DUVALL v. DALLAS COUNTY TEXAS
MARK DUVALL, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant,
v.
DALLAS COUNTY TEXAS, Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee.
No. 09-10660.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Filed: January 13, 2011.
Before: DAVIS, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-Appellee Mark Duvall brought this action against Defendant-Appellant Dallas County ("the County") for personal injuries stemming from an infection that he contracted while incarcerated in the County's jail ("the Jail"). At the conclusion of a jury trial, Duvall prevailed, and the County appealed. We affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGSDuvall was a pre-trial detainee in the Jail from December 11 to December 26, 2003. During his stay in the prison, Duvall contracted Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus ("MRSA"), a staph infection resistant to usual penicillin-type antibiotics. Duvall's physical suffering was great, and he eventually lost the use of one of his eyes. In his § 1983 complaint, Duvall claimed that the County had deprived him of his right to due process by subjecting him to an unconstitutional condition of confinement. After the jury found for Duvall, the County timely filed a notice of appeal. The County contends that (1) the district court's jury instructions and its denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law were erroneous because the district court relied on the wrong standard, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that Duvall suffered a constitutional violation from his "condition of confinement," and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the County had, with deliberate indifference, maintained a pattern or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation that Duvall suffered. Duvall filed a protective cross appeal in which he asserts that a Monell inquiry is not required in a "conditions of confinement" case. We affirm.
II. ANALYSISA. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review jury instructions for abuse of discretion.1 We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo2 and will overturn the jury verdict only if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [Duvall]."3 We review the record and all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.4
1. Dreiling v. Gen. Elec. Co.,511 F.2d 768, 774 (5th Cir. 1975). 2. Thomas v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice,220 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2000). 3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
4. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 392.
6. Id. at 539.
8. See id. at 644.
9. Id.
10. Scott v. Moore,114 F.3d 51, 54 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 11. Hare, 74 F.3d at 645.
12. Id. at 644.
13. Shepherd v. Dallas County,591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009), quoting Hare, 74 F.3d at 645. 14. Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 454.
16. Hare, 74 F.3d at 645.
17. Bradshaw v. Freightliner Corp.,937 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 18. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of New York,436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 19. In Shepherd, a recent appeal involving "conditions of confinement," we did not require the plaintiff to make a showing of deliberate indifference under Monell, presumably because it is unnecessary in "conditions of confinement" cases.
20. See Brumfield v. Hollins,551 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2008).