIDAD
ANA MARIA HAZLETON, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FERNANDO TRINIDAD, individually and in his official capacity, FRANK SIKOS, individually and in his official capacity, EDWARD ALBINO, individually and in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellants.
No. 11-15418, Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
July 26, 2012.
Before MARTIN, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
DO NOT PUBLISHPER CURIAM. Defendants Fernando Trinidad, Frank Sikos, and Edward Albino (together, "the officers"), officers for the Orlando Police Department, appeal the denial of their motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. After careful review, we affirm. On December 28, 2009, Ana Marie Hazleton brought suit in state court under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging that the officers committed various civil rights violations and common law torts while arresting her in her home without first securing a warrant.1 After the case was removed to federal court, the officers moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court granted the officers' motions in part and denied them in part. While the district court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for Hazleton's claims related to the officers' entry into her garage, the court also decided that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity as to Hazleton's claims of unlawful arrest and seizure. According to the district court, the evidence as construed at summary judgment established that the officers had probable cause to arrest Hazleton for the misdemeanor offense of resisting an officer without violence, see Fla. Stat. § 843.02, but did not establish that there were exigent circumstances that would justify the warrantless entry into Hazleton's home. Following from the determination that Hazleton's arrest was unlawful, the district court also concluded that the force used by the officers in effectuating that arrest was excessive. On appeal, the officers argue that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity, both because exigent circumstances existed to justify their pursuit of Hazleton into her residence and because the force used by the officers in arresting Hazleton was "minimal and reasonable," not excessive. We review de novo a district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004).
1. The district court's order summarized the evidence in the summary judgment record, so we will not recite that evidence here. Instead, we will refer to specific facts as necessary for our analysis.
2. The officers do not argue that other factors contributing to exigent circumstances, such as "danger of flight or escape; danger of harm to police officers or the general public; [or] risk of loss, destruction, removal, or concealment of evidence," were present when they arrested Hazleton. United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 669 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
3. The Supreme Court has since relied on that holding to distinguish Welsh from situations in which exigent circumstances were found to exist. See Brigham City, UT v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1949 (2006) (noting that, in Welsh, "the `only potential emergency' confronting the officers was the need to preserve evidence (i.e., the suspect's blood alcohol level)").
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