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GORLACH v. SPORTS CLUB CO.
209 Cal.App.4th 1497 (2012)
148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71
SUSAN GORLACH, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
THE SPORTS CLUB COMPANY et al., Defendants and Appellants.
No. B233672.
Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Four.
October 16, 2012.
OPINIONSUZUKAWA, J. — Defendants The Sports Club Company and five of its officers appeal an order denying a motion to compel arbitration.1 We conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion to compel, and thus we affirm. STATEMENT OF FACTSSusan Gorlach is the former human resources director for Sports Club. She resigned her position on August 6, 2010.
Prior to 2010, there were no arbitration agreements between Sports Club and its employees (or "team members"). In 2010, Sports Club revised its "Team Member Handbook" (handbook) to include an arbitration agreement. The revisions relevant to this appeal are as follows:(1) On page 31, the handbook states: "As a condition to employment, all Team Members must sign the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims found in Appendix 4."
1. Throughout this opinion, we use "Sports Club" interchangeably to refer both to the company and to the six defendants.
2. The Sports Club officers named as defendants are chief executive officer Rex Licklider, president Nanette Francini, chief operating officer April Morgan, vice-president of sales Phillip Kasdorf, and founder and manager Michael Talla.
3. The three cases on which Sports Club relies are distinguishable from the present case because in each of those cases, there was evidence of detrimental reliance. (See Gleed v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 213 [150 P.2d 484] [insurer's acceptance of late premiums for six years estopped the insurer from claiming that the insured had defaulted by making a final late payment]; Benner v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 346, 350 [159 P.2d 24] ["the employer and its insurance carrier cannot escape the consequences of their acts or conduct affirmatively engaged in to procure delay for purposes of settlement, or investigation or otherwise, upon which the employee has relied and by which he has been induced to delay the filing of a claim until after the expiration of the statutory period"]; Lorenson v. City of Los Angeles (1953) 41 Cal.2d 334, 340 [260 P.2d 49] ["Under all of those circumstances the city is properly held estopped to repudiate its own acts and declarations to its own monetary advantage and at the expense of the employee who was concededly illegally deprived of his salary."].)
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